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Institutional Decolonization: The Internationalization of the Conflict Over
Organized Labor in British Guiana, 1946-1961
Abstract
This dissertation argues that an internationalized struggle for control of British Guiana’s trade
unions after 1946 resulted in institutional dysfunction and violence in the early 1960s. Some
Guianese nationalists, who eventually became leaders of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP),
wanted to replace the institutions imported from Great Britain with trade unionism geared
towards a Guianese version of communism. Conversely, reformist Guianese labor leaders were
intent on establishing a left-leaning capitalist framework of labor relations, primarily based on a
British model of unionism. Guianese unionists’ ideological proclivities shaped their international
affiliations, adding a transnational dimension to the struggle between the colony’s nationalist
leaders. Thus, this dissertation argues that key British, American, and Eastern-bloc trade union
connections were established in the colony in the late 1940s, well before the violent conclusion
to Guianese decolonization.
Meanwhile, economic weakness, international pressure, and strategic calculations, convinced
British policymakers to allow self-government in the colonies after assuring the territories were
integrated into a British-led capitalist system. United States policymakers turned their attention
to British Guiana when it became evident that the PPP represented a threat to break the colony’s
connections with the West and undermine American hegemony at the height of the Cold War.
Thus, this dissertation analyzes decolonization and the Cold War through a single analytical
frame, arguing that the two dynamics were mutually reinforcing.
In response to the PPP’s pursuit of social revolution, the Colonial Office engaged in institutionbuilding projects to preserve pro-British capitalism in the colony. Simultaneously, American
trade unionists and policymakers pursued institution-building to replace British influence and
design Guiana’s post-colonial labor relations based on American trade union practices. This
dissertation demonstrates that British trade unionists deferred to American labor leaders in
British Guiana after 1960, and argues that the colony’s transition into the American sphere of
influence among non-governmental actors preceded the end of formal British rule in the colony.
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Institutional Decolonization as a Prism for Understanding
International Relations
“In most countries, the progressive trade union movement is the backbone of the national
liberation struggle. Trade unions, by the very nature of their organization and activities must, of
necessity, be part of the struggle for self-rule and freedom from foreign control.” Janet Jagan,
19591
“Once the crucial phase of the liberation struggle begins to take shape, a group of indigenous
union leaders decides to create a national labor movement. The locals desert en masse the
previous organization imported from the metropolis. The formation of this union is another way
for the urban population to exert pressure on the colonial authorities…The national labor unions
born out of the liberation struggle are…above all political and nationalist.” Frantz Fanon, The
Wretched of the Earth2
The Cold War and Decolonization
Throughout the twentieth century the system of international relations underwent
extensive transformations. Competition between world powers, and the impact of
industrialization, culminated in two massive world wars from 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945. In
part as a consequence of those conflagrations, the distribution of global power shifted away from
European empires toward the United States and the Soviet Union, and ambiguously toward
European colonies.3 American and Soviet policymakers opposed the perpetuation of colonial
systems for ideological and strategic reasons; however, the two nations’ leaders had
irreconcilable ideas of how the modern industrial world should be restructured.4 Colonial leaders

1

Janet Jagan, “To Working People of Guiana: Join the Struggle for Self-Rule,” Thunder, May 2, 1959, Cheddi
Jagan Research Center (hereafter: CJRC).
2
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 73 (originally published in 1961).
3
Nigel Bolland offers a concise explanation of World War II’s impact on the British Empire. See: O. Nigel Bolland,
The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism and Democracy in the
Labour Movement (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), 381-383. See also: John Darwin, “Diplomacy and
Decolonization,” in, Kent Fedorowich and Martin Thomas, eds., International Diplomacy and Colonial Retreat
(London: Frank Cass, 2001), 13-18; William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the
Decolonization of the British Empire 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
4
Ideology: Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977); Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1987); Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation
Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); John Fousek, To Lead
the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of

1

often pursued engagement with the superpowers based on the type of economic and social model
they thought would best apply to their newly independent countries. As a result, the Cold War
rivals courted colonial leaders, and frequently intervened in decolonizing areas, to expand
capitalist or communist systems. The Cold War and decolonization were mutually constitutive
expressions of the larger changes in international relationships.
In the British Guiana, the Political Affairs Committee (PAC), which became the People’s
Progressive Party (PPP) in 1950, attempted to break from the American-led capitalist system.
PAC and PPP leaders attempted to establish Guianese socialism as a means of addressing the
colony’s severe poverty, and their efforts included establishing ties to socialist countries in the
Eastern-bloc.5 At the same time, opponents of the PAC/PPP exploited connections to British and
American labor leaders to oppose the social revolution and institutionalize capitalism and
connections to Great Britain and the United States. The combination of internal debates over the
structure of society and appeals to Cold War rivals initiated a Cold War conflict in the colony.
American and British labor and political leaders were influenced by Cold War ideology and
appealed to it; however, at a basic level their opposition to the PAC/PPP was rooted in a desire to
integrate the Guiana into the Western system prior to its independence.6 This is particularly
evident at the institutional level when examining the conflicts between trade unionists in Guiana,
Great Britain, and the United States; and it helps to explain why non-state actors played the most
important role in British Guiana. The Guianese experience also sheds light on the early Cold War

North Carolina Press, 2000); Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999). Geo-strategic concerns: John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold
War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the
Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
5
Jan Koura and Robert Waters, “Cheddi Jagan and Guianese Overtures to the East: Evidence from the Czech
National Archives,” Cold War International History Project, e-Dossier No. 54, Wilson Center, 2015.
6
Though as will be explained in chapter three, British and American policymakers disagreed strongly on which
nation’s institutional values should shape the Western capitalist system.
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in that it suggests British colonists engaged in a conflict of ideologies before the Cold War
began.
The Cold War centered on United States officials’ attempt to build and integrate capitalist
democracies into an American-led system and Soviet leaders’ advocacy for development based
on Soviet-styled communism in conjunction with increased Russian influence. 7 Importantly,
scholars note that American and Soviet policymakers feared that the expansion of their rivals’
political-economic ideology would manifest in a loss of relative power and represent an
existential threat to their own survival.8 European empires faced domestic constraints, economic
weakness, nationalist movements in colonial territories, and international pressures from state as
well as non-state actors that further eroded their ability and, at times, desire to reassert control
over colonial territories.9 Post-1945 international relations can be understood to a great extent as
a period of adjustment in the international structure that Matthew Connelly refers to as a
7

Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the
Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire:
America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1:
Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union
in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Kathryn C.
Statler and Andrew L. Johns, eds., The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the
Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006).
8
Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2001).
9
The desire to retain empire varied with time and place; however, the broad reappraisal of colonial policy after
World War II trended toward decentralization of formal colonial control and eventually toward decolonization.
While not an exhaustive list, the following works are most useful in overviewing decolonization’s central themes.
For a more complete list, see Bibliography. Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for
Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Darwin,
“Decolonization and the End of Empire,” in Robin Winks and William Roger Louis, The Oxford History of the
British Empire, Vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of
the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Cary Fraser,
Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-1964
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation
1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The
Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Spencer Mawby, Ordering
Independence: The End of Empire in the Anglophone Caribbean, 1947-1969 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012); Jason Parker, Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

3

“simultaneous fragmentation and integration of the world community.” Importantly, Connelly
and Jason Parker demonstrate that the Cold War involved a critical North-South conflict in
which actors in the developing world exerted disproportionate influence through nongovernmental organizations.10 That international reorientation was complicated by ideological
and national rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union for dominance in the revised
system.
British Guiana’s Significance in the Post-War Period
Guyana is a small country located between Venezuela, Brazil, and Suriname on the
Caribbean coast of South America. Territorially Guyana is slightly smaller than Idaho, has a
population of around 735,000, and as of 2014 is among the poorest countries in the hemisphere
with a per capita GDP marginally higher than Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras.11 The area that
became Guyana when it gained independence from Great Britain in 1966 was previously known
as British Guiana beginning in 1815 when the British formally assumed control of the colony
after defeating the Dutch in the Napoleonic Wars.12
At first glance, British Guiana appears to scholars of United States foreign relations as
merely another example of American intervention, an interesting and temporary sideshow for
global superpowers during the Cold War. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. The
progression toward self-government in British Guiana was not as violent as decolonization in
Kenya, India, or Vietnam and as a result it has received much less attention from scholars.13

10

Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 10. Parker, Brother’s Keeper.
CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/llibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gy.html
12
Stephen G. Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2005), 15.
13
In particular, it is noteworthy that there is a considerable amount of scholarship on British Guiana that addresses
the colony as part of broader studies of decolonization or American intervention. Placing the Guianese experience in
a comparative context allows scholars to illuminate important general concepts; however, these works are inherently
limited in their ability to closely analyze the process of decolonization in the colony. See: Sara Abraham, Labour
and the Multiracial Project in the Caribbean: Its History and Its Promise (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
11

4

Nonetheless, Guiana played a key role in shaping the post-war world. It was the largest British
colony in the Caribbean where there was a strong possibility that self-determination would have
led to social revolution and close association with the Eastern-bloc.14
In British Guiana the PAC represented the earliest, most consistent attempt at peaceful
social revolution within the British Empire. PAC and PPP leaders attempted to move toward a
Marxist-Leninist development model and established connections with the Eastern bloc to
address the extreme poverty that had long plagued the colony’s people. The PAC/PPP met
constant resistance from reformist Guianese leaders wary of Marxism-Leninism, beginning with
the PAC’s founding in 1946. At the same time, British and American political and labor leaders
and Western international trade unionists responded to the PPP with political intervention and
the first attempt at full-scale post-war institution-building. The political, social, and physical
conflicts that rocked the colony between 1946 and 1965, and the appeals of competing Guianese
labor leaders to both sides of the Cold War divide, evidence an important connection between the
Cold War and decolonization. The Guianese experience also provides a clear example of the
significant influence of non-state actors on post-1945 international relations.
The British Empire slowly receded in the Caribbean beginning in the late 1930s, creating
the conditions for the Cold War’s expansion into the region after World War II, and Guianese

Publishers, Inc., 2007); Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (New
York: World Publishing Company, 1968); Bolland, The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean; Cary Fraser,
Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-1964
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); Frank Furedi, Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism
(London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994); Gerald Horne, Cold War in a Hot Zone: The United States Confronts Labor
and Independence Struggles in the British West Indies (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007); Matthew
Lange, Lineages of Despotism and Development: British Colonialism and State Power (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 2009); Perry Mars and Alma H. Young, eds., Caribbean Labor and Politics: Legacies of Cheddi
Jagan and Michael Manley (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2004); Mawby, Ordering Independence.
14
Throughout this dissertation I use the terms Guiana and British Guiana to refer to the colony.

5

leaders played an important role in the larger Cold War conflict.15 The PAC/PPP’s most
important leader, Cheddi Jagan, was born into poverty on the Guianese plantation at Port
Mourant in 1918. Jagan, who was of East Indian descent, used his family’s life savings to travel
to the United States where he studied from 1936 to 1943. Upon his return, Jagan entered politics
and, along with his American-born wife, Janet Rosenberg, helped found the PAC. In 1953 Jagan
introduced a proposal that expanded the communist-dominated World Federation of Trade
Unions’s (WFTU) efforts in colonial territories and, in 1961, he became one of the first colonial
leaders to speak at the United Nations (UN).16 Leaders of the Manpower Citizens’ Association
(MPCA), the PAC/PPP’s most consistent rival, responded by playing a central role in founding
the Caribbean Area Division of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers
(CADORIT), the local arm of the Anglo-American dominated, staunchly anti-communist,
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).17
In 1954 the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) designated the MPCA, a reformist
Guianese sugar workers’ union, as the first colonial labor organization to be the recipient of a
full-scale institution-building program. Colonial leaders and British trade unionists argued that
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without external funding, training, and support in negotiations, the MPCA would collapse,
destroying the Guianese labor movement. British assistance aimed at increasing the size and
effectiveness of reformist Guianese labor organizations. As organizing improved, the British
sought to strengthen structural connections between the unions and employers while
institutionalizing reformist trade unionism within the state apparatus—embedding a capitalist
system in British Guiana. The precedent-setting program directly taxed British workers and
combined their funds with covert aid from the Colonial Office to aid the MPCA.18 In 1959 the
British Guiana Trades Union Council (BGTUC) became the first colonial trade union delegation
received by the Colonial Office and TUC in London for the purpose of discussing territorial
development.19 The extent of British support for reformist trade unions in Guiana suggests that
policymakers, colonial officials, and trade union leaders in the United Kingdom considered the
colony among the most important strategic challenges of the late-1950s and early 1960s.
American policymakers and trade union leaders exhibited similar concern about the
colony. Serafino Romualdi, the inter-American representative of the American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), acknowledged that beginning in 1951
he did “everything in [his] power” to oppose the Jagan-led PPP after becoming convinced the
Guianese leader was a dedicated communist. The AFL and CIO (and later the AFL-CIO)
unwaveringly followed Romualdi’s lead throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.20 In 1961, just
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three months after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Senator Thomas Dodd of Massachusetts warned
legislators that Cheddi Jagan was “more dangerous than [Fidel] Castro.”21 American concern
with controlling Guianese decolonization reached the highest levels of the United States
government. Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to President John F. Kennedy,
noted in 1962 that the United States spent more man-hours per capita on British Guiana than any
other area.22 By 1964 AFL-CIO representatives suggested that British Guiana was among the
most strategically important areas of the world and warned TUC leaders that Guiana, Cuba, and
Vietnam represented the key areas of potential communist subversion.23 Crucially, U.S.
policymakers’ hostility toward the PAC/PPP followed American labor leaders’ opposition to the
Jagan-led movement and the AFL-CIO’s antagonism to the party was largely a response to
appeals from the MPCA.
The PPP’s rejection of the Anglo-American post-war system preceded more famous
examples of leftist regional movements in Cuba, Chile, and even Guatemala, and there is some
evidence that Cuban leaders considered the PPP an important ally in the early 1960s. 24 Most
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importantly, however, local conflicts in the colony underlay international tensions in part due to
the competition between the communist and non-communist blocs. Guianese leaders faced a
decision to choose one of two paths forward as the colony moved toward self-government. Both
reformist and revolutionary Guianese leaders appealed to external actors for assistance, thus
internationalizing the conflict within British Guiana. The Marxist-Leninist-dominated PPP had
the strongest support among the Guianese people and attempted to peacefully alter the structures
of society to establish an Eastern bloc-oriented socialism in Guiana. Ultimately, the PPP had
considerably more domestic support and greater ties to the Eastern bloc than Salvador Allende.
The colony is also significant in that like Chile, British Guiana was progressing toward the
establishment of a popularly elected Marxist government before United States intervention
exploited local conflicts to topple a democratically elected leader.25 The PPP also symbolized the
possibility of a regional social revolution nearly a decade before the Cuban Revolution.
Institutional Decolonization
For such a popular revolution to even get started the colonial-era structures would have to
be altered or dismantled. Some of the complex political alliances established in Guiana after
World War II challenged the model of unionization the Colonial Office and TUC worked to
establish as part of the process of institution-building between 1946 and 1961. Frantz Fanon was
an Afro-Caribbean French psychiatrist, philosopher, and revolutionary whose work on the
invasion. Guillermo Batista, Cuban Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago similarly noted that Guevara sent fuel,
food, and printing machinery to Jagan as an expression of solidarity between their movements. See: “Interview by
Cuban journalist Ernesto Nunez Jimenz to the late President Cheddi Jagan,” February 1997, CJRC. Robert Waters,
Gordon Daniels, and Clem Seecharan have all emphasized the importance of Cheddi Jagan’s relationship with Cuba
though Cardenas alone suggests the PPP leader offered armed support to Guevara. See: Robert Anthony Waters, Jr.
and Gordon Oliver Daniels, “Striking for Freedom? International Intervention and the Guianese Sugar Workers’
Strike of 1964,” Cold War History, Vol. 10, No. 4, (November 2010): 537-569; Clem Seecharan, Sweetening ‘Bitter
Sugar’: Jock Campbell the Booker Reformer in British Guiana 1934-1966 (Miami: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005),
488-492.
25
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psychology of decolonization provides an important framework with which to examine the
conflicts in British Guiana. Specifically, Fanon’s analysis of trade unions’ role in decolonization
illuminates the most important aspect of the conflicts that shaped the Guianese path toward
political independence, a process I term institutional decolonization.
The term institutional decolonization refers to the process through which colonial
structures were contested in the last phase of British colonization and during the transition to
political independence in former colonies.26 In British Guiana, British, American, and Guyanese
trade union and political leaders negotiated, cooperated, and clashed over how post-colonial
society should be structured. In addition to colonial officers and State Department officials, other
participants in the struggle included international labor organizations, regional labor leaders and
politicians, private citizens who helped finance each side, and trade unionists in Eastern Europe.
The concept of institutional decolonization clarifies and adds depth to what Nigel Bolland
describes as the institutionalization of trade unions during the final phase of British colonialism
in the Caribbean. Bolland argues that the TUC engaged Caribbean labor movements primarily to
26
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protect property interests and reinforce employers’ control of workers in preparation for British
withdrawal from the West Indies. He suggests that British programs contributed to authoritarian
tendencies in theoretically democratic institutions resulting in anti-democratic propensities in
post-colonial West Indian governments.27 Similarly, Spencer Mawby argues that colonial
administrators established various structural frameworks to slow down decolonization and assure
independence was ordered in a way beneficial to British objectives.28 As Bolland and Mawby
suggest, British efforts to build the trade union movement in Guiana aimed at solidifying a
capitalist system of labor relations in the colony to protect British interests as the colony
advanced toward self-government. While acknowledging that British officials wielded
substantially superior power in shaping the nature of colonial labor relations, this dissertation
adds that Guianese actors played a major role in internationalizing the colony’s institutional
decolonization.
The concept of institutional decolonization also draws on John Darwin’s Unfinished
Empire which argues that decolonization is most accurately understood as “the break-up or
dismantling of…a ‘globalized’ system of imperial domination centered upon Europe.”29
Examining Guianese decolonization through Darwin’s prism of systemic control permits a
deeper analysis of the challenge to colonial structures that previous scholarship on Guianese
decolonization only peripherally addressed due to a focus on Cold War political intervention.
The PAC/PPP’s ideology is examined in chapter four; however, the most important aspect of the
movement was its insistence on breaking from Western economic control rather than integrating

27

Bolland, The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean, 363-364; 513-515.
Mawby, Ordering Independence, 30.
29
John Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), xiii,
388-389.
28

11

into an American-led system.30 In this sense, PAC/PPP efforts to restructure Guianese
institutions simultaneously rejected colonial control and resisted the possibility of American
expansion of power into the void left after British withdrawal.31
Finally, the international dynamics of institutional decolonization are best understood in
the context of Jason Parker’s Brother’s Keeper, which argues that transnational connections
heavily influenced British Caribbean decolonization. Parker’s work discusses the ways nongovernmental relationships eased the transition to independence in most of the West Indies. 32
This study argues that similar tendencies existed in British Guiana and that some Guianese labor
leaders’ connections to American, British, and pro-Western international trade unions improved
their organizations’ ability to negotiate with foreign employers. However, the most influential
Guianese leaders rejected the establishment of institutional connections with Anglo-American
trade unions and instead pursed relations with Eastern-bloc organizations. Consequently, heavyhanded American intervention and domestic conflict shaped Guianese decolonization in contrast
to the relatively smooth transition to independence in the rest of the West Indies. Thus, debates
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regarding the role of trade unions as social institutions led to domestic and international conflicts
that shaped decolonization and the Cold War in the British Caribbean.
Analyzing decolonization at the institutional level allows for a deeper analysis of political
objectives and ensuing international conflicts more effectively than the examination of political
rhetoric or public discourse. For example, PPP leader Cheddi Jagan and MPCA founder Ayude
Edun both framed their political ideas as a form of socialism; however, the institutional models
with which Jagan and Edun attempted to shape labor relations differed dramatically.33
Nationalist leaders’ attempts to shape the institutional foundations of society explain more about
their aims than requests for foreign aid. The PAC/PPP’s unofficial international relationships are
more illuminating than their official diplomatic relations with other nations. Cheddi Jagan, for
example, requested aid from the United States and Great Britain but never opened to the
possibility of permitting existing labor relations to be based on a British or American model. As
a result, the PAC/PPP led early efforts to replace Guianese trade unions integrated into Western
labor’s international structures. PAC/PPP efforts to retain connections to the Eastern-bloc labor
international, the WFTU, while resisting integration into the Western-bloc’s ICFTU helps
explain the reasons American labor leaders became involved in the colony well before United
States policymakers expressed concern about the Guianese labor movement. Institutional
objectives influenced international relations when the PPP increased political connections to
Eastern-bloc to help to transform the labor movement into something approximating the
“scientific socialist model.”34
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An inter-disciplinary perspective allows for a focus on Guianese decolonization at the
institutional level that illuminates three important and previously underappreciated aspects of
labor conflict in British Guiana. First, political-scientist Kathleen Thalen’s study of institutional
evolution is useful in identifying the incompatible objectives of the various actors in Guiana.35
Thalen notes that political and social institutions can develop for several purposes. British
colonial officials, trade unionists, and employers wanted labor institutions in British Guiana to
preserve labor relationships and maintain stability to protect British interests. American labor
leaders and policymakers expressed similar objectives while hoping to advance United States
interests as British control receded. Reformist Guianese leaders in the MPCA and BGTUC
agreed and hoped to advance workers’ interests within that system of labor relations.36
Conversely, the Jagan-led members of the PAC and PPP viewed the labor institutions as a means
through which they could alter economic relationships and challenge the dynamics of power
relations in the colony.
Second, Thalen’s study suggests that institutions can change considerably in subtle ways
while superficially remaining consistent, thus allowing for a greater appreciation of institutional
change during periods when labor relations seem stagnant. Applying Thalen’s framework to
Guiana suggests that conservative labor leaders played a more complex role than historians
appreciate and did not act as a barrier to advancing trade union objectives even though their
efforts failed to address stifling poverty and did not avert the emergence of the PPP.37 To be sure,
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the PPP’s existence as a radical alternative provided an important motive for employers to
embrace reform and the MPCA’s successes derived largely from British fears that inaction
would lead to political radicalism. Nonetheless, close examination suggests a gradual expansion
of the reformist labor movement in British Guiana. Thalen’s work also helps explain why most
labor leaders who held leadership positions in Guianese trade unions did not insist on structural
breaks with the Anglo-American model of labor relations and opposed the PAC/PPP model of
labor relations. MPCA leaders, Richard Ishmael in particular, appreciated the small but
important advancements in labor relations between 1946 and 1961 and expressed optimism that
those changes would meaningfully impact workers over time. In short, they expressed
confidence in trade unions within a capitalist society.38
Finally, tracing institutional conflicts allows for greater appreciation of the underlying
factors shaping the racial split in the labor movement after 1957. Walter Rodney, a Guianese
scholar and political activist, noted that colonization shaped employment patterns and
contributed to racial tensions in the colony in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Rodney’s insights shed light on racial conflicts in the 1950s as well.39 Differences in labor
relationships made possible the Anglo-American exploitation of racial tensions discussed by
scholars. Even though colonialism embedded racial conflict within Guianese society, the PPP
withstood ethnic divisions and external attempts to destroy the movement until the party became
the administrating authority against which predominantly Afro-Guianese civil service unions
negotiated for wage increases. The PPP’s advocacy of strikes to demand wage increases for
overwhelmingly East Indian sugar workers negotiating against foreign capitalists stood in stark
Development: British Colonialism and State Power (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 7-8, 117,
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38
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contrast to their resistance to increasing taxes to raise pay for government employees. Thus,
labor relations, rather than race, explain why predominantly Afro-Guianese civil servants bitterly
opposed the PPP in the early 1960s.
Matthew Lange, like Stephen Rabe, emphasizes external factors undermining Guianese
democracy; however, Guianese leaders independently at times chose to subvert institutional
democracy within their organizations. The radical movement pushed forward reforms, but also
led to a current of authoritarianism and anti-democratic features within the reformist trade
unions, which resulted in institutional dysfunction over the long-term. While Thalen’s study
suggests that examining Guianese institutional development closely will help appreciate gradual
but important changes in labor relations, Lange’s work on British Guiana suggests that the period
between 1945 and 1961 represented a critical juncture in Guianese history. Lange argues that
external intervention in Guiana resulting from Anglo-American Cold War concerns destroyed
efforts at change and led to institutional failure after independence. Importantly, Lange argues
that absent intervention British Guiana should have been expected, as a directly-ruled colony, to
develop effective and lasting institutional foundations for democratic stability.40
Four perspectives were most important in shaping the process of institutional
decolonization—those of British trade union and political leaders, those of American trade union
and political leaders, those of the revolutionary Cheddi and Janet Jagan-led left-of-center
Guianese leaders, and those of reformist left-moderate Guianese leaders.41 Anglo-American trade
unionists and political leaders agreed that British Guiana should be transitioned from a colony to
an independent capitalist democracy even though they disagreed on the specifics of institutionbuilding efforts in the 1950s and competed for influence in the post-colonial Caribbean.
40
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Significantly, American policymakers resisted promoting free trade for British Guiana and
insisted that liberalized trade with the Eastern-bloc represented a threat to American national
security during the Cold War.42 Thus, Anglo-American policy aimed at integrating the Guianese
economy with the Western capitalist system rather than accepting autonomy for the Guianese
people or promoting free trade.
Ultimately, British, American, and Guianese leaders viewed the establishment of specific
types of institutionalized labor relations in British Guiana as an opportunity to achieve broader
objectives regarding the nature of post-colonial society and Guiana’s place within the
decolonized post-war international system.
Capitalism, Colonialism, and the British Guianese Economy
Capitalism and imperialism, closely related in the British experience though not
inherently connected, resulted in the concentration of economic power that defined social
relations in developed countries and colonies. The primary institutional mechanisms through
which capitalist societies maintained stability and democracy were representative political bodies
and industrial organizations designed to protect workers’ interests. In British Guiana, as in most
colonial territories, political representation was severely restricted leaving workers’ movements
and trade unions as the sole source of mass representation and democratic expression.43 While
the Colonial Office considered Guianese trade unions weak and thoroughly inadequate
throughout the late-colonial period, a far greater percentage of the population was able to express
their demands through trade unions or unauthorized industrial action than could participate in
42
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electoral politics before 1950.44 Paradoxically, Guianese trade unions’ inability to meaningfully
address workers’ extreme poverty in the 1940s and 1950s convinced many laborers that unions
were useless unless they were connected to a political party that could provide financial support
and legislative representation as was the custom in the British Caribbean.
Labor relations in British Guiana were a matter of international affairs, and trade union
actions were episodes in foreign relations in addition to being the most important type of
democratic activity in the colony. Colonialism created an economy in British Guiana
overwhelmingly based on exporting raw materials, particularly sugar and bauxite, limiting the
ability of the Guianese people to address the colony’s intense poverty.45 Booker Brothers’
McConnell & Co., the largest sugar company in the colony, consolidated control over the
Guianese economy after 1900, particularly between 1920 and 1940, deepening the plantation
economy in British Guiana. Nigel Bolland argues that, as a result, “the survival of the plantation
system meant the persistence of the monoculture economy, of dependency and foreign control,
and consequently of the absence of sustained diversification and development,” leaving the
population “condemned to poverty and powerlessness.”46 Booker Brothers, a private sugar
company owned and operated by British investors, so thoroughly controlled the Guianese
economy that British Guiana was often derisively referred to as Booker’s Guiana. Historian Sara
Abraham notes that Booker Brothers was responsible for at least 45% of government revenue
and directly or indirectly controlled the employment of up to 80% of the population in British
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Guiana.47 Moreover, Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor (ORIT) economic reports
suggested that in the early 1950s over 60% of the colony’s revenue derived from the sugar
industry, that 75% of the population were low income wage-earners, and that the vast majority of
wage earners were dependent on the sugar industry. 48
Similarly, the expansion of American aluminum companies in the bauxite industry
limited Guianese workers to employment in raw material extraction. United States labor laws
restricted employment to American seamen on ships transporting bauxite, limiting Guianese
workers’ opportunity to benefit from their country’s resources for employment beyond mining.49
Bauxite was British Guiana’s second largest economic interest and the colony was the world’s
second largest producer of the ore. However, the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) held
virtual monopoly over the industry through its subsidiaries the Demerara Bauxite Company, Ltd.
(Demba) and Aluminum Company of Canada (Alcan).50 Moreover, American policymakers
considered control of Guianese bauxite a national security issue and emphasized access to the
strategic mineral.51 Thus, British and American companies exerted overwhelming influence over
the Guianese economy and the majority of the colony’s people.

47

Abraham, Labour and the Multiracial Project in the Caribbean, 56.
Ernst Schwarz, ed., “British Guiana: A Colonial Miniature,” from Research Department of the Inter-American
Regional Organization of Workers, January 1951, Vol. 1, No.1, RG-18: International Department, Serafino
Romualdi Files, Box 8, Research Department, 1951-1953, George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, MD
(Hereafter, GMMA); Leo E. Eliazer, Regional Organizer of ORIT in the Caribbean Areas, “Report on British
Guiana,” RG-18, International Affairs Department, Staff Files: George Delaney’s Files, 1921-1957, ORIT Executive
Board Meetings, 1951-1953, GMMA.
49
A. Vieira, Secretary British Guiana and West Indies Seaman’s Union to AFL, October 11, 1951; Serafino
Romualdi, Latin American Representative, AFL to A. Vieira, BG and WI Seaman’s Union, November 8, 1951;
Serafino Romualdi to Willy J. Dorchain, International Transport Federation, November 8, 1951, RG 1-027, Office
of the President, George Meany’s Files, 1944-1960, Subjects: ORIT Office, 1949-1957, GMMA.
50
A. John Cope, Jr., American Consul, Georgetown to Department of State, April 23, 1957, RG 59 122.41D, Box
717, National Archives II, College Park, MD (Hereafter, NARA II); Jagan, The West On Trial, 98-104.
51
A. John Cope, Jr., American Consul, Georgetown to Department of State, April 23, 1957, RG 59 122.41D, Box
717, NARA II. Jason Parker argues that the rise in Cold War tensions and especially the onset of the Korean War,
increased American policymakers’ concern with anti-communism and stability in Jamaica as a means of preserving
access to bauxite as well. See: Parker, Brother’s Keeper, 86. Stephen Rabe argues that the Eisenhower
administration was particularly focused on retaining access to strategic materials. See: Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower
48

19

British and American policymakers argued that exploitation in monopolistic
relationships, however, could be countered through other democratic institutions. Specifically,
they suggested that trade unions were the lynchpin of international capitalist interests. British
policymakers sought to adjust the imperial framework to preserve commercial and political
connections while decentralizing authority and, at least in the Caribbean, gradually preparing the
colonies for increased self-government and eventually political independence as they assessed
the Empire in the decade after World War II.52 The key to preserving the benefits of the Empire
in new circumstances, they argued, was the establishment of British-modeled institutions and the
retention of political and unofficial connections between former colonies and Great Britain.
Conversely, United States policymakers sought to expand American influence into colonial
territories as British control lessened. Both British and American policymakers argued that the
preservation of capitalism in former colonies was important and both pursued policies designed
to keep colonies within the Anglo-America Cold War camp. However, the American and British
political-economic systems differed in small but important ways, with Britain moving toward a
welfare state and the United States slowly drifting away from some of the progressive economic
programs of the 1930s.53 Moreover, British and American labor leaders long disagreed on the
role of trade unions in capitalist society, and political leaders in both countries related to unions
differently.
As a result, Anglo-American trade union and political leaders loosely cooperated to
promote reformist trade unions in British Guiana. British and American political and labor
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leaders argued that developing colonial institutions to support specific social and politicaleconomic relationships to shape post-colonial societies, and thus their international orientation,
was the most important aspect of decolonization. They tended toward agreement on national
lines with trade union leaders acting in accordance with official policy rather than toward a
program of international labor solidarity. British and American policymakers and labor leaders
described defining and developing post-colonial institutions in different ways and, despite shared
broad objectives in the early Cold War, they conflicted in their pursuit of decolonizing colonial
institutions. Most importantly, colonial officials and TUC leaders expressed strong opposition to
allowing American labor practices to shape trade union development in British Guiana.
Nonetheless, the TUC reduced its involvement in British Guiana in mid-1957, which increased
AFL-CIO influence in the Guianese labor movement.
Guianese labor and political leaders also disagreed on the best way to establish a
diversified industrial economy and on how to pursue their foreign relationships. Nationalists
sought to develop and strengthen their institutions in preparation for independence based on the
type of post-colonial society they hoped to establish. It would be overly simplistic to suggest that
Guianese leaders merely appealed to European ideas in imagining an independent Guyana;
however, their designs were based on variations of capitalism, socialism, or communism
adjusted for local circumstances. Significantly, a number of the colony’s key figures in politics
and organized labor were educated in English-run schools and several of the most influential
leaders obtained college and graduate-level educations in England and the United States.54 Thus,
Guianese leaders developed political ideologies while studying in Western educational systems
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and living for extended periods in Western societies. Those overseas experiences shaped
Guianese perceptions of institutional decolonization.
Historiography
This dissertation engages scholars who have begun to examine the ways that regional
actors influenced events and to challenge the notion that the United States imposed its will on
Latin American and Caribbean peoples uninfluenced by local circumstances. It reinforces the
notion that regional actors influenced the course of events to a larger degree than earlier
scholarship appreciated. As Michael Gambone suggests, regional developments are best
understood as a convergence of multi-layered local, national, regional, international dynamics.55
While Cold War concerns provided an overarching framework for Guianese
decolonization, the consistent American pursuit of regional hegemony was most important in
explaining U.S. involvement in the colony’s progression toward self-government.56 Scholars
have long appreciated that the United States exerted control throughout the hemisphere though
they disagree on the motives of American actors and the extent to which other countries in the
region influenced American foreign policy. Orthodox and some post-revisionist scholars suggest
that United States actions in Latin America balanced national interest with an idealistic altruism
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focused on advancing a collective set of regional ideals.57 Revisionists and some postrevisionists counter that U.S. actions are most effectively understood as a form of imperialism
based primarily on economic domination frequently maintained through the use of military
force.58 While scholars debate the drivers of the United States’ hemispheric policy they agree on
the consistency of American aims and suggest that decolonization and the Cold War offered a
different backdrop that merely reframed long-standing issues.59 The merging of the specific Cold
War challenges to traditional American policy in the hemisphere was made clear in 1954 when
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed the National Security Council that his
understanding of the Monroe Doctrine excluded foreign ideologies, specifically communism, in
the hemisphere.60
United States involvement in British Guiana’s decolonization demonstrates a continuity
of policy based on efforts to integrate the region into an American-dominated neo-liberal
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economic system.61 As James Siekmeier and others have shown, United States policymakers
fervently opposed economic nationalism in the Western Hemisphere.62 At the same time, as
Marc-William Palen points out, U.S. officials did not consistently advocate a true “Open Door
Policy” designed to foster free trade in Latin America. Instead, U.S. policymakers and labor
leaders pursued an ever-expanding, pro-United States closed door.63 The Cold War reinforced the
tendency to limit regional free trade. The National Security Council specifically stated its
opposition to restricting the trade of raw materials between the Caribbean and the Soviet Union
if those materials would “break certain bottlenecks” in the Soviet economy.64 In that context,
British colonists attempted to improve their position within the international system and
nationalists pursued social, structural, and political-economic changes domestically with the
objective of modernizing in their own way, often appealing to the American and Soviet models.65
In British Guiana the relative importance of economic, ideological, and strategic concerns varied
among the range of actors involved in the process of decolonization, though to the Guianese
economics were the heart of the debate.
Several scholars have also emphasized the importance of appreciating the domestic
concerns influencing regional leaders rather than viewing them as merely responding to United
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States policy.66 Guianese labor leaders established connections to the AFL-CIO and appealed to
American policymakers to advance their own objectives before the United States became
involved in the colony. Ultimately, the PAC/PPP’s attempt to address extreme poverty and
asymmetries of power through social revolution and connections with the Eastern-bloc
challenged both short-term and long-term American interests. Guianese leaders’ internal
disagreements and conflict with colonial authorities led to American involvement through a
weak attempt at institution-building cast aside for intervention when the project failed.
In addition to using the prism of institutional decolonization to explain the process of
negotiation and conflict in British Guiana between 1946 and 1961, this dissertation makes use of
Guianese sources made available on a large scale in the past five years through the Cheddi Jagan
Research Center.67 It juxtaposes those sources with British and American governmental and
trade union records, many previously unexamined, to explain the multifaceted and
internationalized conflict over British Guiana’s institutional development. Conflicts between
Guianese labor leaders over the nature of post-colonial institutions were internal and emanated
outward, suggesting that in at least one way the ideological disagreements that shaped the Cold
War unleashed conflict which began between Guianese trade unionists before American, Soviet,
and British leaders acknowledged a state of Cold War among the world’s most powerful nations.
Nonetheless, it is critical to acknowledge that Great Britain and later the United States imposed
their will in the colony however much they were influenced by Guianese leaders.
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The literature on Guianese decolonization primarily emphasizes the importance of
external actors in shaping the colony’s transition to political independence and, as a result,
focuses on the 1953 suspension of internal self-government and later Anglo-American
subversion of the PPP government before the colony gained political independence. 68 In the
earliest study on the subject, Leo Despres identifies important cultural and ideological
differences that disrupted Guianese society; however, he suggests that external actors were the
decisive factor in the disintegration of a unified nationalist movement.69 The Guianese people
elected Cheddi Jagan to office in 1992 in the country’s first fair elections since the AngloAmerican intervention in 1964 which laid the foundation for Forbes Burnham’s dictatorship.
Soon after Jagan’s return, Cary Fraser and Stephen Rabe wrote highly critical studies arguing
that narrow anti-communism drove American policymakers to manipulate the Guianese labor
movement and exert pressure on the British government to delay independence until the PPP
could be removed from office. American policymakers, they argued, misunderstood Jagan, and
the intervention made the colony “collateral damage” as the United States waged the Cold War. 70
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Similarly, Nigel Bolland and Spencer Mawby argue that British officials pursued policies
designed to shape decolonization and institutionalize capitalist labor relations to preserve British
interests in the Caribbean. Bolland and Mawby agree that British policies resulted in
authoritarian tendencies in the institutions tasked with assuring social democracy, especially
West Indian trade unions.71 Colin Palmer agrees that colonialism’s legacy was the creation of
schisms in Guianese society and that British and American actions during decolonization
contributed to increasing violence as Guiana progressed toward independence. However, Palmer
suggests that Guianese leaders’ manipulation of racial conflicts for political gain contributed to
the colony’s devolution into violence and repressive government.72 The fundamental
historiographical challenge to these works revolves around Cheddi and Janet Jagan’s political
orientation and the degree of the PPP’s connection to the Eastern-bloc. Robert Waters argues that
the depiction of Cheddi Jagan as a socialist victim of overzealous anti-communism too easily
dismisses the PPP’s Marxist ideology and its attempts to secure connections with
Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.73
The existing literature captures the connections between the Cold War and
decolonization, British attempts to shape labor relations, and the importance of colonial
structures on racial violence during decolonization, and it is beginning to explain the complexity
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of Guianese leaders’ relations with both sides of the Cold War divide. However, none of it has
adequately tackled the fundamental issue that shaped Guianese decolonization: the debate over
the institutions that would shape post-colonial society. Guianese labor leaders’ political
ideologies influenced, but also grew out of their experiences in seeking improvements for the
colony’s impoverished workers through the labor movement. Political and trade union ideologies
shaped transnational relationships and were the basis of the relationship between the Cold War
and decolonization in British Guiana.74
Ultimately, British, American, and Guianese leaders viewed the establishment of specific
types of institutionalized labor relations in British Guiana as an opportunity to achieve broader
objectives regarding post-colonial society and Guiana’s place within the decolonized post-war
international system. After 1946, a conflict emerged between Guianese labor leaders who
supported the idea of decolonization within the existing system and those who interpreted
decolonization as a more fundamental break from British and American control, objectives
achievable only through greater association with the Eastern-bloc. Guianese leaders played a
more important role in late-colonial struggles than scholars realize, and the conflict in the
colony’s labor movement was considerably internationalized by mid-1950s.
American involvement in British Guiana shifted from institution-building and political
intervention to subversion. The CIA and AFL-CIO intervened to exacerbate domestic unrest as a
means of undermining the PPP government between 1962 and 1964 at the same time the
Kennedy administration pressured British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to hold new
elections based on proportional representation. The new electoral system allowed a coalition
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between the PNC and United Front (UF) to replace the PPP before the colony became
independent in 1966 and set the stage for a twenty-seven-year PNC dictatorship in the colony.
The relationships the CIA exploited, which are the focus of Rabe’s and Fraser’s work, grew out
of the efforts of reformist Guianese labor leaders to use contacts in British and American trade
unions in the 1950s. The PPP’s attempt to resist its Anglo-American orchestrated removal, in
part through cooperation with Cuba, ended in failure.75 Ultimately, disagreements between the
Guianese owing largely to the structure of colonial society assured conflict during
decolonization; however, the PPP’s removal and Burnham’s subsequent dictatorship were the
result of U.S. intervention to protect American interests. Thus, the internationalization of
Guianese trade union struggles contributed to the corruption of the labor movement and the
destruction of democracy in Guyana.
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter two explores the context,
ideology, and objectives that drove AFL/AFL-CIO international activities after World War II,
arguing that American labor leaders were willing to undermine democracy and selfdetermination abroad to advance pro-American capitalism. Chapter three juxtaposes British and
American foreign policies after World War II and argues that both nations’ labor and political
leaders connected the expansion of reformist trade unions to the preservation of global
capitalism. Chapter three also shows that British and American policymakers and trade unionists
competed to advance national interests while advancing shared objectives. Chapter four shows
that Guianese trade unionists and political leaders clashed over the political-economic system
through which they hoped to develop Guiana, and as a result the foreign relationships Guianese
leaders pursued. Moreover, this conflict began in the Guianese labor movement before the start
of the Cold War. Chapter five suggests that the PAC’s founding in 1946 represented a first phase
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of institutional decolonization during which revolutionary Guianese labor and political leaders
rejected the British-imposed model of trade unionism and struggled to break from institutional
connections to the West. This first phase culminated in the PPP’s electoral victory and ended
when the colonial government suspended the Waddington constitution and re-imposed direct rule
in the British Guiana.
Chapters six and seven explain Anglo-American institution-building programs in British
Guiana and argue that Anglo-American rivalry limited cooperation in the colony during a second
phase of institutional decolonization. As a result, reformist Guianese trade unionists appealed to
both British and American trade unionists, as well as Western international labor organizations,
to counter the PPP’s revolutionary program in the colony. Thus, reformist Guianese labor leaders
were the driving force behind external involvement in the colony between 1954 and 1961.
Together, those chapters show that the internationalization of labor relations paradoxically
sustained the reformist labor movement and helped it gain important institutional advancements,
while increasing Guianese unionists’ dependence on external assistance and contributing to the
loss of democracy within those organizations. This dissertation concludes with a brief overview
of the third phase of institutional decolonization, the period during which institutional
breakdown in the labor movement resulted in U.S.-supported subversion of the elected PPP
government between 1962 and 1964. Ultimately, American intervention through relationships
developed at the behest of reformist Guianese labor leaders was the decisive factor in removing
the PPP and placing Forbes Burnham at the head of the colony’s government when Guyana
became independent in 1966.
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Chapter 2: The Origins of AFL, CIO, and TUC Involvement in Institutional
Decolonization

The American Federation of Labor (AFL), Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO),
and Trades Union Congress (TUC) pursued activist foreign policies after World War II that
promoted democracy, economic development, and international solidarity in the pursuit of global
peace and a liberal capitalist international economic system. Anglo-American labor leaders
expected those objectives to be mutually reinforcing, and they often were; however, they were
also frequently incompatible. As labor’s Cold War grew in intensity in the late 1940s and early
1950s, Anglo-American labor leaders increasingly pursued foreign policies that subordinated
promoting democracy abroad to imposing liberal capitalism and business-unionism on colonial
areas. Thus, British and American trade unions’ institution-building efforts in British Guiana in
the 1950s and early 1960s were part of a broader effort to integrate colonial unions into a liberal
capitalist economic system centered in the U.S. and Great Britain. Despite national rivalry,
tactical disagreements, and organizational conflicts, the AFL, CIO, and TUC agreed on the
importance of integrating colonial trade unions into the Western system through the labor
movement.
The existing scholarship on American labor’s post-war foreign policy objectives is best
understood as falling into three general schools of thought; orthodox, revisionist, and postrevisionist. The earliest significant studies of American labor’s Cold War foreign policy were
written in the 1960s and 1970s and varied between praise for American labor’s defense of
freedom abroad and criticism of the motives, actions, and especially consequences of AFL-CIO
international activities. Orthodox labor scholars accepted AFL-CIO leaders’ public explanations
of policy and encouraged or defended their actions as a form of positive anti-communism. The

earliest orthodox work, George Lodge’s, Spearheads of Democracy, was published for the
Council on Foreign Relations in 1962. The author, who was Secretary of Labor in the late 1950s,
submitted a draft of his work to several labor leaders for approval before publishing a manuscript
that called for greater labor-government cooperation in international relations. Despite its bias,
Lodge’s work is useful in hinting at the underlying institutional issue at the center of this
dissertation. The author criticizes the United States government’s ineptitude and American
businesses abroad for failing to realize that undermining trade unions in developing countries
reinforced arguments for class struggle and missed “the opportunity to build a relationship and
an institution which in time of instability and trouble might save its neck.”1 Active collaboration
between the United States government and the AFL-CIO, Lodge argued, was crucial to
advancing the political-economic system designed in the United States and, specifically, to
combatting the international Communist conspiracy directed from Moscow. 2
Ronald Radosh’s, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy is the foundational
revisionist work on American labor’s international relations. Radosh argues that American labor
leaders accepted a role as junior partners cooperating with the United States government to
reinforce the capitalist political economic system and pursue an expansionist foreign policy.
Radosh suggests that labor leaders expected American economic expansion to lead to increasing
employment, wages, and benefits for American workers.3 Furthermore, Radosh suggests that
American labor leaders’ support for an imperialist United States foreign policy led to labor’s
adoption of reactionary overseas activities including support for dictatorial leaders who
suppressed free trade unions as a means of limiting the forces of social change. Radosh contests
1
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labor leaders’ public statements, which argued that the AFL-CIO’s aggressive foreign policy
grew out of the post-war threat of expansionist totalitarian Communism emanating from the
Soviet Union. The AFL/AFL-CIO, Radosh argues, consistently contributed to an expansionist
foreign policy in pursuit of the Open Door ideal, or the free flow of trade and investments, since
the early twentieth century. Radosh suggests that anti-communist rhetoric was a guise to increase
overseas activities in opposition to revolutionary or nationalist movements that threatened
corporate capitalism after World War II.4 Significantly, Radosh argues that labor leaders often
took aggressive anti-communist positions in advance of official United States policy, including
in British Guiana. Nonetheless, he argues that once official policy was determined, the
AFL/AFL-CIO frequently became pawns for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State
Department, and American corporations who used trade unionists to build institutions overseas
to forestall social revolutions.5
Philip Taft examines AFL-CIO archives for his work, Defending Freedom, and uses the
organizations’ materials to defend American labor leaders’ expansion of overseas activities after
World War II. Taft rejected revisionist criticism of AFL-CIO foreign policy as the work of
“conceited politicians” or “lazy and arrogant liberal intellectuals.”6 He praises labor leaders, such
as Jay Lovestone, George Meany, Matthew Woll, William Green, Serafino Romualdi, and David
Dubinsky for identifying totalitarianism as a “monstrous evil” as well as recognizing the
4
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similarities between Soviet domination of trade unions and German, Spanish, and Italian fascist
repression of workers in the 1930s.7 Those men, Taft argues, laid the foundation for an
aggressive post-war policy of anti-communism designed to promote democracy and defend
workers across the world from falling under the control of communist, fascist, or colonial
totalitarian governments. 8 Taft suggests that the CIO joined the AFL in advocating a staunchly
anti-communist policy by 1949 in response to the Soviet Unions’ antagonism in the World
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the international labor organization established in 1945 to
unify trade unions across the globe.9 Taft’s work articulates the AFL-CIO’s stated foreign policy
objectives; however, it is limited in that it uncritically accepts labor leaders’ public statements
and organizations’ official policies without examining the underlying nature of those programs
or their consequences. Perhaps most damaging, Taft defends the AFL-CIO from allegations of
complicity with the CIA in carrying out subversive activities overseas, activities which have
since been confirmed with the release of classified materials. Nonetheless, Taft made a
significant contribution to the historiography in arguing that American labor leaders pursued
their own foreign policy objectives rather than merely acting on behalf of agencies within the
United States government.10
Jon Kofas’s The Struggle For Legitimacy argues that anti-communism was the driving
force behind AFL/AFL-CIO foreign policy after World War II; however, like Radosh he
suggests that American labor leaders’ policy in the hemisphere needs to also be understood in the
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broader context of consistent opposition to Latin American economic nationalism.11 Kofas
agrees that the State Department drove labor’s foreign policy, suggesting that as a result the
United States government was the most important actor in shaping the foreign policies of
international organizations to which American labor belonged, especially the Inter-American
Regional Organization of Labor (ORIT).12 Kofas, however, notes disagreements between
American labor leaders and suggests that the CIO occasionally pressured the AFL to implement
progressive policies, including the adoption of a position of strong opposition to right-wing
dictatorships as a central tenet of ORIT policy.13 Other revisionist works expounded on the same
ideas, primarily focusing on American labor leaders’ negative anti-communism, cooperation
with or subordination to agencies within the United States government, and pursuit of a foreign
policy that undermined workers and subverted democracy.14
Post-revisionist scholars examining Anglo-American labor foreign policy have begun to
synthesize earlier efforts. They acknowledge that AFL and CIO leaders supported an
expansionist and often self-interested economic policy while emphasizing that anti-communism
and the promotion of “free trade unionism” were central to American labor leaders’ foreign
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policymaking. While often critical of the outcomes of AFL-CIO policy, some scholars have
begun to nuance previous explanations of labor leaders’ motives.15 Martin Halpern, John Fousek,
and Nelson Lichtenstein note the domestic context in which labor leaders developed their foreign
policies. Halpern and Fousek argue that labor leaders adopted conservative policies to solidify
New Deal gains in the face of an anti-labor backlash in the late 1940s.16 Lichtenstein agrees and
notes that CIO President Walter Reuther determined to pursue a policy of staunch anticommunism coupled with a program to reinforce and adjust the existing capitalist system that he
thought most effectively advanced workers’ interests.17
Post-revisionist scholarship makes several other contributions that are significant for the
purposes of this dissertation. Anthony Carew argues that the Cold War was merely a new context
in which long-standing debates over theories of trade unionism were reignited.18 His assertion
that different interpretations of “free trade unionism” were central to post-1945 conflicts in
international labor anticipates the work of scholars like Edmund Wehrle, Geert van Goethem,
Dustin Walcher, Robert Waters, Federico Romero, and Victor Silverman, who have begun to
examine the role of free trade unionism as an ideological factor in shaping American labor
leaders’ foreign policies. Silverman also considers the TUC ideal of “voluntaryism,” which he
suggests was the organization’s version of free-labor ideology.19
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Walcher’s and Romero’s essays in American Labor’s Global Ambassadors and
Silverman’s Imagining Internationalism in British and American Labor, like Lichtenstein, note
that American labor leaders’ sincere belief in the universal applicability of American-style liberal
trade unionism and corporatism contributed to the development of an ideology that justified
activist overseas policies. Specifically, Walcher suggests that American labor leaders embraced
the corporatist political economic system emerging from the New Deal in the United States.20
Walcher and Romero suggest that American labor leaders adopted as a viable system to export
the concept of a liberal trade unionism that focused on preserving labor’s autonomy and ability
to negotiate within the larger political-economic structure without challenging business’ right to
manage.21
Silverman argues that British and American views of liberal political economy and trade
unionism precluded state interference in union activities and therefore rejected the Leninist
principle of centralization that contributed to communist methods of unionization.22 Despite what
Silverman describes as the TUC’s attempt to take the helm of a new postwar system to avoid
war, the concepts of free trade unionism and voluntaryism devolved into narrow anti-
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communism by 1949, which he suggests was the AFL view all along.23 Carew is more specific in
noting the differences between AFL and TUC ideology. He suggests that the AFL favored a
definition of free trade unionism that included emphasizing organizational independence from
political parties, government, employers, or churches. The TUC, in contrast, favored a looser
definition that merely suggested freedom from external domination and allowed a degree of
party-union collaboration similar to that which existed between the TUC and the Labor Party in
Great Britain.24
Kim Scipes’, AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers, like
Silverman, applies a post-revisionist methodology to draw a nearly revisionist conclusion.25
Scipes agrees that American labor leaders determined AFL-CIO policy even when policy
mirrored or contributed to government policy and programs. Nonetheless, Scipes aggressively
criticizes AFL-CIO policy, arguing that it was based on an imperialist attempt to impose
American-style “business unionism” on foreign unions.26 Like Radosh, Scipes suggests that
AFL-CIO policy did not fundamentally change after the Russian Revolution and as a result is not
most effectively understood as merely anticommunist.27 Scipes insists that AFL-CIO
rationalizations of their policy as supportive of freedom of association are “a complete and utter
fraud.”28 He argues that United States labor leaders were inconsistent in their use of power;
however, he concludes that labor imperialism worked in conjunction with the pursuit of
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American Empire in a non-democratic, non-transparent manner, and that labor leaders’ policies
frequently worked against the interests of both American workers and laborers abroad.29
Less critically, Edmund Wehrle’s Between a River and a Mountain addresses the concept
of free trade unionism and rejects the notion that American labor leaders acted as “junior
partners” taking orders from the United States government. Wehrle suggests instead that
American trade union leaders designed AFL-CIO foreign policy based on labor’s objectives and
exerted considerable influence in relations with the United States government. He argues that
labor leaders consistently pursued a foreign policy that promoted the ideal of trade unions acting
as “essential components of democracies- the sole defense of workers against a multitude of
threatening interests and institutions” in modern society.30 Wehrle acknowledges that various
factors contributed to labor’s foreign policy; however, he suggests that the most significant was
the idea of free trade unionism, which he defines as trade union autonomy and “activist
internationalism, a commitment to maintaining the essential autonomy of trade unions and
advocacy of aggressive full-employment economics.”31
Post-revisionists also nuance earlier explanations of the relationship between American
labor leaders and United States government agencies. Wehrle suggests anticommunist labor
leaders became more prevalent in the CIO after 1947 and AFL and CIO leadership coalesced
around an anti-communist policy in the late 1940s despite deep differences regarding tactics.
29
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Wehrle notes that the unions’ merger in 1955 muted dissention in practice.32 Wehrle also
suggests that the close relationship between AFL-CIO leaders and the Kennedy and Johnson
White House in the 1960s may have contributed to a more aggressive United States foreign
policy.33 When considered in conjunction with his explanation of free trade unionism, Wehrle
convincingly argues that American labor leaders pursued an interventionist, anti-communist
foreign policy to further their own objectives rather than as tools of United States government
agencies.
Ted Morgan’s biography of Jay Lovestone, A Covert Life, expands on Wehrle’s
suggestion that labor leaders influenced foreign policy in important ways. Morgan suggests that
Lovestone, who held a variety of positions within the AFL international apparatus, acted covertly
as one of the most influential foreign policymakers in the United States between 1944 and 1974.
Lovestone influenced Presidential appointments, Senatorial speeches, and operated covertly
overseas before the establishment of the CIA.34 Morgan suggests that Lovestone and his AFL
associates collaborated closely with the CIA at the highest levels by 1950 at times altering
policies with which they disagreed; however, he suggests that AFL influence decreased after
1958.35 Hugh Wilford’s, The Mighty Wurlitzer further nuances the relationship between
American labor leaders and the CIA. Wilford notes that Lovestone’s faction in the AFL
frequently disagreed and conflicted with official policy and ultimately the CIA-AFL-CIO
connection ended when the CIA attempted to exert more control over labor activities than labor
32
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leaders were willing to concede.36 Quenby Olmsted Hughes’ In the Interest of Democracy is the
most thorough examination of the AFL-CIA relationship and more generally the ideological
foundations of American labor leaders’ anti-communism. Hughes argues that labor-government
cooperation was based on shared ideological objectives, as well as the realization that
organizational weaknesses could be offset through collaboration, and that the relationship ended
when labor leaders’ concluded the CIA was attempting to control trade union foreign policy.37
Finally, scholars from all three schools address the question of when labor leaders
became engaged in the Cold War, an issue that is critical for this study. The scholarship is
virtually unanimous in concluding that American labor leaders, particularly in the AFL, became
widely engaged in a Cold War before the United States government. American labor leaders
frequently deemed foreign unionists or political leaders communist in advance of the United
States government and pursued more aggressive policies to combat the perceived threat of
communist expansion.38 Victor Silverman suggests that the reverse was true in Great Britain,
arguing that despite pressure from the Foreign Office and some trade union leaders, rank-and-file
concern with economic self-interest and the avoidance of war acted as a counterforce that slowed
the TUC’s drift into the Cold War. Nonetheless, he suggests that changes in TUC leadership in
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the early 1950s led to closer collaboration between the TUC and Foreign Office in waging the
Cold War.39
International Labor
Anti-communism was the defining characteristic of the AFL’s international activities no
later than 1944 and it was increasingly significant to the Western world’s labor internationalism
after the establishment of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in
December 1949. Nonetheless, anti-communism was not a reflexive policy or an end in itself; it
was the dominant theme in Anglo-American labor’s foreign policy because it was seen as the
most immediate threat to the preservation of the Anglo-American dominated capitalist system
labor leaders thought would protect trade union independence and increase material benefits for
workers, promote peace and economic growth, and advance American and British national
interests. Labor leaders argued that communist trade unions operated based on a theory of trade
unionism incompatible with Western labor, a practice that was designed to introduce a
revolutionary political economic system that did not protect workers’ freedom. Moreover
American and British labor leaders argued that communists frequently attempted to infiltrate
non-communist unions to turn the organizations into tools of political subversion rather than to
collaborate in pursuit of workers’ interests. Ultimately, they feared that communist unions would
facilitate the expansion of a political-economic system that concentrated economic and political
power, subverted workers’ independence, spread poverty, and led to military conflict. 40
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American and British labor leaders increasingly adopted anti-communism in the late
1940s and in the 1950s as a means of preserving the international system, which they expected to
decentralize power and increase workers’ influence. As a result, they expected that their
objectives could only be attained within the Anglo-American-led capitalist system with trade
unions designed to perpetuate that system.41 Several scholars place their analyses of American
labor’s foreign policy in this broader structural context.42 Ultimately, the TUC and CIO followed
the AFL into a Cold War, engaging in institution-building activities designed to subvert potential
challenges to the Anglo-American political-economic system or British and American national
interests.43
Labor leaders representing the AFL, CIO, and TUC disagreed on a wide range of tactical
questions regarding their organizations’ roles in international labor and the international labor
movement’s role in post-World War II international relations; however, they agreed that peace,
economic stability, democratic principles, workers’ rights, and the interests of British and
41
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American workers could only be preserved within the existing capitalist system.44 More
importantly, they argued that the trade union movement, based on British and American trade
union practices, was fundamental to the preservation of the capitalist system and democratic
politics. Crucially, instability in the post-war international system, the near assurance that
colonies would gain a degree of autonomy, and the appeal of communism to many colonial
leaders, convinced many labor leaders that the development or imposition of specific
institutional structures was the only safeguard against the collapse of international capitalism,
democracy, economic stability, and peace, as well as British and American workers’ interests.
Thus, Anglo-American trade union leaders engaged in a post-war policy of institution building in
colonial areas that was more aggressive than pre-war TUC, AFL, or CIO activities.
Peace and Democracy
AFL, CIO, and TUC post-war institution-building centered on the theoretically mutually
constitutive promotion of peace, economic growth, democracy, and self-determination; however,
contradictions in British and American labor foreign policies undermined those ideals in
practice. British and American labor leaders consistently emphasized trade unions’ and
international labor institutions’ importance as associations to preserve peace during and after the
Second World War. Sidney Hillman of the CIO, who historian Jennifer Luff argues was part of a
“cadre of left unionists” that “made up the labor wing of the progressive alliance” in the United
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States during the 1930s, was one of the most influential men in founding the WFTU in 1945.45
The first of several aims Hillman listed as organizational purposes at the WFTU’s founding was
its role in contributing to an enduring global peace.46 When the ICFTU was founded in 1951,
largely for the purpose of opposing the WFTU, its leaders acknowledged that one of the WFTU’s
most important objectives was to promote peace even though they determined that it failed as an
organization.47 Furthermore, in articulating its broad responsibilities and defining its relations
with United Nations agencies in the Western Hemisphere, the ICFTU emphasized the
importance of workers’ self-organization, collective bargaining, and improved standards of
living as central to “the responsibilities of the trade union movement of America and the World
toward peace founded on justice.”48
British and American labor leaders emphasized the importance of using trade union
activity to preserve peace in their bilateral meetings as well. Richard Walsh, an AFL
representative who met with the TUC in 1952, emphasized in his speech that “the first task of the
free world is to prevent World War III and not refight World War II.”49 Individual unions
explained part of their post-war mission in similar terms. The United Auto Workers (UAW)
adopted a resolution in 1953 emphasizing the important role that their organization and other
trade unions played in acting as a deterrent to “reactionary isolationists” and “trigger-happy
Senators” whose actions could undermine negotiation between nations and result in the use of
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force in disagreements between communist and non-communist countries.50 Walter Reuther, who
was president of the UAW and vice president of the AFL-CIO, echoed the resolution in a speech
to the TUC in 1957, arguing that the problem of world peace “transcends every other problem
we face.”51
In addressing the second ORIT convention in December 1952, AFL representative
William Doherty identified the greatest challenge facing the organization as the “ability to find a
way to insure lasting peace and international security as well as economic and social
advancement.” Doherty argued that peace, through a broadly defined freedom, was possible only
with the strength of organized labor, noting that Adolf Hitler’s Germany and Benito Mussolini’s
Italy first asserted dictatorial powers through dissolution of their nation’s trade unions. In
addition to identifying peace as an ideal, Doherty’s speech identified communist dictatorships as
the primary threat to peace, arguing that non-communist dictatorships used “identical methods
and employ the same basic techniques” as in communist countries. The means of undermining
communist dictatorship and preserving post-war peace, Doherty argued, was to “strengthen all
instruments of democracy, including the free-trade union movement.” Doherty suggested that
grassroots organizing and people’s participation in civic enterprises were essential and in their
absence “the rise of dictatorship of one form or another is inevitable.”52
Doherty’s address illuminated two important conclusions AFL leaders drew regarding
foreign policy by 1952. First, in associating dictatorship with the use of communist methods, it
insinuated that communism was the source of oppression, rather than totalitarianism. In doing so
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it sought to delegitimize communist ideology of local as well as Soviet origin and also discredit
the use of “communist methods;” specifically, the use of trade unions for organizing anticapitalist political activities. It also opened the possibility of compromise with right-wing
dictatorships as a temporary means of defeating communism since the latter was explained as the
root cause of tyranny. To be clear, America labor leaders actively, if inconsistently, opposed
right-wing authoritarian regimes that suppressed trade unions. The AFL-CIO refused several
requests from the State Department to participate in an International Labor Organization (ILO)
conference in Caracas, Venezuela in 1955 in protest to the Perez Jiménez regime’s suppression
of trade unions.53 Similarly, American labor leaders’ and other members of ORIT issued a
statement emphasizing the organization’s opposition to military dictatorships that repressed
citizens and made it difficult to counter communism in 1957.54 Nonetheless, the tendency in
American labor circles was to identify communism as the most significant threat to democracy
and peace. Secondly, the speech directly asserted that the only means of preserving workers’
freedom was institution building, the establishment of trade unions based on AFL methods.
Labor leaders, particularly in the AFL, reinforced the notion that trade unions played a
crucial role in preserving peace and that doing so was central to their mission; however they
acknowledged that peace was unachievable without action and may not be an end in itself. The
AFL’s views increasingly influenced debates within international labor organizations as
American labor leaders tried to work from within the ICFTU and especially ORIT in the early
1950s. An AFL memorandum describing the establishment and ideology of the newly
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established ICFTU in 1950 noted that peace and democracy were mutually compatible; however,
it argued that pacifism could not adapt to a modern society with constant threats of
totalitarianism. International labor organizations, the memorandum argued, needed to use all
means possible of advancing democracy which experience taught was the only means of
providing for people’s spiritual and material needs.55 Examination of international organizations
founding documents strongly suggests that the AFL’s international relations philosophy
permeated the ICFTU and especially ORIT.56
After the AFL engineered the replacement of TUC General Secretary Vincent Tewson as
president of the ICFTU with Omar Becu in early 1953, the AFL News Reporter took pride in
claiming that the new leadership would “transform the ICFTU from a dormant debating society
into an active and militant organization” to “advance peace, without appeasement.” The
inclusion of the phrase “without appeasement” is subtle but significant. The qualification
acknowledged that preserving peace was less important than pursuing aggressive anti-communist
policies from the perspective of AFL leadership. Specifically, the article noted that the new
leadership allowed for a shift away from Tewson’s strategy of negotiation toward a policy that
encouraged active engagement against communism.57 Pierre Ferri-Pisani, a French trade unionist
who worked closely with Lovestone, Brown, and the AFL’s covert Free Trade Union Committee
(FTUC), defended American labor’s emphasis on aggressive anti-communism and criticized
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efforts at peaceful coexistence in international labor relations.58 Ferri-Pisani criticized the
ICFTU, arguing that neutralism was akin to “cowardice” and “pathological indecision.”59
Similarly, George Harrison, Chairman of the AFL-CIO Committee on International Affairs,
reminded delegates to a Conference on World Affairs in 1960 that American labor did “not want
peace with chains and slavery” in a speech edited by Lovestone and Mike Ross, Director of the
AFL-CIO International Affairs Department. Harrison’s speech argued that communist expansion
would result in “the peace of the prison or the cemetery.”60
As mentioned above, Anglo-American labor leaders’ foreign policy rhetorically aimed at
protecting and advancing democratic principles through international trade union activity after
World War II because democracy and peace were deemed mutually constitutive. Regarding trade
unions’ preservation of democracy, David Dubinsky, one of CIO leaders most responsible for the
organization’s foreign policy, noted that Communist control of the trade unions in
Czechoslovakia presaged the 1948 Soviet coup d’état in that country.61 He argued that, “the
catastrophe that has befallen Czecho-Slovakia confirms that once a country falls under the yoke
of a totalitarian regime, free unions perish. There can be no democracy without free trade
unionism; there can be no bona fide, free, trade unionism without democracy.” Dubinsky
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concluded that, “Free trade unionism and genuine democracy need each other like a fish needs
water or like a human being needs air to breath and live.”62
A report presented to the CIO International Committee in 1950 argued that strengthening
free labor abroad was essential “so that we can promote democracy now and save lives later.”
The report warned that supporting free labor abroad “stands today as the only firm and reliable
bulwark against further infiltration of red totalitarianism” and the “double threat of reaction from
the Right and subversion from the Left.”63 The merged AFL-CIO reiterated similar objectives
and emphasized the mutually dependent relationship between trade unions and democratic
societies during their first convention in December 1955. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO defined the
organization’s international role as the pursuit of good relations to foster “and promote enduring
peace and freedom” and “to encourage mutually advantageous trade… in order to advance
common economic stability and social well-being.”64
Perhaps the most direct and illuminating examples of the difficult and sometimes
ambiguous nature of balancing several post-war ideals are two speeches found in Jay
Lovestone’s files among the records of the AFL-CIO. The first speech is untitled and seems to
have been given by an AFL representative, possibly Lovestone, to the TUC in 1954. It
acknowledged that the two organizations occasionally clashed in international activities but
expressed hope that they had “learned to disagree without being disagreeable.” It suggested that
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failure to cooperate was suicide and that “above all, we do not want to have [sic] fight a World
War III.”65 The speech illuminates labor leaders’ continued fear of military engagement,
reinforces the notion that they viewed their role in the post-war world as advancing solidarity
between national trade union fronts to avoid conflict, and makes clear that the AFL and TUC
disagreed on how to achieve those objectives.
The second speech seems to have been given to the TUC in 1955 by either C.J. Haggarty
of the AFL or Lovestone. Lovestone, who was perhaps more influential than anyone else in
establishing and implementing the AFL’s foreign policy program, almost certainly contributed to
or at least approved the speech. The speech outlines the importance of democracy and trade
unions’ role in upholding it, emphasizing that the AFL could not support non-free unions even if
official United States policy was supportive of a dictatorial government. However, the speech
cautions that “In the quest for peace, we must be prepared to sup with Satan.” After reinforcing
the superiority of democratic ideals and demanding caution when “dining with the devil,”
Lovestone continues, arguing that “Ballerina, prima dona, and concert tours, trade missions and
exchange of sundry sorts of delegations, may appear attractive but they are not effective means
for reducing international tension.”66 While stressing labor leaders’ ideals for the post-war world
and their willingness to stand for free trade union principles even faced with conflicting policies
on the part of their own government, the speech insinuates a willingness to engage in antidemocratic activities when necessary to achieve broader objectives.
Furthermore, members of the AFL-CIO were allied with the Cold War Council, Council
on Communist Aggression, and other organizations engaged in promoting psychological warfare
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in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Cold War Council openly justified its willingness to unite
with totalitarian governments. The Council argued that “All totalitarian tyrannies are bad, but
only the Communists aim at the destruction of the U.S. and the enslavement of all mankind,”
while noting that the United States aligned with the Soviet Union to defeat Nazi Germany.
Similarly, they argued, cooperation with non-communist dictators may be necessary to combat
Communism.67 Thus, some American labor leaders were willing to temporarily sacrifice
democratic principles abroad to defeat what they viewed as an immediately and existential threat
to democracy.
Importantly, labor leaders’ views of dictatorship and democracy mirrored those expressed
in President Dwight Eisenhower’s National Security Council (NSC) and pursued throughout the
1950s during the period under examination in this dissertation. Nelson Rockefeller,
Eisenhower’s special assistant on foreign affairs, told the NSC that dictators were “a mixed
blessing.” Rockefeller suggested that authoritarian Latin American leaders effectively combat
communism; however, he warned the NSC that it was in the best interest of the United States to
back democratic governments. Eisenhower’s agreement with Rockefeller’s assessment suggests
that American labor and governmental leaders shared a belief in promoting regional democracy
while expressing a willingness to see democratic principles temporarily compromised to defeat
communism.68 Furthermore, Stephen Rabe notes that Eisenhower worked with dictatorial
governments and even rewarded Latin American dictators who enforced anti-communist
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stability.69 Lovestone’s cryptic speech and the Eisenhower administration’s reluctant support of
anti-communist dictators are sobering acknowledgments of the contradictions American labor
leaders and policymakers faced and the compromises they were willing to make in the pursuit of
foreign policy objectives.
Economic Development, Stability, and Institution Building
Anglo-American labor leaders consistently argued in favor of economic policies and
trade agreements designed to promote economic growth and stability overseas; however, their
idealism was trumped by motives rooted in protecting their constituents’ economic status and
combatting communism to preserve liberal, Western-oriented capitalist system and their
favorable position within it.70 There were notable differences, however, in the economic
philosophies of AFL, CIO, and TUC leaders and those dissimilarities contributed to the
ideological outlook that shaped overseas activities in the 1950s as well as Guianese political and
labor leaders’ response to Western international organizations. The AFL’s gradual assertion of
dominance over American labor’s foreign policy and eventually within the ICFTU, ORIT, and
the Caribbean Area Division of ORIT (CADORIT), led to a more conservative economic stance
that was increasingly hostile to the Guianese labor leaders’ socialist tendencies.
Sidney Hillman spoke of the need for international cooperation to industrialize
underdeveloped areas, pursue reconstruction after the war, and to “fully utilize the rich resources
of the world for the benefit of its people, yielding rising standards of living and real security to
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the men and women of all nations,” at the World Trade Union Congress in 1945.71 Hillman’s
speech was not radical, particularly in the context in which it was given--during World War II as
an appeal for international trade union cooperation in rebuilding the world and contributing to a
lasting peace. Nonetheless, there was criticism within the AFL regarding Hillman’s insinuation
of international cooperation. In June 1945 Robert Maisel warned AFL President William Green
that Hillman’s proposal to “provide other credits and facilities” for reconstruction were part of
“the economic chess game that we now see being played before our eyes, to make American
resources available to Russia and Russia’s allies after World War II.”72
A comparison of two reports written by CIO Executive Secretary Ernst Schwarz
illuminates the ways in which labor’s emerging Cold War contributed to the contradictions CIO
leaders faced in balancing economic ideals with Cold War context. Schwarz’s first report
articulated the difficulties facing transnational labor cooperation in economic development
programs in an analysis he wrote for the WFTU Economic and Employment Commission in
1948. In his study, Schwarz acknowledged a split among trade union leaders in the WFTU over
the type of economic development programs proposed for needy countries. CIO, TUC, and
French trade unionists argued that agricultural development and private foreign investment
should form the basis of economic programs to underdeveloped countries. Conversely, Eastern
European trade unionists argued that industrialization and self-sufficiency were the central
components of economic development in poor countries and those improvements could only be
made after colonies gained political independence.73
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Bureaucratic debates likely hardened positions in the organization, particularly in respect
to the CIO’s position alongside the TUC and French union leaders seemingly acting in support of
colonialism and emphasizing the importance of private investment. Nonetheless, Schwarz’s
report suggests that British and American trade union leaders endorsed policies within the
WFTU that reinforced the nature of international economic relationships regardless of idealism.
It is also significant that Schwarz noted the somewhat isolated American, British, and French
position on the issue of economic development when he acknowledged that other countries,
including Brazil, China, India, Australia, and Norway “ took a stand somewhere in the
middle…but often showed more sympathy toward the views of Eastern European members.”74
Schwarz’s note suggests that there was sympathy among many international labor leaders for
political-economic ideas and international policies that conflicted with British and American
aims, including in former British colonies. The expression of starkly contrasting views of
economic development in the context of post-war debates regarding the future of industrial
modernization and the international system reinforced American and British labor leaders’
proclivities toward greater international activity to stabilize the existing system and their position
within it.
Schwarz’s second report, which he sent Mike Ross in March 1949, was the draft of a plan
for economic development in Latin America. Schwarz’s proposed plan is striking in the extent to
which it deviated from the Western economic development view articulated in his WFTU report
from the previous year. Schwarz argued that Latin America’s economic underdevelopment was a
result of foreign exploitation that subverted regional nations’ attempts to diversify their
economies and created financial dependencies. Regional development, he argued, could only be
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obtained through a progressive economic program undertaken by democratic governments in
coordination with free labor institutions. Schwarz criticized the “colonial and semi-colonial”
nature of Latin American economies, argued in favor of national economic planning that
subordinated private investment to public agencies, proposed land reform, and advocated
nationalization to develop heavy industry.75 ORIT’s founding members copied Schwarz’s
analysis nearly verbatim and included in the discussions during the organization’s establishment
in March 1951 and an ICFTU report in 1949 echoed the primacy of public good over private
profit.76
Comparing the Schwarz documents suggests that rivalries and bureaucratic struggles
within the WFTU polarized views and discouraged compromise on subjects about which
delegates held similar views. Even though Schwarz’s proposals were included in discussions at
the ORIT founding and similar ideals were expressed in ICFTU resolutions, in practice the
Western labor internationals did not emphasize the importance of Schwarz’s development
program. In practice, the ICFTU and ORIT primarily focused on institution building to confront
communism and labor movements that engaged in socialist trade union practices, despite the
importance British and American labor leaders placed on economic development.
The uncertainty regarding ORIT’s primary purpose further illuminates the complexity of
American labor’s international activities. ORIT was established, in part, to assist in strengthening
trade unionism in developing Latin American nations and advance the goals of regional workers
in collaboration with American labor. According to Rutgers professor and labor activist Robert
75

Ernst Schwarz, “A Hemisphere Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Countries of Latin
America,” March 15, 1949, International Affairs Department (CIO), Director’s Files (Mike Ross), 1945-1955, SubSeries 1: International Committees, 007/16, CIO Latin America Committee, 1949, GMMA.
76
“Statement on Economic and Social Development Program for Latin America,” attached to documents pertaining
to the establishment of the Inter-American Regional Organization of ORIT, March, 1951, International Affairs
Department, Staff Files, George Delaney’s Files, 1921-1957, ICFTU 1951-1952, GMMA; “International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions: Its Organization, Objectives, Ideology and Structure,” May 2, 1950, Office of
the President-Meany (1948-1960), Box 49, Formation, 1949-1950, GMMA.

56

Alexander, ORIT’s role was essential because American companies owned and operated many
of the corporations exploiting hemispheric workers. Consequently, ORIT and American labor
unions pressured United States businesses that were harassing Latin American labor as a means
of protecting workers in the United States and the rest of the region.77 Alexander’s view is
significant because it is the clearest expression of his idealism and because he was a central
figure in AFL activity in British Guiana in the early 1950s. Nonetheless, Alexander’s
explanation was expressed in a public forum and as will be discussed in the next three chapters
his activities in British Guiana were far more focused on political activity and institution building
than economic activities.
William Doherty acknowledged another subtlety in the AFL’s position during an address
at the second ORIT convention in December 1952. Doherty noted that “the most compelling
reason why organized labor in the United States is vitally concerned with preventing a recurrence
of economic crises” was because “one nation cannot live in peace and plenty while the rest of the
world is plagued with misery and starvation.”78 The AFL vice president’s speech was primarily
an argument against dictatorship; however, in the context of articulating an aggressive vision for
ORIT’s opposition to totalitarianism Doherty illuminated a more complicated issue facing
international labor. Early Cold War AFL efforts to promote economic advancement abroad were
at their core attempts to avoid the recurrence of political radicalism that could lead to military
conflict. On their most fundamental level, AFL appeals to avert armed conflagration were
attempts to protect American workers. Thus, their support for economic advancement overseas
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was occasionally limited and self-serving however sincere and laudable attempts to prevent a
third World War.
Doherty’s address to a group of hemispheric labor leaders called for a sound program of
industrialization to diversify Latin American economies; however, American labor leaders did
not consistently support measures aimed at altering the status of underdeveloped areas when in a
position to advocate for policies that could conflict with American workers’ interests. Stanley
Ruttenberg, director of the CIO’s Department of Education and Research, had an opportunity to
influence American policymaking when he spoke with the Eisenhower administration’s
Commission on Foreign Economic Policy in 1953.79 Ruttenberg argued for a trade policy that
avoided supporting industrialization in the hemisphere’s underdeveloped areas and instead
emphasized the significance of trade unions to the post-war economy and preservation of
American workers’ increasing living standards. He suggested that unimpeded “tri-cornered”
trade gave the United States access to raw materials, provided underdeveloped areas with dollars
for development and purchase of American exports, and also gave underdeveloped areas dollars
to spend in Europe allowing Europeans to purchase American manufactured products.
Ruttenberg’s focus on creating jobs for American workers led to his advocating a policy that
reinforced the existing international economic system and underdevelopment in some parts of the
world.80
David McDonald, President of the United Steelworkers of America, disagreed with
Ruttenberg and suggested that industrialization in underdeveloped areas might not harm
79
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American workers and may even be beneficial.81 The difference between Ruttenberg’s and
McDonald’s views on industrialization in undeveloped areas is significant. Certainly Ruttenberg
was acting according to his mandate in advocating for policies in the best interest of his
constituents. However, many colonial leaders, including the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in
British Guiana, saw the post-war era as an opportunity to improve their country’s place in the
international economic system, to establish a modern industrial economy, and consequently to
increase the quality of life for people often living in dire poverty. PPP leaders understood that
complete incorporation into Anglo-American international institutions such as ORIT or the
ICFTU, or close relationships with the AFL/AFL-CIO and TUC, would result in inconsistent
support for the structural changes they sought as their territories moved toward independence.
Boris Shishkin, an AFL economist, spoke to the Eisenhower commission on behalf of
AFL President George Meany the same day as Ruttenberg. Meany’s statement echoed
Ruttenberg’s argument for increased efforts at establishing minimum international labor
standards and emphasized the importance of American economic assistance to underdeveloped
areas for a several reasons. Meany suggested that economic aid could improve living standards
and purchasing power in underdeveloped areas, increase American exports, and improve access
to raw materials. He also noted that in many cases American aid was actually spent in the United
States and sent abroad as commodities that aided domestic job creation. Meany further argued
that economic aid and development abroad would increase trade and interconnectedness and
undermine communism’s appeal; however, he emphasized that his support for freer trade and
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economic cooperation was not a response to communism but a sincere belief that economic
isolationism stunted growth and created long-term economic decay on a wide scale.82
Shifting focus, Ruttenberg also reminded the commission that the CIO joined
international trade confederations to assist in building trade unions throughout the world because
“Until the workers in various parts of the world are organized into sound, free, democratic trade
unions, they will not be able effectively to establish and maintain adequate living standards.”
Ruttenberg argued that the absence of trade unions depressed wages abroad and made it
impossible for even improved mass production techniques in the United States to allow
American businesses to compete.83 Similarly, McDonald suggested that United States trade
policy should contribute to raising wage standards abroad to protect American workers from
unfair competition.84 Ruttenberg’s statement was consistent with CIO discussions earlier in the
year. Labor leaders at the CIO’s executive board meeting in August 1953 determined that the
expansion of free trade unions and expanded economic assistance in underdeveloped areas could
increase living standards and “defeat the false totalitarian promise of world Communism.” CIO
leaders argued that objective could be achieved with expanded trade to assure access to raw
materials and foreign markets.85 The CIO’s foreign policy was, at least by 1953, focused on
expanding trade and assisting economic improvement in underdeveloped areas as a means of
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improving the American economy and countering the conditions that led poor countries’ leaders
to look for non-capitalist political-economic systems.
Similarly, a UAW resolution adopted in March 1953 emphasized the need for
international labor standards “so that exploitation of weakly organized workers in one country
shall not undermine the wage rates and living standards of workers in other countries.” The
resolution also argued for promoting economic and social betterment for workers abroad
primarily because CIO leaders expressed confidence that economic improvement and social
justice were the “fundamental answer to the challenge of Communist Russia.”86 David Dubinsky
discussed the interdependence of labor unions in a 1949 speech and emphasized the need for
cooperation in the economic sphere. He noted that trade union internationalism improved “living
standards and purchasing power-especially in underdeveloped areas” and that consequently “the
prospects for better pay and decent working conditions are enhanced even in countries with
stronger economies like the United States.”87
Ruttenberg’s and McDonald’s concerns, the UAW resolution, and Meany’s and
Dubinsky’s speeches hint at economic contradictions in American labor’s post-war foreign
policy. Idealistically, American labor leaders wanted to assist in improving workers’ standards of
living abroad out of a sense of solidarity; however, they had an obligation to pursue policies that
were most advantageous to American workers. In some ways, such as increased wages for
workers in undeveloped areas, those policies seemed mutually compatible; however, other
economic issues, such as promoting industrial development abroad, held ambiguous and possibly
detrimental consequences for American workers. Moreover, economic programs were often
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understood as tools for combating communism and contributing to national security rather than
as ends in themselves.
As will be seen in subsequent chapters, AFL-CIO leaders opposed Guianese unions
whose leaders cooperated with politicians to alter the colony’s place in the tri-cornered trade
Ruttenberg described. AFL-CIO opposition was not solely, or even primarily a result of the
specific challenge to Guiana’s position as a provider of raw materials in and of itself; however,
concerns regarding the nature of trade relations were an important part of the milieu that shaped
American and Guianese viewpoints. American labor leaders saw various challenges to the
American-defined system through trade, domestic political-economy, trade union practices, and
transnational relations as mutually reinforcing. American labor leaders frequently suggested that
deviations from the United States-defined system constituted serious challenges that threatened
American power and the prosperity and security of the American workforce.
The Eisenhower Commission agreed with Ruttenberg, recommending that the United
States “be party to agreements with other countries to raise standards generally” and that an
international conference could be called to address the subject, “the focal point [of which] might
be the formulation of a Code of Fair Labor Standards, which would include the right of workers
to organize in free trade unions and engage in free collective bargaining.”88 According to
President Eisenhower’s Committee on Foreign Economic Policy, trade unions were fundamental
to economic development and the advancement of American workers’ standards of living. An
International Labor Organization (ILO) resolution drawn up in 1956 was consistent with
Eisenhower’s views. The committee, which included the AFL’s Latin American representative,
Serafino Romualdi, and Mike Ross, argued for the need to establish strong trade unions to help
88
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businesses increase production in underdeveloped areas. The ILO explained the unions’ role in
terms similar to the AFL model and concluded that increases in production, rather than social
expenditures, were the key to improved living conditions in the developing world.89
AFL, CIO, and TUC economic policies were simultaneously idealistic and pragmatic,
focused on promoting advancement for workers abroad and protecting workers’ interests at
home. Idealism was discarded in favor of policies that directly benefited American workers when
interests seemingly clashed. Furthermore, Cold War tensions polarized the nature of AFL/AFLCIO and TUC transnational economic programs. As a result of AFL, CIO, and TUC economic
policies some Guianese political and trade union leaders concluded that cooperation with
Western labor institutions would inhibit the pursuit of far-reaching and necessary social reforms.
Free trade unionism
The TUC, CIO, and especially AFL responded to events in British Guiana based on an
ideological commitment to “free trade unionism” which they argued was essential to providing a
democratic voice for workers in capitalist-democratic systems. It is significant that the
AFL/AFL-CIO understanding of free trade unionism was not universally accepted however
much it dominated the American labor leaders’ worldview. Anthony Carew suggests that the
American perspective emphasized the importance of unions’ independence from a variety of
social institutions, including political parties, while the TUC was more flexible, accepting close
connection between political parties and trade unions as long as union imperatives were not
subordinated to government, employer, or foreign domination.90 Several scholars suggest that the
89
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ideal was a rhetorical façade, or at best paradoxical. Beth Sims suggests that AFL and CIO
accepted a role as subordinate partners in the United States and undermined independent unions
abroad at the same time American labor leaders define free unions as independent of government
or business control and committed to democracy and pluralism.91 Victor Silverman notes that
TUC leaders frequently argued in favor of voluntaryism, which was the notion that individual
workers retained the right to choose whether or not to join a union. Silverman suggests that
voluntaryism was a variant of free trade unionism and that both the American and British trade
union ideologies devolved into narrow anti-communism by 1949.92
Given the wealth of scholarly discourse on the subject, it is necessary only to highlight a
few aspects of the ideal that relate directly to Anglo-American labor involvement in British
Guiana. AFL/AFL-CIO leadership’s understanding of free labor was viewed in part through the
prism of the pre-war anti-fascist experience. David Dubinsky argued that trade unions were a
defense against political radicalism on both the left and the right and that extremism advanced
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when unions were undermined.93 American labor leaders argued that unions closely connected to
political parties were particularly vulnerable to becoming organs of state control in the same way
government controlled unions repressed German and Italian workers in the 1930s.94 They further
argued that governments assumed the role of employers in state dominated economic systems
and as a result that unions connected to political parties could not act independently of the state
because the party could not negotiate against itself.95 The TUC was more ambiguous regarding
trade unions’ affiliations, generally arguing that they should be “free from outside control by
Government, employers, or any other influence which might come between a worker and his
union.”96
Colonial political leaders, including in British Guiana, were often drawn from the ranks
of organized labor as a result of long-standing colonial structures and limitations on suffrage. In
British Guiana, property requirement restricted the vote to several thousand Guianese until to the
1953 election.97 Moreover, local politicians operating within a colonial framework could be
disregarded in a way that labor leaders could not if they were able to mobilize the workforce in
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opposition to employers. Consequently, British and especially American labor leaders were
suspicious of the development of a politicized labor movement in British Guiana and the
connections between politicians and trade unions as the colony progressed toward selfgovernment.
The Impact of International Labor Organizations on AFL, CIO, and TUC Leaders
In addition to pursuing ideals and broad objectives, American and British labor leaders’
shaped their organizations’ foreign policies based on experiences with post-war international
labor organizations and the nature and consequences of the WFTU-ICFTU rivalry directly
impacted decolonization in British Guiana. The TUC and CIO helped establish the WFTU in
1945 to promote global solidarity in the international labor movement. During the waning years
of World War II, CIO and TUC officials argued that post-war peace and global economic
stability required cooperation between the major national labor fronts in the post-war world
including Communist organizations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. CIO and TUC
architects of the WFTU expressed a desire to stabilize the global system and advance workers’
rights through a worldwide labor organization that participated as members in new international
organizations such as the United Nations.98
Sidney Hillman emphasized the importance of giving labor representatives a voice at
post-war peace settlements and conferences regarding economic reconstruction in a speech at the
London Conference in February 1945, which served as the precursor to the establishment of the
WFTU. Hillman argued that the emerging WFTU would hasten the end of World War II and
assist in establishing “an enduring peace, an economy which will fully utilize the rich resources
of the world for the benefit of its people” resulting in improved living standards and

98

Silverman, Imagining Internationalism in American and British Labor, 5; Lewis L. Lorwin, The International
Labor Movement: History, Policies, Outlook (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), 205-210.

66

democratization after the war. However, he cautioned the conference’s delegates that “powerful
and well organized forces of reaction” opposed the formation of a new international workers’
organization. Reactionary victory, Hillman argued, meant that “all we have suffered and fought
and died for will have been in vain.” Ultimately, Hillman warned that reactionary victory over a
unified international workers’ organization would result in “economic depression,
unemployment and want, the impression of weaker peoples and imperialist aggressions, leading
inevitably to a new world war.”99
AFL leaders argued that the inclusion of Soviet and Communist unions in the WFTU
threatened to subordinate the organization to dictates from the Soviet state and that inclusion of
multiple national fronts from one country strengthened the CIO challenge to AFL predominance
in the American labor movement. The AFL did not participate in the new international as a result
of AFL leaders’ concerns. AFL leaders argued that their objective was the “rebuilding and
reconstituting a new world order, the reestablishing of agencies of free government, and the
resurrecting and resumption of free institutions of labor,” suggesting that they would act
independently if necessary.100 Two tenets defined the AFL position and they resulted in two
important conclusions. First, AFL leaders argued that communist ideology necessitated trade
unions subordination to the Communist Party and threatened the independence of trade unions.
Second, they argued that all communism was Soviet directed and that labor leaders who adhered
to communist ideology inevitably used trade union activity to advance Soviet objectives. AFL
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leaders accepted isolation from the international labor community and a sharpening of the anticommunist issue within American unions as a consequence of non-affiliation in the WFTU.101
Geert van Goethem suggests that the division between the AFL and TUC regarding
participation in the WFTU was central to postwar developments in international labor.
According to van Goethem, the AFL’s aim of promoting freedom and democracy was
irreconcilable with the TUC’s desire to narrowly focus on trade union representation and
recognition to defend the interests of British workers internationally.102 It is important to
consider again the importance of contradictions between AFL ideals and actions; specifically,
three factors help illuminate the AFL’s post-war ideology and refusal to join the WFTU.
First, the WFTU included a large number of Communist unions and AFL leaders
referenced Soviet attempts to infiltrate and manipulate international labor organizations in the
1920s as evidence that Communist unions could not be trusted to engage in collaborative labor
efforts rather than political subversion. Lovestone was particularly influential in shaping AFL
leaders’ interpretations since he was a central figure in debates between American Communists
in the 1920s and 1930s. Ultimately, Lovestone’s challenge to Joseph Stalin’s mandates led to his
separation from the party and his renouncing communism.103 Some Communist leaders thought
that trade unions should be ignored as reactionary elements of capitalism while others thought
they should be taken over from within and used as tools of the Communist Party. Both strategies
discounted the legitimacy of using trade unions to independently pursue workers’ interests.
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Moreover, the representative of the Communist International (Comintern) determined
trade union strategy instead of members of the Communist Party in the United States (CPUSA).
The Comintern also advocated the use of the Red International as a means of organizing national
trade unions in support of international communism from the outside.104 During the 1940s, the
AFL pointed to creation of a new labor international while the International Federation of Trade
Unions (IFTU) was already in existence as evidence of the subversive nature of the World Trade
Unions Conference in 1945. Thus, AFL leaders concluded that the WFTU’s purpose was to
impose Soviet political philosophy on the international labor movement and “subordinate the
American labor movement, its affiliates and membership as well as that of other lands, to the
dictates and the will of those who themselves are not free to determine their destiny.”105
Secondly, the AFL deemed unions under communist systems illegitimate since they were
involuntary organizations that acted as subordinate agencies of governments.106 The involuntary
nature of Soviet unions also clashed with British ideals of voluntaryism, though differences were
briefly muted after the WFTU’s establishment.107 AFL leaders argued that their resistance to the
WFTU was a continuation of long-standing opposition to government controlled trade unions
that included pre-war Communist organizations as well as Nazi and Fascist controlled labor
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organizations during the 1930s and 1940s.108 AFL Vice President William Doherty reminded
delegates at the second ORIT convention that his organization was dedicated to “vigorously
oppos[ing] any kind of dictatorship-communist, fascist, military or civil, where the privileged
few impose their ruthless edicts upon the masses,” undermining the freedoms that were the
foundation of AFL policy.109 AFL leaders argued that the WFTU’s theory of unionism would
eventually lead to a political system designed to “enslave and enchain workers to the state.”110
Furthermore, AFL leaders voiced strong opposition to a WFTU resolution that they interpreted
as accepting the inevitability of a forced labor program in the Soviet Union, suggesting it was an
indication of broader Soviet designs to use the organization for the oppression of workers
worldwide.111 More generally, American labor leaders promoted “business unionism” that aimed
at the pursuit of increased material benefits rather than societal transformation and compromise
with unions in the WFTU assured a degree of politicization in trade union activities.
Finally, the AFL and CIO were engaged in an intense struggle for control of the United
States labor movement and the WFTU’s acceptance of representatives from multiple national
unions assured the AFL could not claim to be American workers’ sole representative in the
international sphere. The AFL-CIO conflict was the least significant factor motivating AFL
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opposition to the WFTU; however, AFL leaders concluded that “In terms of domestic labor
politics” the CIO’s increased prestige “will mean an acute sharpening of the anti-Communist
issue within the American unions” as well as “a further widening of the breach between the CIO
and AFL which will close the doors to labor unity for perhaps years to come.”112 Therefore,
territorial struggles contributed to AFL foreign policy and hostility toward the WFTU.
The AFL’s red-baiting as a means of delegitimizing the CIO contributed to the enflamed
rhetoric of early Cold War domestic political discourse in the United States and increased the
AFL’s standing as the Cold War intensified.113 AFL anti-communism increased the
organization’s esteem after the CIO withdrew from the WFTU citing the Soviet-domination of
the organization that motivated AFL non-participation. As a result, the AFL’s domestic status
increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s as the NSC emphasized the importance of
“destroying the structure of relationships by which leaders of the All-Union Communist Party
have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority” in countries not under communist
control, specifically the WFTU.114 Consequently, AFL members dominated government-labor
programs, including in British Guiana.
The TUC, CIO, and most Western European unions withdrew from the WFTU in early
1949, arguing that the organization was “controlled by communist organizations which
themselves are controlled by the Kremlin and Cominform.”115 TUC representatives argued that
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the WFTU’s major policy discussions, particularly regarding the European Recovery Program,
were poisoned with propaganda and a “stream of vilification and abuse which has been poured
on the British T.U.C., American Labor and leaders of those national centers who are not
prepared to become subservient to Communist doctrine and dictation.”116 According to the TUC,
Soviet leaders and the Cominform used WFTU publications and meetings as a platform for
communist political propaganda and refusal to cooperate in the pursuit of goodwill and trade
unionism resulting in irreparable organizational schisms.
Nigel Bolland contests TUC leaders’ public rationalization for leaving the WFTU.
Bolland argues that British labor leaders’ motives were largely a consequence of the TUC’s
inability to control the WFTU and the possibility that the international would support colonial
labor unions engaged in labor politics outside of acceptable British practices.117 Significantly,
British trade union leaders concluded that the WFTU was directly opposed to TUC interests
when it continued to function after the TUC and a considerable number of national centers
withdrew from the organization. TUC leaders justified their position on the assumption that the
remaining members of the WFTU were aligned based on their shared Communist viewpoints and
accepted as inevitable an intensification of international rivalries.118

Committee, “Congress Resolution No. 37: Trade Unions in Developing Countries,” July 26, 1966, Marjorie
Nicholson Files, Box 8, I.C. Minutes 1965/66 [901], TUCLC. Bernard Morris noted in an article in World Politics in
1956 that the WFTU had an estimated 65 million members in 1953. He argued that about 58.5 million members
were from communist-governed countries, 4.5 million members in communist-dominated trade federations in
France and Italy, and about 2 million members outside of the communist world, primarily in India and Indonesia.
See: Bernard S. Morris, “Communist International Front Organizations: Their Nature and Function,” World Politics
Vol. 9 No. 1 (October 1956), 76-87.
116
Published statement by British TUC, CIO, and Confederation of Free Trade Unions of the Netherlands, “Free
Trade Unions Leave the WFTU,” undated, International Affairs Department (CIO) Director’s Files (Mike Ross),
1945-1955, Sub-series 1, World Federation of Trade Unions, GMMA.
117
Bolland, The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean, 490.
118
Memorandum attached to letter from Vincent Tewson, General Secretary of the British Trades Union Congress to
Secretaries of all Affiliated Organizations, October 27, 1948, Office of the President-George Meany (1948-1960),
Box 52, Subjects: World Federation of Trade Unions (1945-1949), GMMA. For more on the CIO and TUC
withdrawal from the WFTU, see: Trades Union Congress Memorandum to the Secretaries of All Affiliated
Organizations: World Federation of Trade Unions, 27 October 1948, RG1-027, Office of the President, President’s

72

Western labor leaders concluded that cooperation with Communist trade unions or
communist labor leaders was impossible after the WFTU split. American labor leaders,
especially in the AFL, conflated Soviet dictatorship with communist ideology and occasionally
opposed social reformism and trade union organization closely aligned with political parties
under an aegis of anti-communism. As a result, social revolutionary movements that connected
trade union and political activity, especially those that were sympathetic to communist ideals,
were considered contributors to Soviet imperialism and a direct threat to international capitalism,
democracy, and national security. That context, reinforced through experiences in the WFTU,
was critical in explaining American, and to a lesser degree British labor responses to trade union
conflicts and political developments in British Guiana. Three other important developments in
international labor during the period between 1944 and 1949 directly shaped subsequent events
in British Guiana.
First, the London Conference offered the initial opportunity for British colonial trade
unionists to participate in an international labor conference and the AFL’s report on the meeting
suggested that “sections of the final resolution gave partial expression to their demands.”119
George Lichtblau argues that the TUC’s suggested inviting colonial unionists to the conference;
however, subsequent events suggest that even if that were true TUC support for colonial
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working-class aspirations was limited.120 Nigel Bolland points out that the TUC refused to
financially assist colonial unions’ participation in the WFTU.121At the same time, Arnold
Steinbach argues that Soviet concepts of class struggle and imperialism articulated in the WFTU
neatly conflated with nationalist movements in many areas.122 Steinbach’s suggestion is
particularly relevant in examining the Jagan faction in British Guiana where labor-employer
conflict was inherently a conflict for power between colonists and colonizers and Cheddi Jagan
frequently sought assistance from the WFTU in confronting British imperialism. Bolland argues
that the WFTU was an effective advocate for colonial interests and that British labor leaders’
expressed considerable fear that colonial unions would choose to align with the WFTU rather
than the TUC when the British organization left the international.123 Finally, Lichtblau suggests
that the WFTU assisted movements in colonial areas seeking quick detachments from colonizers
and social transformations to break with the Western political and economic system beginning in
the mid-1950s.124
Meanwhile, TUC resistance to anti-colonialism in the ICFTU, and TUC, AFL/AFL-CIO,
and ICFTU support for affiliated unions in the 1950s alienated colonial labor leaders who wished
to organize in a manner inconsistent from the Western model. Moreover, AFL/AFL-CIO, TUC,
and ICFTU support for affiliated unions was inherently a political activity in the colonies given
the political nature of colonial trade unionism. The competition between the ICFTU and WFTU
after 1949 allowed colonial unions to appeal for external support in internal labor conflicts based
on ideological affiliation, often by exploiting ideological fears.
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Second, the formation of the ICFTU and the articulation of its aims led to an increased
emphasis on anti-communism in Western labor while simultaneously increasing competition
between the TUC and AFL/AFL-CIO.125 American and British labor leaders immediately
conflicted over leadership in the ICFTU and the AFL orchestrated TUC General Secretary
Vincent Tewson’s removal as ICFTU President in 1953. Additionally, TUC and AFL leaders
expressed differences of opinion regarding the primary objectives of Western international labor
activities. The Colonial Office echoed TUC perspectives in reviewing the purpose of the newly
formed ICFTU in 1951, noting that that the primary purpose of the organization was “the
establishment of a powerful and effective international organization” that was “pledged to the
task of promoting the interests of working people throughout the world” rather than merely
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existing to counter the WFTU.126 Nonetheless, in examining the trajectory of its international
programs after World War II, the TUC International Committee acknowledged in 1966 that “for
many of its affiliates” the ICFTU’s creation was merely an attempt to “counteract the activities
of the WFTU.”127 Specifically, AFL leaders interpreted the organization’s primary objective as
operating “as a militant arm of free labor throughout the world in the fight against Communist
slavery.”128
Additionally, AFL influence contributed to a politically conservative ICFTU constitution
that differed from previous international organizations most significantly in its dissociation from
emphasizing class struggle and the overthrow of the economic system.129 Anglo-American
governmental influence in the organization also contributed to the ICFTU’s minimizing
challenges to the existing international system. Several labor leaders argued that the United
States and British governments worked through their national trade union fronts to use the
ICFTU as an arm of governmental foreign policy.
Richard Deverall, a former UAW education officer and member of the AFL’s FTUC,
noted in a report to George Meany that, “from the foundation of the ICFTU the American
government has financed in one way or another activities of the ICFTU in order to further
American foreign policy.” Deverall also argued that the British government financed or used
American financing to use the ICFTU to “choke off rebellious Communist and/or vigorously
nationalist unions in the colonies” and to develop ICFTU unions to “divert nationalist aspirations
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into activities that are non-political.” Deverall noted that the British were frank about their use of
the international to suppress development of nationalist demands for independence.130 AngloAmerican pursuit of national interests in the ICFTU undermined the organization’s efforts to
promote international worker solidary and led to skepticism about ICFTU motives among many
colonial and Western European labor leaders.
The brief CIO-TUC inclusion in the WFTU exacerbated long-standing tensions between
the AFL, CIO, and TUC and struggles for influence over the nature of the ICFTU assured that
conflicts continued after the CIO and TUC left the WFTU. Western labor leaders in the ICFTU
from countries other than the United States and Great Britain frequently struggled to limit
AFL/AFL-CIO and to a lesser extent TUC influence in the organization and independent AngloAmerican overseas labor activities. ICFTU bureaucratic struggles continued throughout the
1950s and 1960s. AFL leaders, including George Meany, discussed leaving the organization to
pursue independent activity almost immediately and withdrew from the ICFTU from 1969 to
1982.131 AFL alienation from the international labor community reinforced its tendency to act
independently in pursuit of business unionism and opposed to the European social reformist style
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of unionism.132 Taken together with TUC parochialism in the colonies, the five year period in
international labor activity after World War II contributed to conditions that undermined efforts
at coordinating institutional decolonization through the ICFTU in the 1950s.
In sum, there were three specific outcomes that grew out of the early Cold War period in
international labor that directly impacted the working-class struggle in British Guiana between
1948 and 1965: a strong anti-communist trend in Western labor, a power struggle between
American and British labor leaders that minimized cooperative action through an international
labor body, and the establishment of two international labor organizations with different views
on political economy and colonialism. In British Guiana, the AFL/AFL-CIO, TUC, and ICFTU
affiliated with organizations that were strongly anti-communist and that did not associate with
the WFTU. Most importantly, the TUC-AFL rivalry occasionally impeded the coordination of
British and American labor programs in British Guiana and resulted in inefficient institution
building efforts as a whole.133
American and British labor leaders expressed a shared desire to build liberal capitalistoriented trade unions connected to the Western international labor movement in British Guiana
partially to protect their own nations’ interests. Anglo-American trade union leaders argued that
pro-Western trade unions would contribute to establishing a non-communist government and
improve Guianese workers’ conditions and influence based on the ideals of free labor unionism
or voluntaryism. However, American labor leaders considered the primary threat to AFL-styled
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unions to be political leaders who acted through the labor movement to subvert the capitalistdemocratic system and AFL-CIO efforts aimed at address the political threat as a means of
defending Guiana’s unions from subversion to a political party. Conversely, the TUC expressed
the view that the threat to Western interests in British Guiana was a lack of effective democratic
institutions that perpetuated poor conditions for workers, workers’ lack of investment in the
political-economic system, and a consequent success for radical political leaders.
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Chapter 3: Anglo-American Objectives and the Limits of Official Cooperation

British policymakers advocated granting colonies’ independence more quickly than the
United States at times, as was the case in British Guiana. American and British trade unions and
governments cooperated to advance liberal capitalism after World War II, especially in
contesting the expansion of communism, which was the most direct threat to a liberal capitalist
international system. Both nations’ political leaders argued for collaboration with trade unions to
build capitalist institutions as a means of pursuing their foreign policies. American policymakers,
however, expressed less confidence than the British that institutional structures could effectively
safeguard against communism. In British Guiana, American policymakers’ determined that the
People’s Progressive Party’s (PPP) Marxist-Leninist proclivities would overwhelm the reformist
labor unions and establish a communist beachhead in South America if independence was
granted too soon. Thus, American policymakers pressured British officials into delaying
Guianese independence until the PPP was removed. At the same time, British officials
acknowledged the importance of cooperating with U.S. policymakers in determining the future
of British Guiana. Both countries’ policymakers and labor leaders pursued national interests in
trying to obtain the most advantageous place within the international order. By the 1950s a
dynamic emerged in which British and American officials cooperated diplomatically while
engaging in institution-building projects designed to advance national interests in British
colonies as they progressed toward self-government and independence.
The Anglo-American alliance during World War II contributed to the emergence of
decolonization as a means of strengthening the liberal capitalist international system in which the

United States and Great Britain exerted the greatest degree of influence.1 United States
policymakers advocated the expansion of self-determination to British colonies for ideological,
strategic, and most importantly economic reasons and began pressing Great Britain to grant
independence to its colonial possessions during the war. British policymakers resisted American
pressure; however, they concluded that Britain’s economic and strategic interests benefited from
ending formal empire after the Suez Crisis in 1956, and as early as 1949 in the West Indies.2 At
the same time, American policymakers’ fear that socialist or communist governments with
Eastern-bloc-oriented foreign policies could emerge in former colonial territories weakened
long-inconsistent American support for self-determination. United States policymakers adjusted
their anti-colonial policy as a response to Cold War developments and frequently pressured
British policymakers to delay independence in colonies until circumstances could be altered

1

The most comprehensive background on the emergence of Anglo-American cooperation in establishing a liberal
capitalist post-war system is: Randall Bennett Woods, A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 19411946 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990). Carey Fraser examines the Anglo-American
pursuit of a liberal economic trading order with a focus on the British Caribbean. See: Cary Fraser, Ambivalent AntiColonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-1964 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1994); Cary Fraser, “The ‘New Frontier’ of Empire in the Caribbean: The Transfer of Power in
British Guiana, 1961-1964,” The International History Review, Vol. XXII, September 3, 2000, pp. 583-610. See
also: John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “the Imperialism of Free Trade,” in John Gallagher, The Decline,
Revival, and Fall of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1-18; O. Nigel Bolland,
The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism and Democracy in the
Labour Movement (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), 589-590; Charlie Whitham, Bitter Rehearsal: British and
American Planning for a Post-War West Indies (London: Praeger, 2002).
2
Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Great Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation
1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United
States and the Decolonization of the British Empire 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978);
William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization (London:
I.B. Tauris, 2006); Jason Parker, Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean,
1937-1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); “[Federation]: draft introduction by C Y Carstairs to the report
of the Standing Close Association Committee on the arguments in favour of federation,” June 21, 1949, CO
318/487/2, no 1, in, British Documents on the End of Empire: Ashton, S.R. and Killingray, David, eds. Series B
Volume 6: The West Indies, London: The Stationary Office, 1999. (Hereafter, BDEEP).

81

more favorably toward American interests.3 As a result, the American position shifted toward
support for a British policy of slow, closely guided, decolonization.4
Anglo-American leaders prioritized the preservation of their alliance during the Cold War
and compromised on the details of decolonization to assure their partner’s as well as their own
objectives were protected. Both nations aimed to retain colonial participation in a liberal
capitalist-international system, to protect strategic raw materials, military bases, and ports, to
assure stability and to preserve as much democracy as possible in emerging countries. 5
Nonetheless, British and American leaders subtly disagreed on the future toward which the
colonies were to be guided. The most important aspect of Anglo-American tension derived from
the British objective of retaining connections and influence in former colonies and United States
policies designed to expand American power in decolonizing areas.6
Pragmatism guided American and British policymakers toward collaboration in British
Guiana. British leaders expressed a strong concern that the imperial withdrawal occur in a
dignified manner leaving colonies stable with viable, pro-Western economic and political
systems.7 American officials acknowledged British objectives including the desire to quickly
3
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leave Guiana given its drain on scarce British resources and minimal strategic significance for
Great Britain.8 British economic weakness precluded protracted decolonization and limited
Britain’s ability to financially support colonial and post-colonial Guyana’s development.9
Moreover, colonial officials expected British Guiana’s economy to worsen over time as the
population increased.10 Nonetheless, the Colonial Office emphasized the importance of
establishing economically stability prior to granting political independence.11
As a result, colonial officials attempted to incorporate the former British Dominion of
Canada into British Guiana’s development plans on the premise that the Canadians had
substantial investments in Guianese bauxite, and Canadian leaders expressed an interest in
exerting influence among former British colonies in the hemisphere.12 British documents,
however, suggest that colonial officials doubted Canadian cooperation could replace the level of
assistance available from the United States. British officials suggested that post-colonial
development required financial and material aid from the United States particularly as the
Caribbean colonies increasingly drained Britain’s diminishing coffers in the early 1960s and as a
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result emphasized the importance of cooperating with American policymakers.13 Additionally,
British policymakers expressed concern that failing to protect American objectives might result
in their partner’s intervention in British Guiana after independence.14
Therefore, British and American policymakers formed a cooperative diplomatic strategy
toward British Guiana despite official assertions that the Colonial Office developed its Guiana
policy independently of outside influence.15 British officials formulated plans that assumed
disagreement with the United States; however, their broad strategy worked in conjunction with
American interests in the region.16 At the same time, American policymakers acknowledged that
political or economic programs designed to shape decolonization in the colony required
cooperation with British officials despite the colony’s geographical proximity to the United
13

Memorandum from Secretary of State to Robin Piper: British Guiana: American Aid, 23 December 1964, CO
1031/4867, Records of the West Indian Department, BNA; Brief For Prime Minister’s Talks with President
Kennedy, Prepared by the Colonial Office, June 1963, CO 1031/4866, Records of the West Indian Department,
BNA; “The West Indies Federation: CO brief for Mr Macmillan’s meeting with President Kennedy at Bermuda,
December 1961, on the question of US aid to the Caribbean, December 15, 1961, CO 1031/3506, no 125, BDEEP.
14
Paper for Defense/Overseas Official Policy, British Guiana: Political Situation, 21 June 1964, CO 1031/4866,
Records of the West Indian Department, BNA; Brief For Prime Minister’s Talks with President Kennedy, Prepared
by the Colonial Office, June 1963, CO 1031/4866, Records of the West Indian Department, BNA.
15
Anglo-American collaboration on British Guiana included the establishment of, “an informal U.K.-U.S. Working
Party of officials [to review] the situation in the Colony and work out an agreed approach to its problems.” British
officials discussed internally the impact of colonial policy toward British Guiana on Anglo-American relations.
British officials went so far as to suggest that policy toward the colony could not move forward prior to consultation
with the United States. See: “British Guiana Independence: memorandum by Mr Maudling for Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee on the arguments for and against moving more quickly to independence,” December 15, 1961,
CAB 134/1560, CPC (61) 32, BDEEP. See also: “[British Guiana]: letter from Mr Rusk to Lord Home asserting that
it is not pobbile for the US ‘to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan.’ Minute by Mr Macmillan,”
February 20, 1962, PREM 11/3666, BDEEP; “[British Guiana]: letter (reply) from Lord Home to Mr Rusk
challenging US policy over British Guiana,” February 26, 1962, PREM 11/3666, BDEEP; “[British Guiana]: record
by Lord Home of his conversation with Mr Rusk in Geneva,” March 12, 1962, PREM 11/3666, BDEEP; “[British
Guiana]: note by Mr Fraser to Mr Maudling on his conversations with President Kennedy and US officials in
Washington,” March 20, 1962, PREM 11/3666, BDEEP; “[British Guiana]: CO briefing note for the AngloAmerican official talks on current situation and the options for UK policy,” June 24, 1963, CO 1031/4402, no 40,
BDEEP; “[British Guiana]: FO record of a meeting between Mr Macmillan and President Kennedy at Birch Grove
House on the current situation in British Guiana,” June 30, 1963, PREM 11/4586, ff 33-36, BDEEP. See also:
Fraser, “The ‘New Frontier’ of Empire in the Caribbean,” 583-610.
16
British Guiana: Anglo-U.S. Consultations on Future Co-operation, 14-16 October 1963, CO 1031/4866, Records
of the West Indian Department, BNA; Note From Foreign Office to Washington, 24 November 1965, FO
371/179146, General Records of the American Department, BNA; Brief for Prime Minister’s Talks with President
Kennedy: British Guiana: Talking Points, June 1963, CO 1031/4866, Records of the West Indian Department, BNA;
“British Guiana Independence: memorandum by Mr Maudling for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on the
arguments for and against moving more quickly to independence,” December 15, 1961, CAB 134/1560, CPC (61)
32, BDEEP.

84

States. Consequently, official American policy developed in conjunction with British interests.
Moreover, both nations tried to obscure American involvement in British-Guianese relations to
avoid international criticism.
As a result of the delicate, occasionally contentious but necessarily collaborative
relationship regarding decolonization in British Guiana, British and American policymakers
looked for unofficial channels through which they could pursue their independent aims in the
colony. Ultimately, British and American policymakers’ objectives merged with their nation’s
labor leaders’ aims, resulting in Anglo-American policymakers’ determinations that institutionbuilding in British Guiana was the most effective means of achieving shared, and also their
national objectives.
AFL-CIO and TUC Debates on Colonialism and Institution-Building
British and American labor leaders agreed that colonies’ transition to increased selfgovernment and eventually political independence required the development of trade unions
acting as institutions in a capitalist democracy. Anglo-American labor leaders opposed the
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in British Guiana for three mutually reinforcing reasons. First,
Anglo-American labor leaders expressed concern that party’s political objectives would lead to
close association with international communism and that communist ideology prescribed a role
for trade unions that subordinated them to the state. Trade unions’ inclusion in the state apparatus
with the state as the primary employer, they argued, precluded the possibility of independent
worker representation.17
17
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Second, British and American labor leaders opposed the PPP’s argument for close
collaboration between trade unions and political parties in pursuit of a social transformation.
American Federation of Labor (AFL) leaders argued that trade unions should restrict their
activities to industrial activity and bargaining for wages and benefits. Conversely, Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) and Trades Union Congress (TUC) leaders argued for broader
trade union activity that included political activism in support of social reforms. However, the
CIO and TUC did not support politically active unionism in colonial areas in the same manner as
in the United States and Great Britain.18 Thus, the AFL, CIO, and TUC shared a general outlook
toward trade unions’ role in colonial areas. Finally, Anglo-American trade union leaders argued
that the PPP’s development of socialist-unionism would result in international associations that
challenged British and American national interests. Specifically, British and American labor
leaders expressed concern about the PPP’s relations with the World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU) in the context of global competition between the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) and WFTU.
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Despite their general agreement regarding the role of trade unions in colonial areas and
support for capitalist democracies, the AFL, CIO, and TUC disagreed considerably on the
political issue of colonialism. British and American labor leaders’ actions regarding European
imperialism contributed to the context in which Guianese labor leaders formulated their
organizational perspectives and considered international relationships. American labor leaders
and other non-British members of the ICFTU after 1949 frequently attacked colonialism and
emphasized challenging colonial social and economic structures as a priority for their
organizations. Conversely, British trade union leaders generally supported official colonial
policy.19 Nonetheless, the TUC and AFL/AFL-CIO engaged in inconsistent inter-organizational
cooperation in the process of institution building.20 All three organizations tried to exert
influence over colonial unions through shared methods, training programs, and affiliation to
American, British, and international labor organizations, particularly with consideration to future
independence.
Sidney Hillman, the first Vice President of the CIO and a close adviser to Franklin
Roosevelt, explained why his organization opposed colonialism in a February 1945 speech
opening the World Trade Union Conference. Hillman argued that post-war imperialism,
regardless of its economic orientation, would lead to the repression of workers’ rights as soon as
the conflict ended. He warned that with allied victory assured imperialist nations were jockeying
for position in the post-war world and “should [reactionary] forces prevail, then all we have
19
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fought and suffered and died for will have been in vain.” Continued imperialism, Hillman
suggested, assured future economic crises, oppression, aggression, and inevitably a third world
war.21 Ernst Schwarz, the CIO’s Latin American representative and a member of the ICFTUaffiliated Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) Executive Council,
introduced a development plan for Latin America in 1949 that was reiterated at ORIT’s founding
conference two years later. Schwarz criticized colonial and semi-colonial systems as being
economically repressive and socially destabilizing.22 Thus, Hillman and Schwarz argued that
peace though the expansion of democracy, economic progress, and social stability required
decolonization.
The debate surrounding an ICFTU resolution on non-self-governing territories provides
the clearest example of AFL, CIO, and TUC views on colonialism and the origins of AngloAmerican labor leaders’ support for institution-building projects in colonial territories. In
November 1951 the ICFTU executive board adopted a resolution on dependent territories that
established a series of measures articulating the organization’s support for self-determination and
to pressure European governments into ending their empires. ICFTU support for political
independence, however, was predicated on the notion that colonies establish “a democratic
society” and “uphold the principles of free trade unionism” because free trade unions were “the
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most important force for democratic development.”23 An article in the AFL News Reporter in
1953 further underscored American labor leaders’ anti-colonialism. The article noted that AFL
pressure to replace the TUC’s Vincent Tewson as President of the ICFTU opened the door to the
pursuit of a policy to bring about “the end of the evils of colonialism.”24
TUC leaders resented American insistence on prioritizing anti-colonialism in the ICFTU
in the early 1950s and their hesitation illuminates a central argument of this dissertation.
Specifically, the TUC followed the British government’s lead and argued for prioritizing the
development of strong political-economic institutions in the colonies before independence. TUC
leaders insisted that focusing on independence before institutions were firmly established was a
course toward chaos. In British Guiana, the TUC’s prediction proved tragically accurate, though
institutional dysfunction was largely a consequence of politically-focused Anglo-American
institution-building. Thus, TUC representatives reserved their position on several aspects of the
ICFTU resolution including the insistence on timetables for self-determination, membership of
non-self-governing territories in the International Labor Organization (ILO), and support for
popular movements for national independence.25
Most importantly, the TUC International Committee quoted Oliver Lyttleton, the new
Secretary of State for the Colonies, in emphasizing that “in pursuit of self-government, we are
seeking as rapidly as possible to build up in each territory the institutions which its
circumstances require.” Self-government absent the appropriate institutions, they argued, was
“fraught with danger” and held the potential for “bad political maneuvering.” TUC leaders
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emphasized the importance of their role in colonial areas because “in many territories the people
are striving to master forms of political and social organization, knowledge and ideas in decades
that the West took centuries to develop.” Furthermore, TUC representatives warned that a
general policy of support for any democratic nationalist movement in colonial areas would “get
the ICFTU into real trouble,” that it was a direct contradiction of TUC policy, and that “based on
experience…the trade union should first be able to build up its industrial strength before
embarking on political activity.”26
Despite strong anti-colonial rhetoric, the AFL, CIO, and ICFTU tacitly agreed that
political emancipation was a means of achieving social and economic improvement and not
necessarily an end in itself. The ICFTU adjusted its resolution in response to TUC objections and
included an emphasis on the significance of institution-building. The revised resolution noted
that, even though the organization supported self-government as an ultimate aim “account must
be taken of the fact that many different degrees of development exist amongst the non-selfgoverning territories” and “intermediate stages may have to be envisaged” to develop modern
democratic institutions over time.27 While the organization agreed to press for self-determination
in colonial areas, ICFTU leaders acknowledged that “one of the factors to bear in mind will be
the existence in the non-self-governing territory of a free trade union movement able to
guarantee workers’ rights.” The new resolution prescribed a role for the ICFTU in contributing
to creating the “conditions permitting the development of political, economic and social
institutions, and particularly a sound free trade union movement” to effectively advocate colonial
independence. In pursuit of that objective, the ICFTU agreed to receive requests from non-self26
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governing territories regarding their particular challenges, to study the situation, consult the
metropolitan trade union, and advocate on the colonial union’s behalf through contact with the
colonizing country.28
Everett Kassalow, Director of Research for the Industrial Union Department of the AFLCIO, concisely articulated this viewpoint when he emphasized in closing a lecture in 1961 that “a
strong case can be made for the proposition that an effective trade union movement that gives
workers a sense of integration and participation in the great industrial processes of their own
society is one of the essential parts of a modern, stable, democratic industrial order.”29 D.I.
Davies expressed a similar view in analyzing British encouragement of colonial labor unions.
Davies suggested that the Colonial Office and TUC collaborated to promote trade unions in
British territories because, as one trade union adviser explained, workers were going to “organize
and act collectively whether Government or employers or anyone else wish to permit it or not”
and trade unions would be “led by men more revolutionary” if British trade unions and colonial
governments failed to support organizations willing to work within the British system, based on
British labor practices.30
British policy shifted during the late 1940s and 1950s from defense of the empire to
decolonization; however, British policymakers considered both possibilities—preservation of the
empire and political independence for their colonies—a means of safeguarding strategic
objectives and retaining systemic connections between former colonies and Great Britain.31 As a
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result, the Colonial Office underscored the importance of building colonial trade unions.
Specifically, colonial officials “endorsed the principle that a sound and responsible trade union
movement is essential to economic and political progress” at a conference for the heads of
Colonial Labor Departments in 1951.32
The Colonial Office and TUC cooperated since the 1920s to establish close connections
between British and colonial unions, to collect information about colonial trade unions for policy
development, and to promote British trade union principles in colonial organizations. Colonial
Office-TUC collaboration expanded throughout the late 1940s and into the early 1950s with the
establishment of the Commonwealth Advisory Committee in 1945 and increased material
assistance, educational training, and TUC advising after 1950. British labor leaders expected
supplementary support from international labor through the ICFTU, particularly financially;
however, they emphasized that the Colonial Office and TUC would play the most significant role
in developing trade unions in British territories.33 The Colonial Office concurred and suggested
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that ICFTU involvement in the colonies should focus on directly combatting communism as an
auxiliary TUC institution-building.34 TUC International Committee analyses of post-war colonial
labor programs acknowledged that the TUC and British government jointly “and consciously
attempted to shape, within limits, both the developing trade union movements and the conditions
under which the trade unions would operate as independence was secured.”35
The Colonial Labor Advisory Committee prepared a memorandum for Secretary of State
for the Colonies James Griffiths in May 1951 that evaluated the situation regarding colonial trade
unions and proposed several recommendations. The committee criticized the failure to
effectively establish labor principles and practices amenable to British interests as colonial trade
union membership increased. As a result, the committee argued that British trade unionists and
colonial officials needed to “pass on to Colonial peoples the protection and experience gained by
labor in this country over the past century.” Trade union development, according to the
committee, was essential to the ultimate objective of British colonial policy, “to guide the
colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that
ensure to the people both a fair standard of living and freedom from aggression in any quarter.”
Freedom of association, wrote the committee, was central.36
Members of the Colonial Labor Advisory Committee met with Labor Department heads
in the fall of 1951 and articulated a shared understanding of trade unions’ fundamental role in the
process of establishing the institutional structures central to capitalist democracy. At the
meetings’ opening session Griffiths insisted that the long-term success of colonial policy
motives were not entirely altruistic and cooperation with the Colonial Office often compromised trade unionists’
pursuit of labor internationalism; however, cooperation was understood to be part of a process of institution-building
that would ultimately create the structures necessary for colonies to transition to independent capitalist-democracies.
34
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depended on effectively managing British territories’ transition to industrialization and that trade
union development was critical to giving colonists a “sense of belonging” as society changed.
Speaking on behalf of the Colonial Employers’ Federation (CEF), Booker Brothers’ chairman,
Sir Frederick Seaford, suggested that employers had a responsibility to encourage the
development of trade unions to protect business interests. Specifically, Seaford pointed to
Bookers’ attempts to establish negotiating machinery in British Guiana as an example of British
employers’ participation in institutional development.37
The members of the TUC, the OEF, and Labor Department officials who made up the
advisory committee determined that colonial labor officers should encourage trade union
development and that the TUC should undertake organization and training. Participants
suggested the TUC should directly implement colonial trade union training courses to give the
programs the appearance of independence from the Colonial Office. More importantly, the
committee agreed that the TUC should strengthen its connections to colonial unions and use its
influence and educational programs to moderate potentially radical movements. The committee
re-emphasized its expectation that international participation in colonial institution-building
through the ICFTU should be complementary and that the TUC would play the primary role in
implementing programs.38
Regarding TUC activities, Griffiths emphasized that “proper liaison should be maintained
with the Colonial Labor Departments” while warning that labor organizations had to avoid being
too closely associated with governments. Conference members agreed that government-union
connections needed to be limited to avoid abuse by “outside politicians or lawyers who see a
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union as vehicle for his ambition.”39 Attendees noted that “time was not on our side.” They
insisted on the critical need for immediate action since “the tide of events was moving rapidly,
and might well not allow scope for the organizations and structures which we wished to see
develop in Colonial societies to grow up by the slow and pure process of natural evolution.”40
Thus, colonial officials, labor leaders, and businessmen engaged in cooperative institutionbuilding in an attempt to establish colonial trade unions that could help colonies transition
economically and socially into capitalist democratic territories and retain connections with Great
Britain.41 In November 1951, Griffiths suggested that the British policy toward its colonies
would be to move toward granting dependent territories greater internal self-government and
promoting economic and social development to achieve stability in the post-war system.
Significantly, he noted: “To that end we are seeking as rapidly as possible to build up in each
territory the institutions which its circumstances require.”42
Colonial officials evaluating the effects of TUC-Colonial Office relations concluded that
the partnership successfully advanced British objectives and noted that TUC activities in the
colonies were “a great advantage” that was “the most important element in the creation of a
stable and responsible trade union movement.” Furthermore, colonial officials offered “great
praise for the work which has already been done,” commending TUC efforts to educate colonial
unionists and restrained their actions. Despite officials’ praise for the collaboration, British labor
leaders expressed skepticism regarding early institution-building efforts. TUC leaders criticized
39

Conference members specifically referenced institution-building efforts in British Guiana as an example of how to
effectively structure institution-building programs. “Trade Unions in the Colonies: Memorandum Submitted to the
Secretary of State by the Colonial Labor Advisory Committee,” May 24, 1951, Trade Unions and Colonies 932.5,
Box 15, Marjorie Nicholson Files, TUCLC.
40
Conference of Heads of Labor Departments, September 24-October 5, 1951, Trade Unions and Colonies 932.5,
Box 15, Marjorie Nicholson Files, TUCLC.
41
Minutes from meeting of Conference of heads of Labor Departments, October 5, 1951, Trade Unions and
Colonies 932.5, Box 15, Marjorie Nicholson Files, TUCLC.
42
“Notes on the ICFTU Resolution Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories,” January 23, 1952, Trade Union
Congress 931.9, Box 9, Marjorie Nicholson Files, TUCLC.

95

“the timidity of the Colonial Office” and restrictions placed on British trade union activities in
the colonies. Additionally, British labor leaders suggested that a lack of foresight and the
“obstruction of Administrations and people within the territories” made their activities
ineffective. However, British labor leaders suggested developing long-term programs to
eliminate the causes of the crises that undermined TUC colonial programs rather than abolishing
their efforts.43
Despite occasional disagreements between government officials and trade unionists, TUC
leaders agreed that their primary objective was protecting British interests, noting that “at no
time has any serious conflict arisen between official British policy” and the policy of the TUC.
Broadly shared international objectives facilitated close cooperation between trade union
officials and the Colonial Office in attempting to develop colonial labor organizations and
integrate them into the Western capitalist system once the decision to pursue decolonization was
reached in the late 1950s. The TUC, according to Cabinet members, could “check irresponsible
nationalism and maintain control in key sectors of the economy” while avoiding charges of
perpetuating colonial relationships.44
Oliver Lyttleton, who succeeded Griffiths as Secretary of State for the Colonies soon
after the joint conference, articulated a crucial and prevalent view during the establishment of an
informal organization involving members of the Overseas Employers’ Federation (OEF) and the
TUC in coordination with the Colonial Office in 1954. Lyttleton explained that the tripartite
Colonial Office-OEF-TUC approach to developing colonial trade unions held as a central aim
countering the expansion of World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) influence in the
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colonies, largely as a result of Soviet domination of the international. Nonetheless, Lyttleton
argued that “communism had made the job [of developing trade unions in colonies] urgent” but
“the problems would exist without it and communism itself could only be met by developing
sound industrial relations.” Therefore, he suggested that material improvements for workers
obtained through capitalist trade unions could improve industrial relations and, according to
TUC Assistant General Secretary George Woodcock, could “be a much more effective check on
the excess of democracy than second chambers or other constitutional devices.”45 The close
relationship between Secretaries of State and the TUC continued under Lyttleton’s successor,
Alan Lennox-Boyd, as institution-building and decolonization expanded in the late 1950s.46
Some OEF leaders disagreed that trade unions were useful as democratic institutions;
however, they often supported cooperating with the Colonial Office and TUC to develop
organized labor as a tool to increase workers’ productivity. According to A.J. Wells, Chief
Personnel Officer of Bookers Sugar Estates in British Guiana, industrial and political democracy
should be limited and trade union training should be focused on teaching workers their individual
responsibilities rather than allowing representation in the decision-making process. Nonetheless,
he argued that cultivating trade unions was the “only possible course open to industrial
management” and that welcoming employees as associates was beneficial because “If you can
influence, control or direct men’s thoughts into the right channels…then the action you desire
will happen as a matter of course.”47 Thus, Bookers cooperated in British institution-building
projects and conducted studies for the Colonial Labor Advisory Committee as a means of
45
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perpetuating the dependence of Guianese workers and improving living conditions to improve
productivity.48 At the same time, historian Clem Seecharan argues that Booker Brothers’
Chairman Jock Campbell strongly advocated social reform and expanded industrial democracy
as an end in itself.49
Moreover, TUC and OEF leaders acknowledged that the weak Guianese economy limited
the extent of wage increases and government assistance to the poor, and they expressed fear that
continued poverty would renew WFTU influence in the colony. As a result, British labor leaders,
colonial officials, and employer representatives in the OEF concluded that the only way to avoid
challenges to the political-economic system from disillusioned workers was to train Guianese
labor leaders and guide trade unions toward a narrowly industrial focus.50 Thus, Colonial
officials, British trade union leaders, and British businessmen invested in the colonies hoped to
improve workers’ conditions as a means of alleviating unrest and stabilizing colonial societies
while avoiding the possibility of mass support for socialism, communism, or radical political
measures. Colonial Officials, British and colonial employers, and British and colonial labor
leaders argued that cooperation was essential; however, they emphasized that collaboration
needed to be covert and that the TUC was obliged to play the most important role in organizing
and training colonial unions.51
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In other words, British labor leaders, colonial officials, and employers articulated a clear
and firm position that colonies’ political independence could only be considered if it was coupled
with the establishment of structural mechanisms designed to alleviate poverty and social unrest.
The British institution-building project aimed at perpetuating capitalist-democratic social and
political-economic systems in former territories, protecting British investments, and preserving
connections between former colonies and Great Britain.
Many of the principles articulated in TUC and Colonial Office records are echoed in the
constitution for the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), the regional arm
of the ICFTU in the Western Hemisphere. American labor leaders in the American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) wielded the greatest influence in ORIT
and operated through the organization to advance American labor’s regional objectives. ORIT’s
constitution defined its objective as promoting “economic development and social progress”
because “economic distress will aid Communist aggressors as much as military weakness.”
ORIT leaders emphasized that support for democratic government was only possible when
“people feel they have something worth fighting for.” To achieve those objectives, the
constitution recommended a complementary program that facilitated full support from regional
labor organizations to strengthen the Western Hemisphere’s economy.52 The ORIT constitution
vaguely echoed some of the ideas emphasized in the ICFTU resolution on non-self-governing
territories, particularly in regards to supporting institution building. However, the AFL’s
influence over the organization is evidenced in the emphasis on anti-communism.
Like British policymakers, American government officials pursued policies after World
War II designed to establish an integrated and stable international system based on
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modernization through liberal capitalism and democracy, to avoid war and depression, and to
preserve national interests.53 As a result, American government officials consistently argued that
the AFL and CIO had an increased and crucial role in play in post-war foreign relations.
However the American labor-government relationship in international affairs differed from that
between the Colonial Office and TUC since the United States did not have colonial
possessions.54 Nonetheless, American policymakers, like colonial officials, viewed trade unions
as institutional mechanisms designed to reinforce a liberal capitalist-democratic system while
safeguarding national interests. The State Department established a relationship with American
labor leaders based on developing effective inter-American economic cooperation and opposing
dictatorships through regional labor unions almost immediately after World War II. 55
Specifically, the State Department agreed to fund CIO training programs for Latin American
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labor leaders so that they could explain “how free, independent trade unions operate in a
democracy” based on American labor practices.56
An article in the October 1950 State Department Bulletin echoed several of the colonial
labor advisors’ conclusions. The article, authored by labor official Bernard Weisman, noted that
organized labor developed over a long period in industrialized countries and established itself as
one of the most important institutions in facilitating liberal capitalist democracy. However, the
article warned that “in newer countries, there is an almost frantic haste to bridge within months
or years the experience of many centuries.” Workers in emerging areas, Weisman suggested,
often took on responsibilities for which they were unprepared out of necessity. Furthermore,
Weisman argued that the desirability of the situation was irrelevant, asserting that: “it is a fact,
and we must try as a nation to face facts and to build upon them the structure which…will be in
the best interest of all concerned.”57 The State Department, much like the Colonial Office,
accepted as inevitable the progression toward some form of modernity in colonial and
undeveloped areas and sought to direct that trajectory through the implementation of specific
institutional structures designed to guide development toward capitalism and democracy.
Weisman maintained that cooperation between government and labor in international
relations was crucial in the post-war world; however, the American view differed from that of
the Colonial Office in important ways. The State Department emphasized advancing a nationalist
agenda and especially the importance of confronting the Kremlin’s “foremost objective:” taking
control of the organized labor movement. According to Weisman, American labor’s dynamic
influence on American economics and politics necessitated that the AFL-CIO “play a major part
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in shaping American diplomacy.” Moreover, Weisman argued that American labor constituted
one of the most potent influences constituting American activity in world affairs. Weisman noted
that “the Department of State has no desire to dictate to labor what it should do or try to control
what labor does,” emphasizing the importance of organized labor’s independence in determining
the course of action it thought best in international relations. However, Weisman concluded
American labor leaders needed to “carry America’s message abroad” and discussed the various
ways American organized labor representatives advised policymaking and contributed to and
supported American foreign policy.58 Thus, the State Department formulated a clear expectation
of government-labor cooperation in international relations that closely resembled the relationship
between the Colonial Office and the TUC.
At the highest level of the United States government, foreign policymakers argued that
organized labor was an important part of American foreign policy. President Dwight
Eisenhower’s reorganization plan establishing the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in
1953 further emphasized the need for organized labor to support official policy and was designed
to subordinate the AFL and CIO to the State Department in international affairs. 59 Nonetheless,
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the State Department’s expressed expectations for government-labor programs did not emphasize
the importance of creating specific institutional structures, which was a key concern for the
Colonial Office. Therefore, British and American policymakers held similar but not identical
expectations regarding the restructuring of colonial territories as they transitioned to
independence. Specifically, the Colonial Office articulated views emphasizing the importance of
institutions and American officials expressed a desire to use existing structures to achieve
political objectives.60 The difference in emphasis between British and American objectives
influenced the nature of Anglo-American labor programs in British Guiana, especially as the
AFL-CIO supplanted the TUC as the most active external labor organization in the colony.
Consecutive American Secretaries of State discussed the importance of State Department
cooperation with labor leaders as an important component of post-war diplomacy. Dean
Acheson, under Secretary of State from 1945 to 1949, assured Jacob Potofsky, President of the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, that the State Department would continue to
regularly meet with American trade unionists to discuss foreign developments.61 As Secretary of
State from 1949 to 1953, Acheson criticized what the nation’s lack of commitment to the early
Cold War, a struggle that he stated was “just as crucial from the point of view of the continued
existence of our way of life” as the Second World War. Acheson argued that successful
confrontation with the Soviet Union in the post-war world necessitated “total diplomacy,” which
included military preparedness and a foreign policy that created “economic, political, social, and
psychological conditions that strengthen and create confidence in the democratic way of life.”
Implementing Acheson’s policy, he suggested, required voluntary coordination between all
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branches of government as well as “business, agriculture, and labor…all of our great national
organizations.”62
John Foster Dulles, Acheson’s successor, shared his predecessor’s interest in cooperation
with non-state actors while emphasizing the need for American involvement in colonial areas.63
In a November 1953 speech to the CIO, Dulles echoed the view that the success of American
foreign policy depended on concurrent action by private citizens and groups; in particular, nongovernmental organizations shared a responsibility to advance the nation’s foreign policy.
Moreover, his speech emphasized the rapidly increasing importance of the third world to
American foreign relations. Dulles argued that “the colonial and dependent areas are the field of
most dramatic contest” in international relations. There, Dulles argued, “the policies of the West
and those of Soviet imperialism come into headlong collision.” The Secretary of State expressed
concern at the possibility that Soviet leaders had a strategic plan to exploit nationalist movements
with the objective of advancing global communist revolution. Specifically, Dulles quoted from a
lecture by Joseph Stalin on Leninism which argued that “the road to victory of the revolution in
the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and
dependent countries.” Dulles’ speech, given less than a month after the British alleged a
communist conspiracy as the justification for suspending self-government in British Guiana,
articulated the ideas behind the FOA and International Cooperation Administration (ICA)
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programs that combined the efforts of American trade unionists and government officials in the
colony beginning in 1954.64
Dulles’s relations with labor leaders, based on a shared pursuit of institution building,
included personal meetings with AFL President George Meany and CIO President Walter
Reuther. Dulles commended Meany for the ICFTU’s role in promoting democratic institutions
throughout the world and met with Meany and Reuther to discuss the continuing success of the
ICFTU in 1953.65 The Secretary also met with Meany, Reuther, and FOA officials to assure
smooth operation of government-labor programs in the mid-1950s.66 Additionally, the Dulles-led
State Department worked with the AFL-CIO to resolve labor disagreements between American
companies and foreign workers, cooperated in public relations efforts to improve perceptions of
the United States abroad, and requested advice on labor appointees to international diplomatic
conferences during the 1950s.67
The Eisenhower administration’s National Security Council (NSC) advocated
government-labor institution-building in pursuit of American foreign policy as well. The NSC
developed broad regional objectives based on hemispheric solidarity in support of United States
world policies, orderly development so that states in the region would be effective members of
the hemispheric system, reduction of internal Communist or anti-American subversion, and the
retention of access to raw materials. To advance those aims, the NSC highlighted the need to
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“assist and encourage the formation and development of responsible organized labor movements
and leadership in Latin American countries” and the importance of strengthening programs for
specialized training in the United States of Latin American labor leaders.68
Dulles’s stated objectives and United States hemispheric policy are best understood
within the context of the broader American Cold War policy aimed at countering Soviet power
and containing the expansion of communist influence. Eisenhower’s “New Look” national
security policy outlined in NSC Document 162/2 noted that underdeveloped and colonial areas
contained vast manpower, crucial resources, and significant potential for growth that “would
greatly, perhaps decisively, alter the world balance of power to our detriment” if incorporated
into the Soviet system. As a result the NSC advocated the orderly development of stable,
responsible nations willing and able to participate in defense of the free world.69 Thus,
Eisenhower’s foreign policy depended largely on preserving confidence in the free world’s
institutions, keeping colonial areas within the Western capitalist system, and defending
American national security.
AFL-CIO leaders also influenced United States foreign policy through informationsharing and correspondence with some of the most influential American policymakers in the late
1950s. Meany and Jay Lovestone of the AFL International Affairs Department in particular
maintained a broad correspondence with high-ranking United States officials including Secretary
of the Navy Arleigh Burke and Senators Thomas Dodd and John F. Kennedy. Meany also
contributed to a study of international communist techniques in the labor field for the House of
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Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities in June 1956.70 American labor leaders
helped train Foreign Service workers during the late 1950s and 1960s on international labor
issues as well.71 Additionally, Eisenhower named Meany and AFL-CIO Vice President George
M. Harrison as members of the United States Delegation to the UN General Assembly from 1957
to 1959.72 Thus, American labor leaders and government officials developed a consistent and
cooperative relationship to advance United States foreign policy.
The Eisenhower administration, like the Colonial Office, expressed appreciation trade
unions’ cooperation in foreign relations.73 George C. Lodge, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
International Affairs from 1958 to 1962, wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in July 1959
warning of communists’ concentration on union leaders in their subversive efforts, that many
foreign unionists were indoctrinated in Moscow, and that American labor’s overseas activities
were critical in impeding communist efforts. Lodge suggested that American labor leaders’
understanding of developing world problems made their training programs and efforts abroad
essential to preserving American-style capitalism internationally.74 Additionally, a January 1961
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White House press release commended the efforts of American labor organizations in countering
the spread of Communism in labor organizations abroad.75
Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s successors strengthened the association between the executive
office and American labor leaders. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State for President John F. Kennedy,
regularly invited several AFL-CIO leaders to conferences to discuss nongovernmental
organizations’ role in foreign policy, suggesting at times that Kennedy himself would attend the
meetings.76 Kennedy’s connection to American labor leaders engaged in AFL-CIO international
relations originated well before his time as President. Jay Lovestone provided Kennedy with
information regarding labor developments while Kennedy was a Senator from Massachusetts and
Kennedy assured Lovestone that he would carefully consider AFL-CIO resolutions.77 Arthur
Schlesinger, Special Assistant to President Kennedy, assured the AFL-CIO’s Latin American
representative, Serafino Romualdi, that American labor leaders’ reports on Latin America
provided important background information for presidential speeches.78 Moreover, one of
Kennedy’s final meetings prior to his inauguration was with the AFL-CIO Executive Council.79
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Despite State Department support, AFL-CIO leaders in the early 1950s argued that the
United States government failed to adequately utilize American labor’s international capabilities
and that, as a result, American foreign policy suffered. In a statement before the TUC, Richard
Walsh of the AFL argued that his organization was “convinced that foreign policy is no longer to
be entrusted solely to the professional diplomats” and that ensuring a democratic foreign policy
necessitated labor participation in execution and particularly at the constructive stage. Rather
than “wait[ing] for our government to evolve and formulate foreign policy,” he argued, “quite
often we come forward with proposals to our government and fight for their being adopted.”80
Thus, American labor leaders acted aggressively, cooperating with the State Department and
other agencies to advance United States foreign policy; however, the AFL-CIO frequently
became involved in overseas activities in advance of governmental agencies.
Juxtaposing the views of the Colonial Office and the State Department regarding the role
of national trade unions in international relations illuminates two important aspects of British and
American policy pertaining to British Guiana between 1946 and 1961. Both governments agreed
that their national trade unions contributed a great deal to the implementation of effective foreign
policy that building effective unions in developing countries was important to national interests
and global stability, and that anti-communism was crucial in the post-war world. The State
Department emphasized trade union diplomacy as a way to directly confront communism, which
was assumed to be Soviet-influenced, through politically shaped activities. Conversely, the
Colonial Office generally argued that unions should focus their efforts toward building strong
institutions and working to alleviate the economic and social conditions that led to communism’s
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ideological appeal. Their perspectives were similar and flexible, but the subtle differences were
important in determining the nature of their programs in British Guiana.81
Most importantly, British influence over institutional structures was an inherent
consequence of the colonial relationship and their objective was to guide development in a
manner that preserved British influence. Conversely, American attempts to influence postcolonial structures required increased influence in British colonies. Cabinet officials expressed
apprehension that American policy directly contradicted British objectives and was designed to
“replace their influence and interests by direct US penetration” in some areas of the world.
Cabinet members specifically noted that Vice President Richard Nixon, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and State Department officials publically expressed the view that colonial
retreat should be coupled with American economic and political expansion, particularly through
the trade union movement.82 Thus, by the end of the 1950s British officials argued that American
actions, at times at the cost of Cold War imperatives, were inherently expansionist in the sense
that they sought to introduce and impose new ideas on former colonial institutional structures.
In other words, American labor leaders and governmental officials, especially in the
AFL, articulated a clear and firm position that colonial trade unions should be supported in a
process of institution-building. Their objective was to establishment fervently anti-communist
unions that operated on the basis of AFL-styled business unionism and acted as structural
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mechanisms designed to perpetuate capitalist-democratic social and political-economic systems
in the developing world while expanding American influence and protecting American
interests.83
British and American trade union leaders also acted to advance their nations’ economic,
strategic, and geo-political interests when developing and implementing programs to influence
the future of British colonies. The TUC and American labor, particularly the AFL, maneuvered
for predominance within the Western international labor movement throughout the late 1940s
and early 1950s. Officials in the British Foreign Office noted that Phillip Pearl of the AFL wrote
an article in the AFL News Reporter regarding TUC General Secretary Vincent Tewson’s
resignation as head of the ICFTU that “caused the utmost indignation in the TUC” and that a
confrontation was imminent for dominance of the organization.84 An informal meeting between
TUC and AFL-CIO leaders in 1957 suggested that considerable tension remained between the
two organizations throughout the 1950s.85 Both organizations frequently levied accusations that
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the other was trying to dominate the ICFTU. American labor leaders expressed concern that the
TUC was trying to “carve out a sphere of influence” in British territories while the TUC justified
their special connection to colonial unions as the result of a long standing cooperative
relationship.86 Here again, the different motives of British and American labor leaders in colonial
territories is evident, with the TUC trying to retain aspects of an existing institutional connection
and American labor leaders trying to replace British influence.
Regarding the ICFTU resolution on non-self-governing territories, the TUC most
fervently opposed the ICFTU’s suggestion that colonies be placed under United Nations
supervision. The TUC argued that such a move would shift control away from Whitehall while
failing to put it in the hands of colonists, reinforcing their sense of inferiority and undermining
“enlightened colonial policy.”87 The TUC and Colonial Office expected that trade union work in
the colonies was a responsibility reserved for the British trade unionists despite the creation of
the ICFTU to advance an international labor program.88 There were mild nationalist undertones
in the TUC’s argument that illuminate the challenges facing national-front trade unions in
international institutions, a subtext that contributed to the predominance of independent AFLCIO and TUC actions rather than the prevalence of ICFTU programs in British Guiana.
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Nonetheless, the TUC’s argument illuminates the significance colonial officials and British labor
leaders placed on achieving their version of institution-building prior to granting political
independence to colonial territories. British institution-building efforts intended to use trade
unions to integrate the Guianese political economy within a British-led liberal capitalist system
as formal political control of colonies diminished. Even though reformist Guianese labor leaders
eagerly participated in these programs, British institution-building programs inevitably clashed
with the objectives of revolutionary Guianese. Thus, institution-building fueled the conflicts at
the center of institutional decolonization.
The importance British and American government officials placed on trade unions’ role
in international relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s went beyond rhetoric. When
differences between the AFL and TUC threatened to undermine the nascent ICFTU in 1952,
British and American foreign officers met with their respective nation’s labor leaders to discuss
ways to compromise and preserve the organization. British officials thought it “a pity if the
impression remained that the TUC had entered into the Washington talks reluctantly or under
government pressure” and that they should “dispel the impression that this had been the case,”
though it is evident that government officials encouraged TUC leaders to find ways to
compromise and collaborate with the AFL.89 It is also noteworthy that AFL president George
Meany met with members of the British Foreign Office and that the British officials thought the
incident important enough to forward details through the chain of command to Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden.90 Finally, the incident is illuminating in that the most significant point of
disagreement grew out of the AFL’s conclusion that the ICFTU was “insufficiently aggressive in
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its anti-communist strategy.”91 Anglo-American labor cooperation in British Guiana remained
limited, in part, as a result of disagreements about the nature of and means to confront the
potential communist threat in the colony. Moreover, British officials occasionally used
connections in the American labor movement to try and influence State Department policy and
encouraged West Indian colonial leaders to do the same.92 Thus, British Foreign Office relations
with American labor leaders were not solely a matter of conflict resolution; rather, a consistent
dialogue existed between American labor leaders and British officials.93
It is important to consider that some colonial labor leaders looked forward to
strengthening their trade unions on British or American principles and increasing formal
connections to those organizations while others expected international labor organizations to act
as a forum to advance the cause of political, economic, and social autonomy. The tension
between the expectations of the latter group of colonists and those of the TUC became evident as
soon as post-war international labor institutions were established. Walter Citrine, the TUC’s
representative to the WFTU conference in October 1945, criticized an unnamed colonial unionist
for suggesting that “his organization was going to join the international because his country
wanted their national Independence and he wished to establish Socialism.” Citrine emphasized
that attempts to use the WFTU as a political international rather than an organization to address
practical union activities contributed considerably to the TUC’s withdrawal from the
organization in 1949.94
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Citrine’s articulation of the British viewpoint regarding anti-colonialism in the WFTU,
and CIO representative Ernst Schwarz’s acknowledgment that British and American unionists
were isolated within the organization in their support for private development initiatives,
illuminate an important aspect of international trade unionism and its relationship to
decolonization.95 When the TUC and CIO left the WFTU and joined with the AFL in forming
the ICFTU they created an institution in which the most conservative elements of the
international labor movement played the most significant role. AFL leaders exercised the most
influence in the ICFTU and argued that trade unions should act independently of politics and
focus on narrow questions of wages and working conditions. Conversely, TUC, CIO, and most
Western European trade union leaders argued that trade unions should act as a progressive force
for broad social reform while retaining independence from politics. Thus, ICFTU efforts to assist
trade unions abroad balanced the trade union ideologies expressed in the leading members’
unions but often leaned toward a version of trade unionism closer to the AFL’s ideals. Tensions
between the viewpoints were consistent and the AFL withdrew from the ICFTU in 1968, in part
as a result of the organization’s challenge to support for AFL-styled business-unionism abroad.96
The WFTU explained the formation of the ICFTU as a new organization doomed to
conflict between the “TUC’s desire for international Trade Union hegemony, based on the policy
of the Foreign Office” and AFL attempts to supplant the TUC through financial domination of
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smaller unions; a “fight between rival trade union imperialisms.”97 Regardless of the political
motives of the communist-dominated unions the WFTU advocated anti-colonialism and
economic development programs designed to alter colonial economic structures far more
aggressively than the ICFTU.98 The ICFTU constitution defended the freedom of all peoples,
“including those in colonial or semi-dependent status to determine or change their own political,
social, or economic institutions by democratic means.”99 Nonetheless, AFL, CIO, TUC, ICFTU,
and ORIT leaders all supported the decision to suspend the Guianese constitution in 1953
making clear the limitations of Anglo-American labor’s support for colonial autonomy.100
Moreover, British socialists acknowledged that the ICFTU tried to assist colonial workers resist
oppression; however, they noted that the OEF often impeded ICFTU activities as they were
implemented in the colonies. Thus, some British socialists and a number of colonial labor leaders
argued that effective pursuit of political independence and socio-economic reform required
continued association with the WFTU.101
Thus, British, American, and colonial leaders engaged in a struggle for influence over
what they determined to be one of the most crucial institutions in determining the nature of postcolonial societies. British and American leaders sought to use trade unions and the labor
movement to decolonize Britain’s colonies in a manner conducive to their national objectives
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while strengthening the liberal-capitalist international system. However, the pursuit of national
objectives undermined consistent cooperation in institution building between the AFL/AFL-CIO
and TUC, and British and American policymakers viewed the conflict over Guiana’s institutions
as an area where they could pursue national interests while collaborating on a diplomatic level.
Most importantly, Guianese leaders disagreed about the meaning of decolonization and some
pursued institutional changes irreconcilably opposed to both the British or American models, a
conflict that was central to the struggle that shaped Guianese decolonization.
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Chapter 4: Economic Emancipation: The Ideological Origins of the People’s Progressive
Party Challenge to Reformist Trade Unionism

The fundamental issue that shaped Guianese decolonization was the debate over the
nature of the institutions that would provide the foundation for post-colonial society. Guianese
labor leaders’ political ideologies influenced but also grew out of their experiences seeking
improvements for the colony’s impoverished workers through the labor movement. Two general
perspectives of labor organization materialized in the colony. One argued for reform through the
preservation of existing labor relations, and a second argued for a break with the Western model
of trade unionism. Transnational relationships derived from political and trade union ideologies
and increased the connection between the Cold War and decolonization in British Guiana.
Ultimately, Guianese, British, and American leaders viewed the establishment of specific types
of institutionalized labor relations in British Guiana as an opportunity to achieve broader
objectives regarding the nature of post-colonial society and Guiana’s place within the
decolonized post-war international system. After 1946 a conflict arose between Guianese labor
leaders who supported the idea of decolonization within the existing system and those who
interpreted decolonization as a fundamental break from British and American control, objectives
achievable only through greater association with the Eastern-bloc.1
There is considerable debate regarding the People’s Progressive Party’s (PPP) political
orientation, especially the ideologies of Cheddi and Janet Jagan, the party’s leaders from 1950 to
1999. Several important Guianese involved in the colony’s transition to independence wrote
memoirs or participated in oral histories about their experiences and each provides unique and
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important insights; however, these works disagree considerably on the PPP’s ideology and the
reasons for the colony’s violent process of decolonization. Cheddi Jagan’s autobiography, The
West on Trial, published in 1967, argues that the PPP became a victim of American Cold War
aggression despite pursuing a socialist-reformist—but non-communist—program.2 The West on
Trial provides crucial insight into Jagan’s background, the context in which Jagan developed his
political ideals, and the origins of the PPP’s philosophy. Nonetheless, the Jagans were
experienced politicians and as a source The West on Trial needs to be understood in perspective.
The memoir’s publication in the immediate aftermath of Anglo-American intervention reinforced
Cheddi Jagan’s long-standing assurances to British and American officials that depicted the PPP
as a non-communist party. Close examination of Jagan’s rhetoric and writings intended for a
Guianese audience, however, suggests that the PPP leader connected his country’s destiny with
that of the international communist movement even if the party was not a disciplined communist
organization.
In a Legislative Council debate in 1953 Cheddi Jagan argued that socialism was merely a
step on the process toward communism. He criticized as “fools” and “ignoramuses” peers who
argued that “socialism is a respectable thing but that communism is the thing which would take
away their liberties and freedom.”3 Three years after the publication of The West on Trial Jagan
explained PPP policies as an adaptation of Leninist principles applied with the objective of
communist development. Moreover, Jagan placed the Guyanese struggle within the context of a
2
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broader international movement to which he suggested the party was “accountable” in 1970. 4
Even between 1957 and 1961, when the PPP moderated its rhetoric and governing policies,
Jagan explained in the party journal that PPP’s national liberation struggle was “part and parcel”
of the “titanic battle between two systems, capitalism—imperialism on the one hand and
socialism—communism on the other.”5 He also criticized Forbes Burnham’s sacrifice of “our
proletarian, working-class, internationalist outlook for narrow nationalism.”6 Ultimately, Jagan
explained the party’s purpose as pursuing socialism with the objective of progressing to the
“second stage” wherein society would be based on the principle “to each according to his need,
from each according to his ability” once the colony achieved independence.7 Thus, The West on
Trial provides a critical background into the political ideas of British Guiana’s working-class
movement; however, it is necessary to evaluate other sources to comprehend the PPP’s ideology.
Several of Jagan’s contemporaries challenged the non-communist depiction of PPP
objectives Jagan intimated to British and American officials. They describe the Jagan-led party
as doctrinaire in its Marxism and committed to international communism. In editing a volume of
Forbes Burnham’s speeches, C.A. Nascimento and R.A. Burrowes argue that Cheddi Jagan
subordinated nationalist interests to advancing global communism.8 Their depiction, however,
suffers from a problematic bias since the authors served as public relations officials for the
Burnham government, which was in the process of establishing a fraudulent and politically
repressive dictatorship in1970.9 Jai Narine Singh, a vice president for the Manpower Citizens
Association (MPCA) in the 1940s and early member of the PPP executive committee also
4
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describes the Jagan-led party as subordinate to Soviet, and later Cuban mandates in his
autobiography which was published in 1996. While Singh played a central role in facilitating
Burnham’s break from the PPP in 1955, he later split with Burnham in 1958.10 Singh, however,
remained opposed to the Jagan-led PPP for decades after the division. Thus, the Jagans’
Guyanese critics challenge the depiction of the PPP as a non-communist, socialist-nationalist
party while suffering from inherent biases.
Two more objective first-hand accounts published in the early 2000s disagree with
Jagan’s depiction of the PPP in The West on Trial. Wynter Crawford, the radical journalist and
politician from Barbados, claims that the Jagans “almost single handedly spread communism
throughout the West Indies.” However, Crawford provides few specifics and acknowledges that
he never personally discussed communism with the Jagans in any of their meetings. 11 Most
significantly, Frank Birbalsingh’s oral history of the PPP includes interviews with almost all of
the PPP’s influential early leaders. Birbalsingh’s work hints that the PPP began as a left-coalition
with a core of communist-inspired leaders and that ideological disagreement played a significant
role in the party split and subsequent local conflicts. However, Birbalsingh’s work does not
suggest a particularly internationalist commitment on the part of PPP leaders.12
The earliest scholarship evaluating Guianese political ideology drew primarily on
American and British archival material with minimal access to Guianese sources, and Jagan’s
autobiography shaped the narrative. In the late 1960s evidence emerged of Anglo-American
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machinations against the Jagan-led PPP earlier in the decade. At the same time, Burnham
solidified his hold on an increasingly repressive regime that nationalized major sectors of the
economy and pursued an Eastern-bloc oriented foreign policy.13 Consequently, contemporary
scholars emphasized the external factors destabilizing British Guiana and Burnham’s duplicity in
diplomatic relations. Rather than criticize intervention’s use as a tool of foreign policy,
regardless of the Jagans’ political ideals, scholars often downplayed the impact of Marxist
ideology on the PPP.14 The cultural anthropologist Leo Despres is exceptional in emphasizing
the importance of the PPP’s left-wing Marxism and the party’s international connections. He
suggests that there existed a “hard core” of extreme Marxists within the Political Affairs
Committee (PAC) including the Jagans, Martin Carter, Rory Westmaas, Sidney King, and
Brindley Benn, who chose to continue relations with international communists rather than try to
advance a nationalist agenda through the conservative labor movement in British Guiana.
Nonetheless, Despres concludes that external forces and cultural factionalism were most
significant in splitting the Guianese nationalist movement.15
Jagan returned to office as a democratic socialist in 1992 after twenty-seven years
opposing Burnham’s People’s National Congress (PNC) autocracy. The disastrous consequences
of American intervention and the Burnham dictatorship for the Guianese people, along with a
continued lack of access to PPP material, contributed to the perpetuation of the existing
13
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interpretation of the party’s ideology after the Cold War. Stephen Rabe and Cary Fraser
produced groundbreaking studies of American involvement in Guianese decolonization in the
early 2000s and their work remains the most influential scholarship shaping the subject. Their
focus on Anglo-American actions in the colony and limited access to Guianese sources resulted
in an uncritical treatment of PPP ideology that is consistent with earlier works on the subject.
Rabe and Fraser agree that American policymakers understood events in British Guiana through
a Cold War prism and mislabeled Jagan’s socialist-democratic ideas as communist.16 However,
Fraser has since argued for a closer examination of PPP ideology during the period and
suggested that the PPP’s radical Marxist ideology differed from the social democratic ideas
which influenced the rest of the British Caribbean.17
The Guianese historian Clem Seecharan introduced the first scholarly counter-narrative in
2005 suggesting that Cheddi Jagan was a doctrinaire Marxist and that party leaders’ ideological
dogmatism impeded reform efforts in British Guiana. Methodologically, Seecharan’s work
represents an important advancement in the scholarship since he based much of his analysis on
close examination of the PAC Bulletin, the earliest platform in which the eventual PPP leaders
explained their political agenda. Consequently, Seecharan is the first scholar to use primary
source material to explain PAC/PPP ideology.18 Colin Palmer’s Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of
Power describes the ideological foundations of PPP leadership as a fusion of Marxism and
16
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Guianese nationalism adapted to circumstances in Guiana in the most focused study of PPP
philosophy. Palmer emphasizes that Jagan and other party leaders acted independently of
international communists despite the similarities in their political ideology.19 Robert Waters
introduced the most direct challenge to the traditional narrative after gaining access to previously
unexamined archives in former communist countries and considering the PPP’s international
policies. Waters suggests that the Jagans sought increased economic, political, and social
relations with Eastern bloc nations consistently beginning at least by 1951, and that they were
willing to engage in political subversion toward that objective.20 Recently declassified British
intelligence files confirm that the Jagans established contact with Soviet representatives in
Washington D.C. as early as 1947 and maintained close contact with the Communist Party of
Great Britain.21
The most recently available archival material corroborates much of the new research in
suggesting that the PPP was a left-coalition before 1955 that included a core of self-described
Marxist-Leninist leaders.22 PPP leaders explained their movement as part of an international
struggle and sought increased association with what they described as socialist countries and
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international organizations to advance their liberation movement in British Guiana, several of
which were communist fronts. Crucially, the Jagan-led left-wing, the ideologically MarxistLeninist members of the PPP, remained unaffiliated with and acted independently of
international communist organizations during the period discussed in this dissertation.23
Nonetheless, it is clear from thorough examination of party materials that Cheddi Jagan did not
differentiate between socialism and communism, arguing that they were theoretically the same
and that communism was merely the advanced stage of socialism.24 As a result, the PPP’s leftwing pursued connections with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and Eastern-bloc
nations for the purpose of transitioning the colony to socialism and expecting an evolution
toward communism while generally governing pragmatically and remaining committed to
parliamentary democracy. Ultimately, close examination of the objectives and consequent
transnational connections Guianese leaders pursued in attempting to establish Guianese socialism
suggests that the Jagan-led PPP sought institutional transformation and increased connections to
the Eastern-bloc as a means of achieving economic autonomy.
The Clash of Trade Union Philosophies in British Guiana
Guianese interpretations of institutional decolonization varied; however, two general
views prevailed and labor leaders acted domestically and internationally to establish trade unions
that would facilitate their supported style of labor organization. The first most consistently
manifested in the policies of the Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA), a sugar workers’
union registered in 1937 that had the largest membership in the Guianese labor movement.
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MPCA leadership tried to address stifling poverty and oppression of workers through
negotiations with British companies and reform within the existing political-economic system.25
MPCA leaders pursued for a form of trade unionism independent of political control that
loosely resembled British and American models of labor organization. MPCA founder Ayude
Edun favored the establishment of a socialist system that permitted a degree of latitude for
private enterprise with unions acting independently of political parties. Importantly, Edun
appealed to Secretary of State for the Colonies James Griffiths to reconfigure Anglo-Guianese
connections as a partnership as the Empire adjusted to the post-1945 world while vehemently
rejecting “Communism and Americanism.”26 Most MPCA leaders in the 1950s, however,
expressed support for a free-market economic ideal and suggested that unions should work to
exact benefits for workers within that system. Rutgers University Economics professor and labor
activist Robert Alexander conducted several hemispheric fact-finding missions for the Free
Trade Union Committee (FTUC), a covert anti-communist branch of the American Federation of
Labor (AFL).27 Alexander interviewed Guianese labor leaders including Rupert Tello, at the time
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the MPCA Vice President and a member of the National Democratic Party (NDP). Tello, who
worked with American and British trade union leaders throughout the 1950s and early 1960s,
took care to note that he supported “importation of capital for the development of the country”
and free enterprise. Tello emphasized that he opposed nationalization with the possible exception
of public utilities and then “only if necessary and wanted.”28
Similarly, Justin Yee, President of the Demerara Electric Company branch of the MPCA,
told Alexander that his union hoped to overcome considerable agitation for nationalization
through strengthening the union and increasing workers’ wages.29 Thus, MPCA leaders sought to
advocate on workers’ behalf while using their organization as a bulwark against party-dominated
unionism and left-wing economics in British Guiana. A Legislative Council debate between
MPCA President Lionel Luckhoo and PPP leader Cheddi Jagan over the role of trade unions in
1952 illuminates the leaders’ contrasting viewpoints. Luckhoo insisted that trade unions should
act independently of politics. “Trade unions and politics,” Jagan replied, “cannot be put into
separate airtight compartments.”30
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Alternately then, a second view of Guianese labor organization emerged after World War
II in part as reaction to increased poverty and the MPCA’s perceived ineffectiveness throughout
the 1940s. This idea was to establish a working-class movement which subordinated trade unions
to a political party and that pursued political independence as a precursor to structural
transformation and the establishment of a socialist society.31 Seecharan suggests that Cheddi
Jagan consistently supported the view that trades unions’ primary purpose was to act as an
instrument to destroy the capitalist state.32 The movement congealed into the left-coalition PAC
in 1946 after Cheddi Jagan resigned from his position as treasurer of the MPCA.33 The PAC laid
the foundation for the establishment of the PPP in 1950, which effectively acted as an alternative
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representative for sugar workers actively opposing MPCA leadership and frequently the union
itself.34
The PAC/PPP’s labor activism grew out of an effort to negotiate against employers who
were overwhelmingly foreign with direct consequences on leaders’ view of trade union
organization. The Guianese people experienced 150 years of British colonial exploitation and the
PAC argued that meaningfully improving the lives of Guianese workers necessitated
empowering them in a manner beyond legally protecting the right to negotiate with employers.
The largest employers in the colony, especially Booker Brothers, effectively controlled the
economy, leaving Guianese workers with little effective negotiating power. The MPCA obtained
concessions from Booker Brothers in the late 1930s and 1940s; however, PAC/PPP leaders
argued that the Guianese would never be able to benefit from their own resources or develop in a
manner that benefited the Guianese people rather than foreign employers unless the Guianese
themselves controlled the economy.35 The only means of decolonizing the colonial economy in
the view of many Guianese political activists was to nationalize foreign investment and take
control of the state.
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Consequently Nigel Bolland notes that the PAC stated as its purpose the “abolition of the
existing economic system” and its replacement with scientific socialism.36 H.J.M. Hubbard, one
of the PAC’s founders, specifically argued that trade unions needed to engage in political activity
to aid in the establishment of a socialist society.37 Cheddi Jagan insisted that the social and
political-economic reforms necessary to improve the lives of Guiana’s workers “must be joined
at the industrial and political level outside the legislature.”38 Ashton Chase was a Trades Union
Congress (TUC)-trained labor leader, lawyer, and high-ranking member of the PPP who served
as Minister of Labor under the short-lived PPP government in 1953. According to Chase, the
PPP’s prioritized strengthening and operating in conjunction with Guianese trade unions. As a
result, Chase suggested that “the PPP and the trade unions worked together, planned together and
struggled together to uproot privilege and a decadent political and economic system.”39
Janet Jagan, Cheddi Jagan’s wife and confidant, and a leading member of the PPP, took
care to note the lessons she learned from trade unionists during a visit to Rumania in 1953. She
specifically noted the “difference in the functions of trade unions existing in capitalist countries
and those in the socialist countries.”40 Janet Jagan’s report does not show that the PPP copied
communist trade union practices; however, it suggests that the party worked toward the
development of labor relations that would promote a fundamentally different economic system in
Guiana than that which the MPCA supported. Several years later Cheddi Jagan explained to the
British Guiana Trades Union Congress (BGTUC) that the PPP expected to assume ownership of
the economy as head of a government democratically responsible to the people. Specifically,
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Jagan suggested that a PPP-headed socialist government would coordinate its activities with
“subsidiary agencies of a democratic character, such as trade unions” that would help manage
industries in addition to arguing with employers.41
Colin Palmer argues that PPP ministers “challenged the institutional structures of the
imperial regime most sharply with the rhetorical weapons at their command.”42 Palmer’s
penetrating analysis provides a key insight into the PPP’s challenge to institutional structures that
is critical to understanding the broader Left-coalition’s efforts in British Guiana. However, the
PPP program was part of broad, active, and consistent efforts to decolonize the labor movement
that went far beyond rhetoric and the most important PPP leaders were also active trade
unionists. While the party itself was never of singular mind, particularly before 1955 when it
acted as a coalition of Left-nationalists, it nonetheless consistently advocated empowering the
Guianese and as much as possible breaking the institutional mechanisms through which British
and American employers controlled the colony.43
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Beyond ideology, it is important to consider that the PPP’s practical needs resulted in
close relations with trade unions that became especially important after 1956, when Cary Fraser
suggests the Party was confronted a “schizophrenic predicament.” Fraser suggests that the PPP
“refashioned itself as a moderate political force” to court support from the fundamentally
conservative and capitalist East Indian community while simultaneously trying to retain its
Marxist ideology as Guianese politics realigned on racial grounds in the late 1950s.44 The
complexity of Guianese politics and the practical realities of governing after 1957 placed the PPP
in a position where its most effective means of pushing for radical change was often through
associated trade unions rather than political action that could undermine the Party’s base of
support, create disorder in government, or result in the suspension of self-government.
The contrast between Jagan’s vision and the views of American and British labor leaders
is stark. David Dubinsky argued that “organized labor has something to say only about the
conditions of work and their standards of pay. Organized labor has nothing to say about
management of industry, the distribution and price of its products at home, and the disposition of
its goods abroad.”45 Similarly, Walter Hood, responsible for the colonial section of the TUC’s
International Department, noted in a 1957 list of frequently asked questions prepared for colonial
unions that “the primary function of a trade union is to give workers a say in the determination of
their wages and conditions of work.”46 TUC leaders’ insistence that trade unions limit their
activities was less rigid within Great Britain; however, they generally dismissed the notion of
political unionism in the colonies.
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In opposing the MPCA’s leader, Luckhoo, Cheddi and Janet Jagan articulated views that
directly contradicted Dubinsky’s and Hood’s ideas. Cheddi Jagan argued that “One does not stop
at wages and working conditions. We need laws that can put profits and other benefits into the
pockets of workers.”47 Janet Jagan, who later became Minister of Labor, Health, and Housing in
the PPP government, explained strikes and trade union activity as legitimate forms of civil
protest in a manner that conflicted with American and British expectations for industrial colonial
unionism.48 Even when the PPP moderated its rhetoric while holding office under a restricted
constitution in 1958 Janet Jagan argued for close collaboration between politics and unionism,
suggesting that the British Labor Party was a viable model for the Guianese.49 Importantly, the
Jagans most cautious public statements demanded a political role for trade unions greater than
what the British were willing to allow in the colony. 50 Thus, Guianese labor and political leaders
found a ready ideological ally in American and British organized labor, and American labor
leaders opposed the PAC/PPP on trade union grounds well before the United States government
determined the Jagans’ PPP was a strategic Cold War threat. Conversely, PAC/PPP leaders
sought connections with the WFTU and communist parties who shared their views on the role of
trade unions as social institutions.
The PAC and PPP were not communist organizations; however, leaders’ Marxist ideals
reinforced their experiences fighting for Guianese workers and shaped the manner in which they
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hoped to design their post-colonial political institutions.51 The evolution of the trade union
struggle helps illuminate Cheddi Jagan’s conclusion in the 1950s that British and American
economic power was the most significant threat to Guianese unions’ effectiveness. Sara
Abraham argues that the Jagan faction of the PPP expected the resolution of their powerlessness
through winning leadership of key national labor unions as did most nationalist parties in the
decolonizing Caribbean.52 The left-wing of the PAC/PPP viewed the establishment of
coordinated trade union-party activity as central to their objective of restructuring Guianese
society. However, the PAC and PPP differed from most Caribbean nationalist parties in
emphasizing the prioritization of party over union and rejecting the notion of integration into
Western international labor organizations.53 Given the core PPP leaders’ Marxists-Leninist
ideology, their conceptualization of the role of trade unions is most effectively understood as
simultaneously anti-colonial and consistent with Lenin’s argument that the fundamental task of
revolutionary movements was to pursue “a gigantic replacement of certain institutions by other
institutions of a fundamentally different type.”54 The PPP’s efforts to alter the structure of labor
relations coincided with attempts to re-orient educational and youth institutions based on
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socialism and simultaneously to increase affiliation between new organizations and communistled international groups.55
Labor leaders’ competing trade union ideologies shaped their pursuit of transnational
relationships and Guianese involvement in international labor organizations internationalized the
conflict. Colonial Office-TUC efforts to help build Guianese trade unions began on a small scale
in 1929 as a result of policies designed to train Guianese labor leaders and institutionalize the
labor movement.56 However, World War II impeded British officials’ plans to expand the
programs in response to labor unrest in the late 1930s.57 Meanwhile, PAC co-founder H.J.M.
Hubbard attended the first conference of the WFTU when international labor leaders formed the
organization in 1945 in an attempt to facilitate universal workers’ solidarity and establish a
cooperative relationship between communist and non-communist labor organizations.58 Tensions
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between communist and non-communist labor leaders, disagreement over the future of European
colonialism, and debates about the Marshall Plan divided the WFTU. As a result, the TUC and
CIO led the non-communist unions out of the organization in 1949 and they established the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as an alternative to the WFTU.59
PAC/PPP leaders individually and in conjunction with the Guiana Industrial Workers
Union (GIWU) retained connections to the WFTU and its loosely affiliated regional
organization, the Caribbean Labor Congress (CLC).60 The WFTU’s anti-colonialism and
advocacy for the PPP increased Guianese leaders’ support for the communist-led international.61
Moreover, a report by Ernst Schwarz, the CIO’s representative to the WFTU prior to the split,
suggests that in addition to conflicting over political ideology, divisions within the organization
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revolved around the type of development to support in underdeveloped areas. Schwarz noted that
British and American representatives were alienated within the organization in their support for
agricultural development and private foreign investment rather than the industrialization and
pursuit of self-sufficiency that Eastern European representatives demanded for poor countries.62
Therefore, the WFTU’s support for socialist development dovetailed with PAC/PPP objectives.63
Meanwhile, MPCA leaders increased their pursuit of institutional connections to the
British and American-led international economic system. As the Guianese labor conflict
increased in the late 1940s, the TUC increased its support for the MPCA. At the same time, the
sugar workers’ union affiliated to ICFTU and its regional arm, the Inter-American Regional
Organization of Workers (ORIT).64 MPCA General Secretary Sheik Shakoor traveled to the
United States to meet with American labor leaders to discuss the organization and purpose of
ORIT just after its founding.65 Shakoor also played an important role in expanding ORIT with
the creation of the Caribbean Area Division of ORIT (CADORIT) in 1952, which Jagan opposed
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in CLC arguing that it disrupted Caribbean labor unity.66 Colonial officials and TUC leaders
supported the MPCA’s integration into the Western labor organizations and occasionally
provided assistance to ease the financial burden on Guianese trade unionists’ travels to ICFTU,
ORIT, or CADORIT conferences.67 Nonetheless, MPCA efforts to resist structural changes to
the nature of trade unionism were not directed from the outside and Shakoor and other leaders
aggressively opposed the PAC/PPP and GIWU despite a general lack of external international
assistance before 1954.68 Richard Ishmael, who became MPCA president in 1953, insisted on
increasing his organization’s integration into ORIT as a result of shared opposition to
communism and mutual support for “free trade unionism.”69 Ishmael’s appeal to the American
concept of free trade unionism in particular underscores MPCA leaders’ opposition to PAC/PPP
trade union ideals. Thus, Guianese labor leaders pursued regional and global integration with
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transnational organizations as a way to strengthen their movements based on the type of postcolonial society they hoped to establish.
The People’s Progressive Party’s Political Objectives
The juxtaposition of Jagan’s depiction of PPP ideas with contemporaries’ accounts and
newly available primary sources suggests that the party acted independently of external forces
while using institutional challenges to pursue Soviet-modeled socialist development and
integration into the Eastern-bloc. Crucially, most of the core PPP leaders defined themselves as
Marxist-Leninists who, though not subordinate to the Soviet Union, interpreted their anticolonial struggle as part of a broader socialist revolution and who hoped to increase affiliation
with other socialist or communist countries as a means of achieving economic independence,
development, and modernization. As Colin Palmer argues, describing PPP leaders as “‘Russian
puppets’ constitutes a gross misunderstanding of their nationalist aspirations” and a “failure to
accord independence of thought and will to colonial subjects;” however, dismissing the extent to
which as nationalists they consciously hoped to participate in and integrate with an international
socialist movement is to dismiss their aspirations too easily as well.70
PPP leaders explained their central objective as improving the lives of Guiana’s
impoverished population through socialist development and a subsequent change from the
colony’s position as raw material exporter in the international capitalist system.71 Cheddi Jagan
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argued that the transition toward political independence was a means of achieving economic
autonomy and the ability to marshal capital toward development and industrialization in the
interest of Guianese workers rather than as an end in itself.72 In addition to giving the Guianese
greater control over their own resources, Jagan argued that local investment in industry and
diversification of the economy would help the Guianese avoid repercussions emanating from the
negative effects of economic cycles in North America.73 The PPP’s explanation of economic
autonomy conflicted with Colonial Office analyses regarding the extension of self-government in
the West Indies. A Colonial Office committee debating the possible federation of Caribbean
territories in 1949 noted that colonies’ dependence on private assistance restricted autonomy as
much as governmental loans. However, the report emphasized the usefulness of private
investment and concluded that “the way to political independence [was], in short through
economic stability and solvency” but not “economic self-sufficiency.”74
Cheddi Jagan acknowledged that industrializing and diversifying the Guianese economy
required significant foreign capital investments; however, he feared that Anglo-American
financing in the Western Hemisphere during the 1950s would limit development while interest
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on loans would accrue to the extent that incoming assistance only served to pay off older debts. 75
In a speech before the Legislative Council in 1952 he argued that external investors sought to use
the colonies as sources of cheap labor while draining them of raw materials. Jagan insisted that
the WFTU opposed the perpetuation of indirect forms of exploitation and should be considered a
possible ally in Guiana’s struggle to end colonial exploitation, suggesting one of the reasons leftwing PPP leaders pursued relations with the communist-dominated international labor
organization.76 J.P. Lachmansingh, the GIWU President and member of the PPP executive
committee, agreed that his union sympathized with the Eastern-bloc international as a result of
the WFTU’s activities supporting agricultural workers.77 Furthermore, Jagan argued that private
foreign control of disbursement would direct funds in the interest of investors’ profits rather than
leaving the Guianese “free to put it, after we have been scientifically advised how to spend it, on
the sectors which will generate wealth more rapidly” and end dependence on external funding.78
Thus, PAC/PPP leaders and the overwhelming majority of the Guianese Left expressed concern
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that political independence without structural reorientation to strengthen working-class influence
on political-economic issues would lead to dependence on the British and American economies.
Jagan’s ultimate objective, then, was political independence as a means of achieving the
economic autonomy and diversification that he expected would break sugar’s hold on the
economy and allow resources to be used for the benefit of the Guianese people through a
program of socialization.79 Despite internal disagreements on ideological and foreign policy
issues, PPP leaders agreed on the importance of ending foreign domination of the Guianese
economy. Even Jai Narine Singh, who along with Lachmansingh and Burnham was most
responsible for dividing the PPP in 1955 over ideological disagreements, suggested in his
autobiography that he viewed independence as a means of achieving a program of
nationalization.80 In speaking with Alexander in 1953, Lachmansingh discussed the need for
nationalization of some industries as a necessary precursor to development. He argued that the
PPP government elected in 1953 would eventually take over public utilities, which would put
them in a position to “push electricity out into the countryside, where there is none now” because
private companies would lose money in providing services to rural areas.81 Thus, Singh and
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Lachmansingh joined with PAC’s left wing in the late 1940s giving the PPP a strong trade union
association when the party formed in 1950.
However, Lachmansingh and Singh’s political philosophies fell in between the reformist
elements in the MPCA and the left-wing of the PPP. Those leaders sought a form of
independence that included significant reforms in Guianese society and a degree of socialism
that stopped short of social revolution and preserved rather than reoriented the colony’s external
connections. Lachmansingh founded the GIWU and, along with Singh, was an early member of
the PPP and minister in the PPP government in 1953. Their split from the PPP, seemingly based
on disagreements over the structure of post-colonial Guyanese society and the PPP’s foreign
relations, was a signal event in the internal conflict over the idea of institutional decolonization.82
Similarly, Richard Ishmael briefly joined the left-coalition in the early 1950s as member of the
PPP but left the party and joined MPCA when he thought the colony was in danger of too
significant a break from traditional British political-economic institutions and of falling into too
close an association with Eastern Bloc nations.83
Moreover, the PAC/PPP philosophy starkly conflicted with the AFL/AFL-CIO and
ICFTU policy that “government participates in improving the standard of living and
safeguarding working conditions, with private enterprise remaining the chief mode for operating
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industry and business.”84 Thus, Anglo-American trade union leaders opposed the political
objectives of nationalist leaders who bridged political and industrial activity in addition to
objecting to the relationship between the PPP’s trade union ideas.
Though Marxist-inspired, much of the PAC’s and PPP’s economic nationalism resembled
that of numerous regional political leaders during the era. Historian Michael Adamson argues
that most Latin American countries pursued policies designed “to restructure their economies
away from commodity production and mineral extraction that exposed them to external corporate
decision making and global financial shocks” after 1945.85 United States policymakers and
businessmen inconsistently responded to appeals for industrial development in the Third World
during President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration when American and British development
assistance to British Guiana peaked. Eisenhower generally continued the policies outlined in the
Truman administration’s Hoover Commission Report, for example, which argued against
promoting industrial development in the developing world, despite disagreement from Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles.86 The American National Association of Manufacturers and CIO
also opposed promoting industrialization in underdeveloped countries in hearings before the
Eisenhower Administration’s Commission on Foreign Economic Policy.87
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American lack of support for industrial development in the underdeveloped world
reinforced Jagan’s preconceptions about Anglo-American economic imperatives. William
Maddox, the United States Consul in Trinidad, held responsibility for British Guiana after the
State Department controversially closed the American consulate in Guiana in early 1953 as a
cost-saving measure. Maddox reported to the State Department on Jagan’s criticism of a British
development plan for British Guiana in 1954. Jagan argued that the plan attempted to “facilitate
imperialist ‘looting of our raw materials.’” Most importantly, Jagan argued that the proposal did
not discuss industrialization and the repayment of interest necessitated the expenditure of funds
that diverted financing from development. Ultimately, Jagan argued that political independence
was a “mirage” unless coupled with economic emancipation. Reiterating that autonomy required
economic independence that went beyond self-government, Jagan suggested that “Colonial
leaders like myself are now increasingly aware that it is possible for an imperialist power to carry
on the imperialist control and exploitation of an underdeveloped country without appearing to
retain control by constitutional form or by making the territory into a direct and formal
colony.”88
Broadly then, the PPP’s left- wing pursued a policy designed to limit integration into the
global capitalist system and to integrate with socialist countries as a means of increasing their
relative economic power.89 As early as 1952 Jagan criticized British economic planners for
“thinking only in one direction” and failing to consider the possibilities of trade while “markets
[were] available in the socialist sector of the world,” arguing that “unless we can rearrange the
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economy of this Colony and unless we can disturb consciously its present economic fabric, we
will never be able to control and make the progress we want.”90 Over time the PPP’s left- wing
leaders aimed for integration into what Cheddi Jagan referred to as a socialist world system that
he suggested in early 1961 “is today challenging capitalism on a world front surpassing it in
certain fields.”91 Expanded trade with the socialist world, however, directly conflicted with
American objectives articulated in National Security Council (NSC) document 162/2, which
formed the basis of the Eisenhower administration’s national security strategy. The NSC argued
that limited integration into the American-led capitalist system on the part of colonial or
underdeveloped areas directly threatened the system itself and undermined United States national
security.92 Moreover, the NSC expressed considerable concern at the possibility of expanded
trade of strategic materials, such as bauxite, with the Soviet-bloc.93 The PPP’s access to free
trade would have included increased economic arrangements with the Soviet-bloc and as a result
directly conflicted with United States national security objectives.
Beyond trading with Eastern-bloc countries, the PPP’s left- wing expressed a desire to
incorporate aspects of Soviet development plans in British Guiana. In an interview with Robert
Alexander, Jagan quoted from a United Nations study suggesting that planned economies, such
as in the Soviet Union, were developing faster than undeveloped societies or capitalist
90
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democracies.94 Jagan explained that he opposed foreign exploitation of the country’s resources
and wished to grow the Guianese economy with internally generated capital.95 Consequently, the
PPP established closer relations with the WFTU and pursued connections with the Eastern-bloc
to assist in the pursuit of socialist development.96 On this issue as well, Jagan found the WFTU a
strong ideological ally. Perry Mars notes in his essay “Ethno-Politics and the Caribbean
Working-Class Project” that the Caribbean movement in which Jagan was a central figure
assumed that “successful power struggles are facilitated by international class solidarity through
the development of close links with like-minded trade union and political movements abroad.”97
Everett Kassalow, Deputy Director of the Office of Labor Affairs for the Foreign
Operations Administration (FOA) and a historian, argues that in European territories colonial
capital tended to “predominate in [the] major industrial and agricultural ventures,” resulting in
“the union movement tak[ing] on a kind of anti-foreign, political character as well as an
economic one.” Kassalow noted that “even ‘routine’ economic action against a corporation
which is controlled by foreign or colonial capital inevitably has political overtones.”98 The PAC
and PPP formed as a result of labor struggles becoming politicized when the groups’ leaders
concluded that industrial action alone insufficiently addressed Guianese poverty. The inability to
effectively engage in routine economic action increased Guianese support for the politicization
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of labor struggles, particularly when the PAC took the lead in organizing workers in the wake of
the violent British response to sugar workers strikes in 1948. Similarly, historian Arnold
Steinbach notes that many colonial unionists appealed to the WFTU in part because the affiliated
countries, including Communists in the Soviet Union, seemed to appreciate the complex
agricultural problems facing their societies more so than unionists in the United States and Great
Britain.99 Along those lines Jagan noted in an interview with Robert Alexander that British
Guiana’s first economic priority was agricultural development and the need to break the
stranglehold sugar held over the colony.100 Therefore, Jagan’s appeal to socialism and Sovietstyle development was typical of a wide variety of postcolonial leaders who noted that the Soviet
Union industrialized within a generation.101
Cheddi Jagan’s political-economic ideas were most concisely articulated during a visit to
the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico in 1961. In recounting the trip, Jagan noted that he
“stated frankly everywhere that my Government was dedicated to the carrying out of a socialist
policy.” Clarifying, Jagan stated that he favored “the workers reaping the full fruits of their labor
through public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange” and that only
planning on that basis could rapidly modernize the economy and provide the Guianese people
with higher standards of living. Despite temporary circumstances, Jagan noted that, “I believe
ideally in the nationalization of all the important means of production, distribution and
99
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exchange.” He directly acknowledged that “we differed from the nations of North America in the
way we propose to organize our economic life” while noting that given the colony’s dire
situation, industrialization necessarily would be “tied to export markets previously explored and
secured.”102
In British Guiana a lack of local capital made external financing for diversification of the
economy and industrialization necessary precursors to development. At the same time,
institutional development required training and external financial assistance. Jagan consistently
stated that he would “seek aid from all possible sources;” however, he was adamant that he
would “not accept any aid upon conditions which limit the sovereignty of my people.”103
Therefore, the activists who sought to restructure Guianese society and modernize their economy
in a manner inconsistent with Anglo-American aims could only do so by developing connections
outside the capitalist world.104 Still, PPP leaders argued that they did not want to sever political
relations with Great Britain after independence and would cooperate with the United States.
They argued that their objective was a reorientation of political and economic power that
included incorporation into Western political institutions such as the British Commonwealth of
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Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) while allowing state-to-state relations to
be based on equality and, as Janet Jagan put it: “to our mutual advantage and benefit.”105
Nonetheless, the argument for continued political association with capitalist countries did
not suggest integration into the capitalist economic system. PPP leaders also aimed to increase
their economic, political, and social connections with communist nations abroad to assist in their
objective of non-violent, democratically driven social revolution.106 Cheddi Jagan hinted that the
PPP thought social revolution and integration with the Eastern-bloc could allow for continued
relations with Great Britain and the United States. In a 1952 Legislative Council debate Jagan
suggested that it was possible to support “the peaceful coexistence of the capitalist and socialist
systems of economy.” He argued that his Guianese opponents misunderstood revolution,
suggesting that “there are such things as social revolution as people’s ideas change.” His
opponents in the Legislature, he argued, did “not want the people of this Colony to change their
ideas at all.” Conservatives wanted to “keep the millstone of capitalist ideas tied around their
necks as long as they live.”107 Ultimately, a political and international reorientation required
redefining the role of trade unions and other social institutions in British Guiana so that they
could act in support of a socialist system rather than as a moderating influence in an AngloAmerican capitalist system.108 In British Guiana, the Cold War and decolonization merged in a
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direct way. Combining socialist nationalization of the economy’s commanding heights with
institutional reorientation, the left-wing PAC and PPP leaders argued, would facilitate a peaceful
social revolution.
Conclusion
Left-wing PAC and PPP leaders consistently advocated a peaceful progression toward
social revolution and a commitment to political democracy between 1946 and 1964 while
retaining more popular support than domestic opposition. It is critical to note that PPP leaders
did not attempt to subvert the Parliamentary Constitutional process or undermine political
democracy when in office in 1953 or between 1957 and 1964. For several months in 1964 the
PPP acted outside of democratic institutions and used political violence in an attempt to stay in
power after Anglo-American intervention combined with domestic opposition to remove the
party from office.109 Excepting 1964, however, and despite evidence that the party prepared for a
campaign of subversion, PPP leaders generally did not act to undermine democratic principles in
Guiana. At the same time, Cheddi Jagan advocated leaving avenues open to private investment if
government did not have enough capital to effectively pursue development as long as the
Guianese could avoid having “foreign individuals coming here today who will take away
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salaries, pensions and everything else including profits in the long run.”110 Thus, there is
evidence that the PPP intended to pursue peaceful co-existence with the Western-bloc.
Nonetheless, the left-wing of the PAC and PPP consistently suggested that compromise on the
nature of Guianese society was temporary and they articulated a belief in Marxist-Leninist theory
and support for communist development.111
Jagan’s frank connection of socialism to communism in the 1953 Legislative Council
debate is significant. His position does not suggest that he intended to impose communism on
British Guiana but that he expected a form of it to evolve from the PPP’s establishment of
socialism.112 As a result, left-wing PAC and PPP leaders attempted to institutionally reorganize
the colony to lay the foundations of socialism and a progression toward communist development.
Even though PPP leaders constantly sought economic aid from the United States and Great
Britain it is far more telling that the party did not pursue institutional connections with the
Western-bloc. Despite suggestions from moderate party members that they would accept aid
from both the ICFTU and WFTU, for example, there is no evidence that PPP leaders attempted
to associate with Western labor institutions at any point.113 Cheddi Jagan specifically dismissed
the idea of cooperation with “the pro-imperialist” ICFTU or CADORIT in a 1956 speech even as
he advocated a temporarily moderated political position within Guiana.114 Economic assistance
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for development, even aid that included specific stipulations, did not hold the key to shaping the
nature of Guianese society in the same way as institutional structures.
Crucially, United States national security estimates suggested using “all feasible
diplomatic, political, economic, and covert measures to counter any threat of a party or
individuals directly or indirectly responsive to Soviet control” to inhibit “Soviet capabilities for
extending control and influence.”115 Thus, the PPP’s consideration of increased trade with the
Eastern-bloc and Soviet-influenced development qualified as a threat to United States national
security and to American policymakers offered a justification for intervention in the early 1960s.
American policymakers argued that communist ideas could potentially offer an opportunity for
expanded Soviet influence regardless of the relationship between the PPP and Eastern-bloc
communists. Moreover, the PPP’s pursuit institutional ties to Eastern-bloc international
organizations such as the WFTU and efforts to restructure Guianese society complemented party
leaders’ attempt to expand economic relations into the socialist world. Despite the ultimate
decisiveness of Anglo-American intervention, the conflict over British Guiana’s institutional
structures and political orientation first emerged internally.
The PAC-GIWU challenge to the MPCA and the British-imposed system of labor
relations in British Guiana congealed into a left-coalition after the violence at Plantation Enmore
in 1948. Available sources limit the extent to which the ideological evolution of left-coalition
leaders can be traced; however, some general conclusions emerge from close examination of the
existing materials. Most importantly, some of the coalition’s leaders argued that challenging the
colonial system’s structural poverty required a fundamental change to the nature of the Guianese
political-economic system and increased connections to the Eastern-bloc. The Guianese left,
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however, disagreed on the extent to which the movement should seek a break with the Western
capitalist system. Moreover, conservative labor leaders advocating reform within the existing
colonial structure resisted the left-coalition and acted with the advantage of preferential
placement within the colonial system. As a result, an ideological, legal, and physical conflict
grounded in disagreements regarding the institutional framework for Guiana began and evolved
into what the first Guianese Labor Commissioner, James Ramphal, referred to as a “persistent
state of inter-union war.”116
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Chapter 5: The First Phase of Institutional Decolonization in British Guiana
Cheddi Jagan’s break with the Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA) and the
subsequent formation of the Political Affairs Committee (PAC) marked the beginning of a
distinct period of labor conflict in British Guiana in which debates about labor relations became
struggles to shape the nature of post-colonial society through institution-building. The first phase
of institutional decolonization was grounded in conflicts between Guianese unionists who
differed on their expectations for the structure of an autonomous society. British efforts to
institutionalize capitalist labor relations exacerbated the internal struggle, as did the slow
internationalization of the debate as American and international labor organizations entered the
fray. The first phase of institutional decolonization in British Guiana peaked when the People’s
Progressive Party (PPP) sought to use its electoral victory to alter Guianese institutions and the
British government forcibly removed the PPP. The British action exacerbated ideological
conflicts within the PPP and initiated the disintegration of the left-coalition and the emergence of
racialized politics. Guianese leaders consistently fought over influence within the labor
movement, the most important political institution in British Caribbean colonial systems. 1
The process of negotiation and conflict centered on establishing post-colonial political
and social structures in British Guiana, what I term institutional decolonization, began in 1946
when the left-coalition PAC organized to replace the existing political-economic system in
British Guiana with a Marxist state.2 The PAC challenged colonialism, capitalism, and Guianese
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labor and political leaders who proposed improving workers’ wages and conditions within the
existing system. PAC leaders used a three-pronged approach to alter the structure of
institutionalized labor relations as a precursor to broader structural transformation of Guianese
society. They engaged in legislative debates, undertook strike actions, and pursued international
connections to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and communist parties to
generate support for their program. Reformist Guianese labor leaders, colonial officials, and
British, American, and Western international trade unionists opposed the left-coalition between
1946 and 1953.
The PAC evolved into the PPP, a multi-racial left-coalition that won a resounding victory
in the 1953 elections, which allowed for full internal self-government in the colony for the first
time.3 The seven-year-long labor conflict erupted as the PPP used its position to alter
institutionalized labor relations and met fierce resistance from colonial employers, reformist
unionists, and eventually the British military. Ultimately, the period between 1946 and 1953 is
best understood as the onset of a twenty-year period of conflict to determine the nature of labor
relations in the colony and the institutional structure of post-colonial society.
The PPP’s success resulted from its ability to forge a multiracial, left-coalition that
brought the most effective Guianese leaders into a single organization designed to advance the
interests of Guianese workers. The brief experiment in self-government illuminated the popular
support for the PPP and the core PPP leaders’ commitment to revolutionary changes in Guianese
society. At the same time, the MPCA’s resistance to PPP labor policies shed light on the depth of
reformist opposition to social revolution. The first phase of institutional decolonization in British
Guiana convinced British and American policymakers and labor leaders of the need to pursue
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institution-building as a counter to the PPP. Ultimately, British officials’ swift reaction to the
PPP in the summer of 1953 disillusioned Guianese leaders and exacerbated ideological schisms,
racial tensions, and personal feuds within the left-coalition.
The existing scholarship on the period between 1946 and 1953 focuses primarily on the
political dimensions of British intervention to re-impose direct rule in British Guiana after a brief
experiment allowing the Guianese full internal self-government and universal suffrage under the
Waddington Constitution from April to October 1953. Scholars agree that the PAC/PPP-led
militant labor movement emerged as a political force that won support of Guianese people as a
result of demands for improved wages and conditions for deeply impoverished workers. The
earliest studies on the subject note the radical nature of the left-coalition’s leadership and argue
that the PPP’s challenge to British control created a dilemma for colonial officials only willing to
permit self-determination that accepted existing economic relationships.
Leo Despres points out that disagreement between Guianese leaders preceded the PPP’s
time in government and he suggests that the left-coalition PAC started to fracture as soon as
colonial officials proposed constitutional changes in 1949. Despres argues that ideological
disagreements between Marxist and non-Marxist members of the coalition struggled to maintain
a unified nationalist program while differing on the nature of post-colonial Guiana.4 Basil Ince
suggests that the constitution’s suspension was a reaction to four pieces of legislation designed to
collectively alter the nature of labor relations in the colony. Ince suggests that the PPP’s
challenge to British control forced colonial officials to question the bounds of expanded colonial
autonomy even though three of the four bills did not pass in the legislature. Ultimately, he argues
that British officials concluded that self-determination did not include permitting colonists to
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pursue a political-economic system that administrators considered a betrayal of the interests of
the people they were charged to govern.5
Post-Cold War scholarship emphasizes the destructive consequences of British
intervention, specifically the fracturing of the nationalist movement, the rise of the authoritarian
Forbes Burnham, and the long-term racial discord that continues to plague Guyana. These works
are crucial in highlighting the important failures of interventionist policies; however, they
disagree on the motives behind British action. Stephen Rabe argues that British policymakers in
London dismissed contrary reports from colonial officials in British Guiana and intervened in
response to a perceived communist threat.6 Colin Palmer, like Rabe, suggests that colonial
officials overreacted to the PPP’s rhetoric and the challenge to certain aspects of British control,
particularly regarding labor relations, and tried to justify the intervention on baseless claims of
impending communist subversion.7
Conversely, Clem Seecharan argues that the PPP’s left- wing governed with the intention
of undermining the Waddington Constitution because party leaders considered it a retrograde
attempt to perpetuate capitalist exploitation in the colony. He specifically suggests that the PPP
attempted to use the Labor Relations Bill to give the party-supported Guiana Industrial Workers
Union (GIWU) the opportunity to act as the vanguard for the advancement of “scientific
socialism” in the colony.8 Similarly, Robert Waters argues that British officials suspended the
Waddington Constitution in response to a wide variety of circumstantial evidence and
intelligence reports which together presented a strong case that the PPP intended to move toward
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the establishment of a communist government.9 Gerald Horne argues that British opposition to
the PPP government revolved around the Guianese attempt to exercise a degree of democracy
beyond what British officials accepted in colonial areas. Specifically, Horne suggests that
colonial officials reacted in response to the Labor Relations Bill and introduced the defense of
the intervention as necessary to counter communism in the colony after the fact.10 Spencer
Mawby suggests that British officials’ response was primarily aimed at the perceived radicalism
of Sydney King and Janet Jagan and simultaneous fears in London of colonial anarchy rather
than of communist subversion.11 While scholars disagree on the specifics of the intervention,
they agree that the debate centered on labor relations.
Thorough examination of the labor struggle suggests that British institution-building
before 1953 institutionalized reformist trade unions, but did not significantly improve day-to-day
life for Guianese workers. In addition to Mawby’s and Seecharan’s studies, Nigel Bolland’s
work is most illuminating in placing the era in the context of a broader labor struggle in which
colonial officials confronted challenges to existing labor relations through force, “limited
concessions, and finally by trying to institutionalize and control the labor movement.”12
However, Bolland notes that wartime price and cost-of-living increases offset minor wage gains.
Moreover, he suggests that raw material extraction and cheap labor formed the basis of colonial
economic systems in the British Caribbean and as a result British efforts to reform the system
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were insufficient.13 As a result, core PPP leaders would have democratically replaced the
Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA) and begun the transition toward peaceful social
revolution absent British intervention. Moreover, the transnational trade union relationships
established between 1946 and 1953 provided the basis for Anglo-American institution-building
and opposition to the PPP after the Waddington Constitution’s suspension.
The Emergence of a left-coalition opposition
In 1953 the left-wing of the PPP challenged the institutions that defined Guianese society,
most importantly the colony’s labor movement, and established connections to the socialist
world in pursuit of social revolution and a reorientation of British Guiana’s position in the
international economic system. Specifically, the core members of the PPP wanted to use the
labor movement to challenge the colony’s exploitative economic relations and to establish a
framework in which trade unions acted as “subsidiary agencies of a democratic character” within
the PPP.14 The Jagan-led left-wing of the PPP held the strongest support of the Guianese
population from the party’s founding in 1950 until after independence; however, a diverse
opposition to the PPP emerged based on disagreement with various aspects of the Jagans’
program.
Some of the PPP’s conservative detractors opposed the party’s pursuit of socialism in
British Guiana; however, Guianese political leaders were widely sympathetic to socialist
principles. Therefore, opposition within the Guianese Left, most importantly regarding the
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relationship between the PPP and trade unions and the party’s international orientation, was most
significant in shaping internal conflicts in British Guiana during decolonization. Specifically,
some members of the Guianese Left pursued social reform through activist unionism to exact
benefits for impoverished Guianese workers while refusing to challenge the political-economic
system. The PPP’s moderate and conservative opponents established relationships with British,
American, and Western international labor organizations to support their trade unions in British
Guiana.
The Jagan-led movement used a three-pronged approach to challenge the nature of
institutionalized labor in British Guiana between 1946 and 1953 and domestic opposition to
PAC/PPP pressure ignited the conflicts central to the process of institutional decolonization.
First, PAC/PPP leaders worked with the GIWU to challenge the MPCA for the right to represent
sugar workers. Colonial officials and employers in the Sugar Producers’ Association (SPA)
recognized the MPCA as the bargaining agent for sugar workers since 1937 and sought to
alleviate poverty and worker unrest through the union in the 1940s.15 Nonetheless, extreme
poverty persisted in the colony and the GIWU rapidly won grassroots support between 1946 and
1948. Second, Cheddi Jagan advocated for political changes to support the GIWU and
undermine the MPCA and other British-supported trade unions after his election to the
Legislative Council in 1947. Finally, the PPP’s left-wing pursued international relationships with
the WFTU and Eastern-bloc labor organizations to obtain support and training for their
movement in British Guiana.16
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The PAC/PPP pursuit of Marxist modernization and development necessitated a break
from or loosening of British Guianese ties to the capitalist world system, a separation that Jagan
thought was possible if the PPP could take control of economy through legislative action and
especially through party-led trade union activity. Since the MPCA and existing unions
simultaneously resisted and appealed to the external capitalist system for assistance, Jagan and
the PPP pushed for the establishment of new trade unions and a closer relationship between the
unions and the party that could be used to reorient the economic system and establish a Guianese
form of communism once the PPP attained power.
Jagan initially pursued political change as a member of the MPCA; however, he left the
union in 1946 after a year as treasurer and helped establish the PAC.17 The MPCA, the largest
union in British Guiana, initially lost the confidence of many sugar workers when evidence
emerged in 1939 that the organization’s treasurer accepted a bribe from Booker Brothers’
McConnell & Co., the privately owned British sugar company that dominated the Guianese
economy.18 Most Guianese sugar workers remained skeptical of the union thereafter even though
there were no proven subsequent instances of corruption. Additionally, the MPCA’s
collaborative bargaining techniques and cooperation with sugar employers led to charges of
being a corrupt company union that ignored the workers’ needs.19 Sugar producers acceded to
small negotiated benefits for Guianese workers in the 1940s; however, a decline in sugar prices
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and employers’ considerable power limited material improvements for workers living in dire
poverty. At the same time, the part-time and seasonal nature of plantation work exacerbated the
MPCA’s weakness since laborers were unable to pay union dues in the offseason. Consequently,
alternate sugar workers’ unions were established throughout the 1940s to pursue a more militant
platform; however, most of them were short-lived and financially insolvent.20
The Colonial Office Commissioner of Labor in British Guiana, William Bissell,
responded to ongoing labor unrest in the 1940s with the support of the British Guiana Trades
Union Council (BGTUC). Bissell advocated a policy that encouraged the growth of two craftbased sugar workers’ unions that inherently contained a great degree of racial segregation
strongly opposed from the Guianese Left.21 Bissell argued that the MPCA should represent the
overwhelmingly East Indian plantation workers and that the British Guiana Workers League
(BGWL) should bargain for the predominantly Afro-Guianese factory workers. Additionally,
Bissell attempted to restrict the number of trade unions and limit their activities to industrial
matters. Bissell’s actions reinforced colonial officials’ argument that Guianese workers could
effectively negotiate with employers if they developed the necessary institutional structures.
However, workers’ conditions remained poor throughout the decade and competing unions
proliferated. In the late 1940s at least twenty-seven trade unions claimed legitimacy, nine in the
sugar industry alone, despite the colony’s population reaching only about 400,000. Thus, the
GIWU’s challenge to the MPCA was representative of broad conflict within the labor
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movement; however, the GIWU was unique in its influence and connection to the left- wing of
the PAC and PPP.22
Dr. Joseph Prayal (J.P.) Lachmansingh, Amos A. Rangela, and Jane Phillips-Gay
founded the GIWU in 1946, establishing a militant union that promoted itself as an alternative to
the MPCA.23 Cheddi Jagan’s election to the Legislative Council in 1947 corresponded with the
emergence of the GIWU, and he backed the union through his seat in government. Jagan
exercised considerable influence within the union despite not officially holding a position in the
organization.24 In February 1948 Jagan pressed the Legislative Council to adopt a policy
compelling recognition of unions with the greatest membership on plantations where multiple
unions existed rather than permitting the Sugar Estates Authorities to choose the union with
which they preferred to negotiate.25 His efforts directly challenged the SPA’s preference of the
MPCA over the GIWU on the sugar plantations.
Jagan clarified his criticism of the Labor Department’s trade union policy in British
Guiana in February 1948. He suggested that both employers and employees would benefit from
the development of strong trade unions; however, he criticized the Labor Department’s methods
of supporting organized labor in British Guiana, specifically on sugar estates. Jagan argued that
Bissell was “merely importing [trade union] principles from the United Kingdom and other
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countries without at first trying to fathom the psychology and amenity background of the people
of British Guiana.” Jagan argued that merely adopting British trade union principles was useless
in British Guiana because workers on sugar plantations were held in “a condition which is
tantamount to forced labor.” Furthermore, Jagan noted that sugar workers’ dependence on
plantation housing and persistent victimization made it impossible for Guianese workers to
negotiate wages and conditions according to British trade union principles.26 Addressing the
needs of sugar workers, Jagan concluded, required trade unions engaged in practices different
than those adapted for the conditions of industrial workers in Great Britain at least until Guianese
society was restructured.27
Jagan articulated a similar view in 1951 while serving as President of the Sawmill
Workers’ Union (SWU), a position he held in addition to his seat in the Legislative Council.
Jagan argued in the council that an agreement between the SWU and employers in September
1949 guaranteed workers a right to renegotiate wage rates no later than March 1950; however,
discussions had still not taken place by early 1951. Jagan accused Bissell of enabling employers’
delaying tactics, such as rejecting union proposals while offering no counterproposals as a way
to end negotiations. Employer intransigence, Jagan argued, led discontented workers to engage
in civil disobedience. Jagan further suggested that the resulting social unrest was a result of
failed democratic institutions since trade unions were unable to effectively protect workers in the
face of powerful foreign employers.28 Ultimately, Jagan argued that the Guianese labor
movement needed to be freed from its colonial framework and adjusted to circumstances in the
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colony. Jagan did not explain exactly what adjustment needed to be made; however, Jagan
argued in a 1948 PAC Bulletin that strikes and worker unrest were inevitable in Guiana until the
government took control of production and distribution. At that point, the Bulletin argued,
capitalism and strikes could be simultaneously eliminated.29
The GIWU’s founding and Jagan’s early political career occurred within the context of
significant labor resistance against the colony’s two most influential companies, the Demerara
Bauxite Company (Demba) and Booker Brothers. Strikes against Demba lasted from April to
June 1947 and sugar workers’ unrest climaxed in the fatal Enmore strike the following year.30
Ashton Chase, a Guianese lawyer whose career began as a trade unionist trained at Oxford
through a TUC exchange program most effectively chronicled Guianese labor unrest in the
1940s. Chase also played a significant role in Guianese decolonization struggles as a minister in
PPP governments.31 Chase suggests that tension between sugar workers and employers increased
throughout the 1940s and created the conditions for GIWU inspired strikes in 1948.
The 1948 sugar strikes began in April and occurred on a number of estates in Demerara
before culminating on June 16, 1948 when police shot fourteen workers, killing five, on the
Enmore Plantation. Striking plantation workers protested an assortment of deep-seated
grievances regarding industrial and political issues. Specifically, workers objected to working
and housing conditions, changes to the cut-and-load system on sugar estates, inaccurate scales,
dissatisfaction with the rules of piece work, and the conduct of rural officials. However, Chase
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suggests that the fundamental issue at stake was recognition of the GIWU rather than the SPAbacked MPCA as sugar workers’ representative.32 In addition to general suspicion that the
MPCA was a company union, sugar workers objected to a recently negotiated MPCA agreement
with the SPA. The MPCA-SPA compromise allowed for increased wage rates of 7- cents per ton
rather than the 40- cents per ton the workers demanded, and workers doubted MPCA leaders’
promise that the settlement was temporary. Furthermore, Nigel Bolland argues that the strike
evolved into a broader political action critiquing the colonial administration and the capitalist
economy when workers passed a resolution requesting Bissell’s removal as labor
commissioner.33 Colonial officials, however, concluded that the strike was primarily a
consequence of “Dr. Jagan, a local communist, and other political malcontents” using the GIWU
to exploit workers’ grievances for political gain.34
Workers refused MPCA requests to return to work, continuing the strike with
encouragement and material assistance from the Jagans, Lachmansingh, Phillips-Gay, and
Rangela. Throughout the strike, the PAC distributed propaganda bulletins at GIWU meetings to
encourage workers to continue their efforts against the sugar companies. Jai Narine Singh, who
was a Vice President in both the BGLU and MPCA in the early 1940s, joined the Jagans in
leading a funeral procession to Georgetown after the strike to protest the use of force. Singh
criticized officials and walked out of the official hearings investigating the strike in protest of the
committee’s impartiality. He also represented some of the victims’ families in court and won
them compensation for their suffering. Meanwhile, Lachmansingh and the Jagans refused to
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testify.35 The Jagans, Lachmansingh, Singh, and Phillips-Gay gained considerable support
among sugar workers as a result of their efforts during and after the strike which in turn
strengthened the emerging left-coalition between the GIWU and PAC.36
The wave of labor unrest in the late 1940s is most completely understood as
simultaneously a form of worker resistance to external employers’ exploitation and the onset of
conflict between Guianese labor leaders pursuing different notions of trade unionism for an
autonomous British Guiana. Evidence supports GIWU claims that employers leveraged their
influence over the MPCA to limit aggressive negotiations. MPCA General Secretary Sheik
Shakoor and President Richard Ishmael noted in an interview with Robert Alexander in 1954 that
the SPA censored the union’s periodical, Labour Advocate, pointing out that the SPA even ran
advertisements criticizing the union’s militancy. Ishmael also noted that SPA advertisements in
the Labour Advocate financed MPCA leaders’ salaries.37 At the same time, Clem Seecharan
notes that Booker Brothers Chairman Jock Campbell worked from within his company to
advocate gradual reforms throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s38 Nonetheless, PAC and
PPP leaders argued that reforms could not address workers needs and they pushed to establish a
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political party that could finance a party-trade union relationship independent of employers to
provide leverage for workers unavailable within the existing economic framework.
GIWU leaders argued that their organization could aggressively confront the SPA since it
was not under employer control and the union’s militancy encouraged Bookers’ officials and
colonial administrators to push for reforms to counter more aggressive demands. Nonetheless,
colonial officials and sugar producers refused to recognize the GIWU limiting its effectiveness.
The labor struggle continued to move toward the political sphere where the left-coalition leaders
hoped to use legislation to allow for changes to union representation that would supplant the
MPCA since the SPA declined to recognize the GIWU. At the same time the plantation structure
reinforced the mutual dependency between political and trade union leaders when some
companies restricted Jagan’s access to plantations where sugar workers lived several miles from
public roads.39 Companies’ assertion that private property laws allowed them to inhibit access to
individuals effectively isolated sugar workers from their elected representatives and contributed
to Jagan’s conclusion that effective democratic representation for workers could only be attained
through cooperation with a recognized trade union. Sugar workers interpreted the ban as
corroboration of Jagan’s claim to challenge sugar producers’ authority on their behalf and his
base of support strengthened.40
In an address to the Legislative Council in February 1949, Cheddi Jagan bitterly
criticized the British response to the previous year’s labor violence and his attack illuminates his
increasingly strong conclusion that Guianese unions needed to be free from external control to be
effective. Jagan argued that Bissell’s attempt to amalgamate Guianese unions beginning in 1945

39

Cheddi Jagan, “Estimates-Legislature: Wednesday February 2, 1949,” Dabydeen and Macedo, eds., Dr. Cheddi
Jagan National Assembly Speeches, Volume 1, 26.
40
Mohan Ragbeer, The Indelible Red Stain: The Destruction of a Tropical Paradise-a Cold War Story (Published by
Mohan Ragbeer, 2011), 168.

169

failed and that the only alternative was determining recognized bargaining agents based on union
membership. However, Jagan accused Bissell of refusing to accept popular recognition because
doing so would empower Guianese leaders who opposed his policies. Furthermore, Jagan
criticized Bissell’s insistence that trade unions and politics should be clearly separated, arguing
that such a policy was inconsistent with trade union politics in Great Britain. Finally, Jagan noted
that he proposed meeting with Bissell and Daniel Debidin, the legislative representatives of
striking workers in Demerara, the previous year but that Bissell refused. Jagan concluded that
Guianese political and labor leaders needed to cooperate to leverage their influence against
British control since Bissell ignored struggling workers. Conversely, Bissell argued that
preserving institutional machinery was paramount in maintaining effective labor relations.
Bissell argued that workers needed to work through their union representatives if the system was
going to be successful and that overturning institutional structures disrupted the system itself.41
Jagan’s speech and his legislative proposal echoing the sugar workers’ resolution calling
for Bissell’s replacement as Commissioner of Labor hint at the difficulty of early British
attempts at institution-building particularly on Guianese sugar plantations. Bissell argued that
colonial policy should focus on developing effective institutional mechanisms as the foundation
of an increasingly politically autonomous colony and that doing so was more important than
addressing immediate economic concerns. However, sugar workers were disinclined to delay
alleviation of intense poverty in the hope that a future organization colonizers developed would
address their needs particularly since existing trade union mechanisms failed to substantially
improve workers’ conditions. Instead, workers turned to Lachmansingh’s GIWU which insisted
on immediately resolving workers’ poverty.
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Simultaneously, sugar workers appealed to Jagan who advocated for social change
designed to fundamentally alter Guianese society and eliminate the potential for perpetuation of
external exploitation in Guiana. In reflecting on the evolution of Guianese politics in 1953, Jagan
explained his 1949 legislative proposal as an action in support of the GIWU. He described his
movement’s broad plan as an attempt to gradually build “a strong and united party and effective
trade unions” as part of a process of carrying out a Socialist reconstruction of the country. 42 He
complemented his legislative actions with trade union activity, becoming president of the SWU
in 1949 and aligning politically with Forbes Burnham, head of the BGLU.43 In the short term,
Jagan tried to use his political position to legislate improvements Guianese unions were unable to
negotiate, such as a two-dollar a day minimum wage for sugar workers. He argued that his
proposal was necessary because existing mechanisms for collective bargaining were inefficient
and the lack of pro-labor legislation left unions impotent in the face of powerful sugar interests.44
Thus, the PAC and GIWU formed a left-coalition between 1946 and 1949 that focused on using
legislative action and strikes to improve workers’ conditions. Most importantly, the Jagan-led
left- wing of the PAC-GIWU coalition aimed to lay the foundations of a party-union relationship
that would alter the nature of Guianese institutions and bring about a socialist transformation of
the colony.
Early Institution-Building in the Wake of the PAC Challenge
The Colonial Office established the Venn Commission to determine the causes and
possible solutions to economic and social unrest in British Guiana in the wake of the violent
conclusion to sugar strikes in 1948. In August 1949 strikes broke out as a result of the rivalry
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between the MPCA and GIWU and Bissell requested the Venn Commission publish its report
arguing that the commission’s conclusions would strengthen the government’s ability to enforce
order and reinforce orthodox labor relations in the wake of the renewed unrest.45 The
commission released the report in November and outlined several conclusions regarding the
development of trade unions in British Guiana. The commission’s conclusions illuminate the
official British perspective on organized labor’s role in the post-war world and the contradictions
within their view that reinforced the PAC’s left-wing Marxist opposition.46 British objectives
were two-fold, each objective containing within it humanitarian concerns and practical benefits
for the British. First, the commission argued for alleviation of the extreme poverty that caused
Guianese discontent. Second, the commission emphasized the need to build stronger mechanisms
through which Guianese workers could express their discontent within the colony’s existing
political-economic structure.47
The Venn Commission concluded that poverty drove the colonial crisis; however, it
suggested that trade unions’ inability to effectively advocate for improvements and political and
labor leaders’ exploitation of conditions for political advantage directly contributed to social
unrest. In assessing the turmoil, the commission drew the critical conclusion that self-interested
political leaders’ abuse of the union movement led to competition between unions rather than the
effective organization of workers necessary to establish a stable labor movement capable of
advocating for improvement to wages and working conditions. Despite Bissell’s efforts, the
commission determined that trade unionism “developed with an emphasis on the political rather
than the purely industrial role of labor organization, and ephemeral unions [had] been founded
45
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and exploited by individuals more for selfish political advantage (and cheap publicity) than for
the real benefit of the worker.” British officials argued that “the GIWU was mainly responsible
for provoking the strike on the Plantation Enmore in April, 1948” and that Lachmansingh’s
“purpose in exploiting this trade union is almost entirely political and personal.” Furthermore,
the commission noted the possibility that Cheddi Jagan, “the Communist member of the
Legislative Council,” had been “worming his way into” the BGWL and might win its presidency
in the union’s upcoming election.48 Thus, the Venn Commission concluded that the solution to
Guianese unrest and poverty lay in reinforcing the institutional structure of trade unionism in the
colony through programs aimed at strengthening the MPCA and guiding its development toward
narrowly industrial ends.
The TUC’s 1949 annual report suggests that some British labor leaders interpreted the
violence in British Guiana differently than the Colonial Office; however, opponents of the
official view agreed that Guianese workers needed assistance from the British labor movement.
A.L. Cohen of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers challenged the Colonial
Advisory Committee’s (CAC) interpretation and suggested that sugar workers’ protests resulted
from a desire for increased wages. Cohen noted sugar workers’ low pay--25 shillings per week
for men and 14 for women--and contrasted their meager wages with reports of considerable
profit for Tate & Lyle, the combine that controlled the sugar plantation at Enmore. Tate & Lyle,
he argued, recorded significant revenues in 1948 followed by record profits of close to five
million shillings in 1949. Cohen referred to other presentations at the meeting that confirmed his
report who shared his recommended of exposing Tate & Lyle’s “insidious propaganda,”
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combatting the company’s anti-nationalization campaign, and assisting workers in defeating “the
machination of this sugar combine.”49
Cohen seems not to have appreciated that the fundamental question of recognition for the
GIWU underlay the strike; however, his conclusion is significant for three reasons. First, it
suggests that some British unionists sympathized with colonial unions and encouraged assistance
based on ideals of workers’ solidarity. Second, it suggests that some British unionists suspected
sugar companies of intentionally spreading disinformation about labor unrest in the colonies as a
means of discrediting Guianese political and labor leaders in a manner that distorted official
perceptions of the nationalist resistance.50 Finally, Cohen’s recommendation suggests that British
unionists’ participation in institution-building efforts were based on an oversimplified
understanding of colonial issues that encouraged attempts to implement a form of organized
labor based narrowly on promoting trade union organization and collective bargaining divorced
from political activism. Despite differences of opinion on the sources of conflict, the TUC and
Colonial Office cooperated to try and bolster reformist Guianese unions and increase their
negotiating effectiveness.
In addition to suggesting a program of institution-building, the Venn Commission
recommended introducing emergency restrictions in British Guiana. Specifically, the
commission suggested delaying implementation of the International Labor Convention’s
49
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standards concerning Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize that had already been
adopted in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the Commission proposed restricting trade union
leadership positions to full-time employees in the industry whose workers the union purported to
represent.51 Commissioners expected the decision to aggravate Guianese workers and provoke
resistance in other Caribbean territories and among regional labor organizations since the policy
restricted trade union rights. Regardless, the commission determined that allowing registrars to
refuse recognition to certain unions, including some those workers preferred benefited workers.
The conclusion suggests that the commission prioritized undermining the GIWU and
strengthening the MPCA in the short-term as part of a process of long-term institution-building.52
Cheddi Jagan criticized the Venn Commission’s ruling regarding trade unions and the
Legislative Council’s inattention to what he deemed the cause of a great deal of labor strife,
workers’ inability to collectively bargain through the union of their choosing.53 He further
criticized the Commission’s suggestion to recognize several different craft unions within the
sugar industry, rather than support an industrial union to represent the entirety of sugar workers,
a criticism consistent with the Colonial Office’s previous recommendation of minimizing the
proliferation of unions.54 Finally, the Commission advocated a rule limiting leadership positions
in trade unions to workers who had three continuous years working within the industry they
proposed to represent. Theoretically the policy aimed at limiting the connections between
industrial and political organizing to minimize the corruption of labor organization for political
advancement; however, it created a barrier between the workers and the people they most trusted
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as representatives, impeding meaningful democracy in colonial society.55 It was also a policy
clearly aimed at undermining the PAC’s influence since colonial officials accepted close
connections between reformist trade unions and nationalist parties in the rest of the Caribbean
territories.56
Jagan argued that the Commission’s proposal was based on conditions in Great Britain,
where the trade union movement grew out of centuries of struggle. In British Guiana, he argued,
workers did not have the same level of experience and needed to be led; a rare point about which
the Legislative Council agreed with Jagan.57 Moreover, the proposal of restricting union
leadership to consistently employed full-time workers limited leadership positions to sugar
workers vulnerable to company victimization if their negotiations pressed for changes sugar
producers deemed too substantial and overlooked the fact that many sugar workers were seasonal
employees.
The Venn Commission’s recommendation of Colonial Office-TUC collaboration
reinforced a broader, longer-term effort at institution-building. The Commission’s
recommendations expanded on more than a decade of cooperative union work for developing
colonial areas. The TUC first established relationships with colonial unions before World War II
for the purpose of advising, educating, and collecting information to assist colonial workers in
pursuing labor organization.58 In 1940 the British government passed the Colonial Development
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and Welfare Act, which was updated in 1945, based on the notion that newly established colonial
trade unions required the assistance of experienced British trade union advisors.59 TUC
cooperation with the Colonial Office included training staff members in Colonial Labor
Departments since at least 1942 and sending British trade unionists to guide colonial trade
unions; however, the war limited the effectiveness of their programs. After 1945 the TUC
collaborated with Ruskin College, Oxford, in bringing colonial unionists to England for
education and circulating correspondence courses in the colonies.60
TUC records indicate that the Colonial Office encouraged British trade unionists to
increase their involvement in the Caribbean after the violence at Enmore and offered some
governmental financing to advance the programs. A grant from the Colonial Development and
Welfare Act financed West Indian courses conducted between August and December 1948 that
included the participation of eighteen trade union leaders in the Caribbean.61 Colonial officials
and British unionists expected that their participation in institution-building activities would
assist in the construction of structural mechanisms to alleviate colonial poverty and promote the
development of social and political-economic institutions based on British practices and
contribute to capitalist-democratic development.62 However, as D.I. Davies argues, British
efforts at trade union development promoted the diffusion of some TUC practices while guiding
organized labor along a moderate path in the colonies. Davies and Spencer Mawby argue that
numbers obscured the significant lack of organization among the rank-and-file, which was the focus of post-war
programs. See: Report of the 78 th Annual Trades Union Congress, October 21-25, 1946, TUC History Online, 162,
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TUC programs focused more on moderating potentially challenging colonial movements than
assuring political voice and material benefits to colonial workers.63 Furthermore, historian Bob
Reinalda argues that in “colonies and former colonies trade union policies were often modeled
according to the national interests of the mother countries, and as such these top-down policies
tended to frustrate local models.”64 Thus, scholarship suggests that the Venn Commission
recommendation for countering the GIWU-PAC alliance in British Guiana through institutionbuilding fell into a broader pattern employed throughout the Empire. British institution-building
efforts, however, unfolded in an increasingly complex international environment in which
international organizations and non-state actors outside of the United Kingdom played an
increasing role in colonial affairs.
The Internationalization of Institutional Decolonization
Cold War conflicts between international labor organizations influenced institutional
decolonization in British Guiana as early as 1945 when H.J.M. Hubbard, a founding member of
the PAC, attended the first conference of the WFTU. In response to PAC association with the
WFTU and its financially independent regionally arm, the Caribbean Labor Congress (CLC), the
Colonial Office and TUC encouraged Guianese unions to associate with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and Inter-American Regional Organization of
Workers (ORIT). Nigel Bolland explains the Colonial Office’s provision of funds for Guianese
unions’ participation at the ICFTU Conferences as a means to bolster support for the anticommunist crusade through affiliation with the newly-formed anti-communist international
organization. He suggests that the TUC previously refused funds to colonial unions for
63
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participation in the WFTU even though the TUC helped found the organization.65 Moreover,
Bolland argues that TUC pressure on colonial unions to join the ICFTU in response to Cold War
politics resulted in a greater politicization of colonial trade unions. Bolland suggests that TUC
pressure was largely a reaction against WFTU efforts to support colonial trade unions and the
TUC’s realization that failure to offer an alternative to the WFTU would result in greater
colonial involvement with Eastern bloc and communist unions at the international level.66 Colin
Palmer also suggests that the WFTU, particularly communists and Eastern bloc representatives,
provided the strongest support for colonial nationalists.67
The establishment of the ICFTU and debates surrounding whether or not, and how,
Guianese unions should align internationally fueled tensions between Guianese unionists and
politicians, as well as between the PAC/PPP and the colonial establishment.68 Some Guianese
labor leaders embraced the new organizations. Hubert Critchlow of the BGLU attended the first
congress of the ICFTU in 1949 and the BGLU and MPCA formally joined the ICFTU in July
1952. However, the BGLU did not disaffiliate with the WFTU and according to Critchlow did
not pay dues to the ICFTU.69 The MPCA also integrated into the Western internationals as one
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of the founding members of ORIT.70 Conversely, Cheddi Jagan criticized the Colonial
Legislature’s decision to contribute funding to send a trade union delegate to the ICFTU
Conference in 1949 arguing that the Council’s recent decision to reject increased funds for
education made the trade union expense extraneous. Jagan’s opposition to using legislative funds
to support unions’ integration into the ICFTU was largely a consequence of ideological support
for the WFTU. Jagan’s speech to the Council attacked support for the ICFTU’s establishment on
the grounds that it split the international labor movement in two to further British and American
Cold War objectives in addition to opposing the use of colonists’ money to help build the
organization.71
Jagan then shifted tactics, using the debate over the international conference as a means
of advocating for the GIWU. In a November legislative session, Jagan acknowledged Critchlow
as the “father of Trade Unionism” in British Guiana; however, he continued to disagree with the
principle that the council should support his attendance at the conference.72 Jagan suggested that
if the government was to fund a trade unionist to attend the conference despite his objections
then the unionist chosen should be a representative from the GIWU. He pointed to a United
Nations (UN) resolution demanding freedom of association and noted that the SPA still refused
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to acknowledge the GIWU even though the union gained recognition from the Guianese
government. The GIWU, he argued, had a legitimate case that it required international assistance
to obtain practical recognition denied in the colony. Jagan clearly understood that his motion
stood no chance of passing in the council since he referred to the debate as a joke; however, he
insisted that he was sincere and wanted his position on the record.73
The legislative debate over funding the BGLU shows the importance British officials’
placed on cultivating relations between colonial unions and the ICFTU as well as colonial
unionists’ use of the ICFTU and ORIT to integrate into the Western capitalist system. Official
British objectives regarding colonial trade unions included the retention of control as a central
objective. In discussing trade unionism in the colonies the Colonial Office concluded in October
1951 that recent legislative proposals regarding colonial union regulations “might in themselves
seem to suggest a legalistic and restrictive spirit that was alien to proclaimed liberal ideas about
freedom of association;” however, “these proposals implied no shift of policy: they must be
viewed simply as a reappraisement [sic] of the measure of guidance and control which might be
desirable to promote the growth of an independent, responsible, and effective trade union
movement.”74 Thus, in the face of British promotion of ICFTU relations and a general program
aimed at controlling colonial trade unions, the PAC increased its efforts to work with the WFTU.
The conflicts shaping institutional decolonization in British Guiana increased after 1950
as Cold War tensions heightened with the onset of the war in Korea and the intense anticommunism of McCarthyism in the United States. In February 1950 colonial officials
recommended that employers and workers negotiate to ensure stability and concluded an
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agreement between the SPA, MPCA, and BGWL to increase wages and paid leave for sugar
workers. The negotiations revolved around a general view that improved conditions would,
according to American Consul Eugene Johnson, “provide an incentive to secure more regular
and continuous working of factories, thus increasing the productivity of the industry.”75 Despite
Johnson’s optimistic outlook, production did not increase significantly and employment for sugar
workers stagnated and possibly decreased throughout the year.76 Moreover, Jagan suggested that
sugar producers offset wage increases with increased prices for local consumption and he
continued his push for recognition for the GIWU in the Legislative Council in March. During a
debate, Jagan criticized Bissell and the Labor Department for alleging to uphold International
Labor Organization (ILO) principles assuring workers the right to organize and have unions
recognized while not enforcing that recognition in practice. He warned that encouraging workers
to organize and having government recognition of their unions while permitting employers to
deal only with unions of their choosing would inevitably lead to continued labor conflict. 77 In
early November the Jagan-backed GIWU instigated a colony-wide strike that resulted in a partial
work stoppage that threatened waning production.78
In response to the Venn Commission Report and continued division in the Guianese labor
movement, the TUC agreed to increase assistance for trade unions in British Guiana at its annual
congress in September 1950. British trade unionists sent “a typewriter, duplicating machinery,
stencils, ink, duplicating paper, stencil pens and other accessories, stapling machine, [and] filing
cabinet” to the BGTUC by January 1951, along with books on “trade union and associated
75
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subjects,” pamphlets, and regular publications to allow the BGTUC to start a trade union library.
Finally, the TUC worked with Ruskin College to design an updated course in trade union
principles for colonial students.79 TUC efforts at educational training continued to expand slowly
through the establishment of correspondence course with the participation of four Guianese
unionists in 1951.80
The TUC program for British Guiana fit within a broader restatement of purpose
articulated in a May 1951 memorandum from the Colonial Labor Advisory Committee to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies. The committee argued that the “central purpose of British
colonial policy is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government,” including
assisting colonies to establish trade unions and overcome the reality that their growth was “not
matched in understanding of principles and practice.” Furthermore, the committee argued that “if
a situation arises in which two strong trade unions compete for recognition” it would create
“serious difficulties for the territory concerned.” Thus, the committee recommended giving
colonial officials the authority to reject registration of unions if they determined that existing
organizations offered sufficient representation. Such a proposal was anathema to British trade
union practices but was deemed necessary in colonies where a multiplicity of unions could
render the movement itself useless and was particularly significant in Guiana where the GIWUMPCA dispute was an ongoing conflict on sugar estates.81
At a Conference of the Heads of Colonial Labor Departments in October 1951 James
Griffiths, Secretary of State for the Colonies, noted that colonial development would result in a
79
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“revolution that would parallel in some degree the Industrial Revolution of this country” and that
the success of British policy depended on how colonial authorities managed those changes to
encourage colonists to develop a “sense of belonging” in new societies. Sir Frederick Seaford of
Booker Brothers suggested that direct TUC involvement was crucial to preparing colonies for
development. While not wanting to “seem to be forcing itself and British methods on colonial
unions,” attendees recommended “trying to prompt requests for help” and increasing TUC
training in colonies rather than through exchange programs in Great Britain.82
At the same time the TUC began sending supplies to the MPCA and BGTUC, American
labor leaders and the American-dominated ORIT became increasingly involved in the colony. In
January 1951 ORIT released its inaugural publication, which began with a report on British
Guiana edited by the organization’s Assistant Secretary, Ernst Schwarz of the American
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The report noted that 75% of the Guianese
population was “wage-earners of lower income,” and another 10% were independent peasant
farmers or civil service and public workers, and that a rapidly developing American-owned
bauxite mining industry offered employment possibilities for the future. The report criticized
appalling workplace conditions and suggested that “squalor, poverty, and the frequently
abominable surroundings no doubt account to a large extent for the low productivity in the
industries.” The report argued that conditions were unacceptable, particularly since “bauxite is
largely used by the United Nations and the United States in the manufacture of war materials”
and therefore represented an important aspect of American military preparedness toward the
year-old conflict in East Asia. Schwarz concluded that strengthening the trade union movement
was the key to improving conditions and he suggested that ORIT particularly support the
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democratically principled MPCA, which had “collective labor agreements with the employers of
the sugar, rice, bauxite, and electric power industries of the colony.”83 The ORIT report suggests
that American labor leaders considered British Guiana important as early as 1951 at least in part
as a result of its production of strategic materials. American opposition to poor labor conditions
derived at least partially from the impact of the workplace environment on effective production
of bauxite. Most importantly, American Federation of Labor (AFL) and CIO leaders determined
that American labor and ORIT needed to increase their involvement in the colony and support
for the MPCA to help build a pro-American trade union movement to secure their interests.
Serafino Romualdi, the AFL’s long-time Latin American representative, Assistant
Secretary of ORIT, and possible CIA operative, visited British Guiana in 1951 and concluded
that Cheddi Jagan was subservient to the international Communist movement.84 In an article
published in the Inter-American Labor News in January 1951 Romualdi criticized PPP-backed
wildcat strikes in British Guiana and accused the party of being Communist. In May 1952
Romualdi published a second article in ORIT’s Inter-American Labor News accusing the PPP of
trying to destroy the MPCA, ORIT’s affiliate in British Guiana.85 Romualdi resolved to work
through the MPCA and other affiliated Guianese unions to rid Guiana of Jagan and began
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discussing the establishment of the Caribbean Area Division of ORIT (CADORIT) to further the
organization’s activities in the Caribbean.86
Leo Eliazer, Surinam’s representative to ORIT and the organization’s regional organizer
in the Caribbean, visited British Guiana in October and November 1951, met with Sheik
Shakoor, General Secretary of the MPCA, and drew up a detailed report on the colony.
Importantly, Eliazer noted that American labor activist and Rutgers professor Robert Alexander
held Shakoor in high regard suggesting that the MPCA leader used international connections to
advance the sugar workers’ cause in British Guiana and giving the union an influential
connection within the American labor movement.87 The ORIT report praised the MPCA’s
persistent support for sugar workers and attainment of marked improvement for laborers in after
World War II warning that “the unrecognized pirate union,” Dr. Lachmansingh’s GIWU,
represented the greatest obstacle in the way of trade union progress.
Eliazer criticized the “communist” GIWU’s relationship with the BGTUC and accused
Lachmansingh of exploiting conditions on the sugar estates for political advantage. 88 Moreover,
Eliazer noted that the Lachmansingh “depends on the communist PPP Party with whom his
union has an alliance for support to continue mischief-making in the sugar industry until he gets
recognition.” He also reported that the GIWU “openly applied for affiliation with the London
Branch of the Communist Caribbean Labor Congress.” As a result of its connections, Eliazer
reported that the GIWU had access to two automobiles while the high cost of transportation--up
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to 45% of MPCA contributions-- inhibited the MPCA’s ability to maintain regular contact with
sugar workers spread out across a wide area on Guiana’s coast. Eliazer concluded that the
financial burden of transportation contributed to the MPCA’s failure to effectively confront
communist propaganda spread through GIWU organizing.89 In addition to indirectly
acknowledging the GIWU’s superior rank-and-file support, Eliazer offered recommendations for
addressing the MCPA-GIWU conflict.
Eliazer emphasized that several steps were undertaken to stabilize the trade union
movement and after reiterating that democracy in the economically and geographically important
territory depended on ORIT assistance, he offered several suggestions to increase the
connections between the Guianese labor movement and ORIT. He noted that the MPCA was
expanding to include negotiating rights for bauxite workers to confront what he deemed
communist organizing in that industry and that the Federation of Government Unions (FUGE)
planned to apply for affiliation to ORIT and the ICFTU. The BGTUC, which applied to affiliate
with ORIT and the ICFTU in 1950 but declined when the GIWU joined the BGTUC in 1951,
reapplied for affiliation after a meeting with Eliazer. Eliazer further “pledged [his] service at the
disposal of the democratic trade union leaders against the communist PPP men.” In addition to
his own services, Eliazer recommended ORIT provide “two full-time paid organizers of the
workers in the democratic trade unions, for a period of five years with all equipments [sic]
necessary to undertake the planning and execution of propaganda calculated to improve the
standard of living of the masses of workers in addition to the intensification of the
organizational, economical, [sic] political and educational activities in the trade unions affiliated
to ORIT.” He further recommended the provision of two cars and a loud-speaker for organizing,
89
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scholarships for unionists to study for eight months in the United States or Puerto Rico, six to
eight tons of newsprint for two years to supply the MPCA for the publication of its journal, and
the placement of responsibility for the provisions in the hands of Shakoor who would report to
ORIT and the ICFTU regularly.90 Thus, ORIT’s most important Caribbean leader used the
regional arm of the ICFTU to encourage American labor leaders to join the trade union conflict
in British Guiana against the left-coalition in the PAC-GIWU within months of the Western
international’s founding.
Shakoor strengthened the MPCA’s connections to American labor when the ORIT
executive board invited him to attend its meeting in late 1951 and early 1952 as an observer. The
list of high-ranking American labor leaders participating included the soon-to-be AFL President
George Meany, Romualdi, and Ernst Schwarz. Board members discussed the expansion of
ORIT’s influence into the British West Indies through a regional organization, a process already
underway as a result decisions made at a conference in Trinidad in 1951 attended by Assistant
General Secretary of the TUC, George Woodcock. Attendees also praised the cooperation
between ORIT, the AFL and CIO, and the State Department in collaborating to strengthen
miners’ movements in British Guiana through negotiations with American industrialists. The
negotiations “represented a great deal of money for all of [those] countries” but “did not bring
comparable social and economic benefits to the workers.” The report notes that increased profits
merely “served to increase the wealth of the capitalists of the countries benefited.”91 Thus, in
1952 labor struggles in British Guiana became increasingly internationalized as the AFL, CIO,
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TUC, ORIT, ICFTU, and State Department involvement in the colony; however, their
participation in industrial disputes failed to effectively addressing the needs of Guianese
workers.
Eliazer and Romualdi’s visits to British Guiana, Shakoor’s attendance at the ORIT
meeting, and the connections established and conclusions drawn from those experiences is
considerable. First, the entrance of American trade union leaders into the labor struggle in British
Guiana provided a small financial base for the MPCA that, in addition to TUC assistance,
allowed the organization to engage the more widely supported and financially sound GIWU
despite a lack of support among sugar workers for the MPCA.92 Second, the ORIT program
directly contradicted at least one aspect of TUC assistance; specifically, ORIT refused to
contribute to a trade union library “until the unions themselves indicate their willingness to make
use of local books and periodicals." The disagreement between ORIT and the TUC on a
seemingly insignificant matter foreshadowed a larger lack of coordination between international
trade unionists’ activities in British Guiana throughout the 1950s. Third, the connections
American labor leaders’ established in British Guiana through ORIT beginning in 1951 formed
the basis of American involvement in the colony for the next fifteen years.93
At the same time ORIT leaders engaged the Guianese trade union movement, the WFTU
offered an alternative for Guianese trade unionists disinclined to affiliate with the ICFTU and
ORIT. Cheddi Jagan expressed a firm conviction that the WFTU was “ready to fight for colonial
people all over the world.” British withdrawal from the WFTU, Jagan argued, indicated a
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rejection of the organization’s “going too far in the sense that it was beginning to investigate
conditions” that “carried to their logical conclusion they would have exposed the rottenness” of
British imperialism. As a result, the Jagan-led PPP continued cooperation with the organization
after the TUC and CIO withdrew in 1949.94 Jagan also traveled to East Germany in 1951 where
he toured factories and trade union resorts to learn “how workers were building socialism, the
constructive role they played, the social and economic benefits they secured and the direct
participation of workers in management and control of factories and production.”95 Jagan’s
appeal to Eastern European trade unions and the WFTU as a guide for Guianese institutionbuilding aimed at breaking the colony’s economy from foreign capitalist control. However, the
PPP’s attempt to establish labor relations on an Eastern-bloc model conflicted with British and
American conceptions of institutional development for the colony while Guianese association
with communist organizations directly challenged Cold War imperatives.
J.Y. Mackenzie of the Foreign Office contacted the Colonial Office to express his
department’s concern that in November 1951 a Guianese delegate to the WFTU conference in
Berlin suggested the organization set up a new colonial department.96 The delegate, Cheddi
Jagan, had his proposal seconded by a delegate from Trinidad before WFTU members agreed to
the plan.97 Foreign Office records also noted that leading speakers at the conference advised the
organization to increase involvement in Latin America and that the Soviet delegate directed that
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the WFTU provide unions in colonial and dependent territories more support.98 An AFL-CIO
report on the conference claimed that the WFTU platform was part of Soviet policy designed to
undermine the Truman administration’s Point Four program. American labor leaders suggested
that WFTU members inaccurately interpreted Point Four as an attempt to insert American
technicians into key positions in developing economies to protect American investments and
profits and secure access to raw materials. The American report suggests that WFTU delegates
agreed to the organization of trade union conferences in Latin America in addition to the creation
of a Colonial Department.99 Thus, British policymakers interpreted the WFTU conference as a
threat to their control of colonial unions and American labor leaders explained WFTU programs
as a direct threat to American foreign policy objectives.
Juxtaposing Shakoor’s and Jagan’s international activities in late-1951 offers an
important reflection on the emerging conflict within the Guianese trade union movement.
Guianese labor leaders advocated two irreconcilably opposed objectives and aggressively
courted international support for their positions. Shakoor and the MPCA represented a reformist
labor movement that sought to improve workers’ conditions through negotiations within a
capitalist system and his organization pursued integration into Western labor institutions to
achieve that aim. Conversely, the Jagan-led left-coalition that made up the PPP advocated
replacing the capitalist system and appealed for closer relations with the Eastern-bloc to advance
their program. Significantly, Jagan’s central role in the proceedings suggests that he was an
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important force behind the WFTU’s increased involvement in colonial areas and Shakoor also
requesting Western assistance.
The discussion between Mackenzie and S.E.V. Luke of the Colonial Office illuminated
the British debate about the role the United States should play in the process. Mackenzie
suggested to Luke that cooperation with the State Department and possibly Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) would be advisable to help confront perceived communist infiltration into
colonial territories though the WFTU.100 Luke disagreed, suggesting that Mackenzie avoid
consulting with the State Department in lieu of a meeting with John Shaw of the British Security
Service. In Luke’s analysis, there were a remarkably small number of local politicians who had
communist contacts and sympathies given the economic condition of the region; however, even
those who held communist views in British Guiana were not members of the Communist
Party.101
Christopher Andrew’s authorized history of MI5, Defend the Realm, confirms the
Colonial Office analysis of communism in British Guiana. Andrew notes that British intelligence
agencies knew that Cheddi Jagan made contact with Soviet representatives in Washington D.C.
in 1947 and maintained contact with the British Communist Party since 1948, but they carefully
noted that no evidence suggested that Jagan’s movement was directed from the outside.102 Two
generally consistent themes throughout the 1950s and early 1960 are evident in this early
exchange of views between the Foreign Office and Colonial Office regarding the WFTU in
1951. First, the Foreign Office encouraged greater collaboration with the United States to the
chagrin of colonial officials who opposed such cooperation. Second, colonial officials explained
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Guianese communism as a uniquely interpreted ideology pursued by local leaders and adapted to
local conditions rather than an infiltration directed from the Soviet Union.
International maneuvering for control of labor relations in British Guiana continued in
1952 as discussions regarding the future of the colony continued to shift toward increased selfgovernment and eventual political independence. TUC reports show that British trade unionists’
completed an initial program to supply equipment to the MPCA during the year. In June ORIT
formed a Caribbean Division (CADORIT) discussed the previous year, with representation from
the MPCA.103 MPCA General Secretary Sheik Shakoor served on CADORIT’s administrative
committee giving the reformist sugar workers’ union a position of influence within the regional
labor movement. At the same time Cheddi Jagan joined the Jamaican Marxist politician and
labor leader Richard Hart in leading protests against the new organization. Jagan and Hart argued
that CADORIT intentionally displaced the CLC to undermine trade union unity in the
Caribbean.104
Guianese businessmen entered the fray when the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce
President E.J. Haywood requested the establishment of an Employers Federation and Labor
Relations Committee to serve as negotiating machinery under the premise that it would ensure
industrial peace. Oliver Littleton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, denied the request on the
grounds that British Guiana had satisfactory machinery for the resolution of industrial
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disputes.105 On July 31 Jagan introduced a bill to the Legislative Council that called for new
regulations to reduce jurisdictional disputes between competing unions based on United States
and Canadian laws ensuring recognition to the organization with the majority membership. The
motion aimed at giving the GIWU legislative backing to displace the MPCA and even though it
failed, the proposal served as a template for PPP proposals in 1953.106
Jagan continued his efforts at facilitating connections between the Guianese labor
movement and the Eastern-bloc in October when he engaged in a two-day debate in the
Legislative Council regarding a Colonial Office ban on entrance into the colony of Billy
Strachan and Ferdinand Smith, two communist Jamaican labor leaders.107 Colonial officials
argued that Smith and Strachan’s attempt to visit British Guiana proved that the WFTU
implemented Jagan’s proposal to increase regional activities since Smith was appointed to the
World Secretariat of the WFTU and was chief of the organization’s Colonial Bureau.108 The
Colonial Office defended the ban on Smith and Strachan’s as a response to attempted communist
infiltration; however, it also served as a reaction against the emergence of inter-colonial labor
organizing in the West Indies that fell outside of what British officials deemed acceptable trade
unionism. The mutually pursued relationship between the WFTU and West Indian trade union
leaders fueled colonial officials’ fears of militant organizing and its connection to international
communism. Ironically, the Colonial Office reports identified Jagan’s proposal as the impetus for
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increased WFTU activity in the region while criticizing trade union organizing between three
West Indian labor leaders as a form of external infiltration.109
Jagan’s objection to the ban is significant because his defense of the men refuted the
British claim that the WFTU was merely a communist-front organization and criticized the
Legislative Council’s financial support for Guianese unionists attending ICFTU meetings. Jagan
contrasted the Council’s treatment of Serafino Romualdi, an American citizen who traveled
freely around British Guiana the previous year while representing ORIT, with the ban on WFTU
representatives Strachan and Smith who were both British subjects. Jagan argued that the
Legislative Council inhibited Guianese unionists’ ability to develop their own institutions and
join with the international organization they determined most directly acted in their interests
while forcing an cooperation with organization that he claimed was controlled by the State
Department. Moreover, he criticized the Legislature’s refusal to overturn sugar estate bans on
trade union organizers and suggested that the two issues evidenced a legal effort to impede
workers’ organization.110
Thus, throughout 1952 Guianese employers and trade unionists introduced legislation to
increase their ability to influence negotiating machinery when a new Constitution allowing for
full internal self-government went into effect the following April. Meanwhile, reformist trade
unionists continued their cooperation with the TUC, ICFTU, ORIT, and CADORIT. TUC
support went to the unions willing to base their activities on British-approved trade union
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methods; however, the supplies and educational literature the TUC sent to the MPCA did not
address the practical problems facing sugar workers.
At the same time, sugar companies continued to victimize workers organizing for the
GIWU. Sugar companies evicted GIWU branch secretaries from company-owned housing
during a 1952 strike for recognition, a practice that Sydney King, one of the PPP’s early leaders,
suggested was regularity during union protests.111 In summarizing his supporters’ “fight for trade
unionism” in 1953, Jagan argued that sugar companies continued to victimize workers hoping to
align with the GIWU and GIWU activists between 1950 and 1953. He suggested that the GIWU
lost members after 1950 despite popularity with sugar workers as a result of union leaders
restriction from company property and workers’ fear of being removed from company housing
for supporting the union.112 TUC efforts to strengthen preferred Guianese unions complemented
sugar companies’ heavy-handed tactics which included exerting official influence to utilize
police action against strikers. Together, British efforts aimed at strengthening trade unions
willing to confine their activities to industrial matters, accept limited improvements to wages and
conditions through collective bargaining, minimize agitation, and associate with the ICFTU
rather than the WFTU.
Institutional Decolonization during the PPP government
The first phase of the struggle for institutional decolonization in British Guiana
culminated in the period between April 27, 1953 when the PPP won eighteen of twenty-four
seats in the House of Assembly in the colony’s first election under the new Waddington
Constitution, and October 8, 1953 when the British suspended the Constitution and re-imposed
111
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direct rule in British Guiana. The Waddington Constitution granted universal suffrage to
Guianese over the age of twenty-one and allowed internal self-government to the elected
Guianese in a lower House of Assembly while reserving veto powers for the newly appointed
governor, Alfred Savage.113 The constitution also created an upper house comprised of appointed
as well as elected representatives designed to act as a check on the elected lower house.
Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Lyttleton warned that the composition of the Executive
Council gave both ministers and unofficial members “styled as ministers” a great deal of
influence over government business. At times, he suggested, situations could arise in which “a
member’s private business activities, his financial interest in particular companies or schemes,
and his activities and interests as an official of a trade union” could conflict with public duties.114
Thus, despite the considerable progress toward self-government, PPP leaders noted the
limits on democracy and the subtle ways the new constitution preserved colonial economic
relationships. Sydney King and Cheddi Jagan criticized the document as “a changed form of
oppression” that refused to countenance economic changes to the structure of Guianese society.
King argued that the constitution was a “British lie” written “to fool the people into thinking that
their elected representatives could now control the country.”115 Jagan agreed with King because
“a representative of Bookers sitting on the Executive Council with me, a representative of the
people,” will not “be framing a similar type of legislation.” He further criticized the constitution
for allowing the Colonial Secretary to oversee foreign trade, which he suggested gave colonial
officials considerable influence to retain the colonial economic framework.116 Jagan’s two-day
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attack on the constitution in the Legislative Council revolved around his determination to wrest
economic control of the colony as a means of directing development away from sending profits
abroad and toward improving the lives of Guianese people through establishing a socialism in
British Guiana. The Waddington Constitution reinforced to PPP leaders the need for institutional
changes to shift the balance of power over Guianese economics.
At the same time, Colin Palmer notes that investors’ fear of the PPP government
weakened the colonial economy as depositors withdrew their holdings from the Government’s
Savings Bank.117 In response to the financial crisis, Savage explained to the PPP ministers that
external economic assistance would be withheld if investors or international lending agencies
thought the government was communist.118 Thus, while communism was the superficial threat,
the subtext was that external financing of development was predicated on a degree of control
over British Guiana’s fiscal policies and political-economic structure. Investors would not invest
in projects likely to lose money and businesses did not want to allocate resources likely to be
nationalized. Left-wing PPP leaders argued that such concerns structurally constricted the
freedom of action necessary for development in the interests of the Guianese people. Colonial
Officials, tasked with establishing a stable, capitalist-oriented, and reasonably democratic society
that would transition to independence as early as the mid-1950s interpreted the PPP’s plans as a
direct threat to each of their objectives. Jagan and King’s criticisms of the constitution as an
impediment to Guianese acquisition of economic power is the backdrop in which the leftcoalition sought to gain influence over the colony’s economic structure through coordinated
efforts between the GIWU and PPP toward institutional reconstruction of Guianese society.
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The PPP won an overwhelming majority of seats in the April election despite the
MPCA’s aggressive anti-PPP campaign and several months of tangible gains negotiated for
sugar workers through MPCA collective bargaining. Throughout early 1953 the MPCA issued
election guides warning Guianese not to vote for PPP candidates while arguing that the leftcoalition party was acting out orders directed from the Soviet Union. The MPCA used Cheddi
Jagan’s participation in WFTU conferences as evidence to support the claim of PPP
subordination to “Russian imperialist masters.” MPCA election guides included crass personal
slanders but directed most of their vitriol at the alleged devotion of PPP candidates subordinate
to international Communists or naiveté that allowed them to be manipulated as part of an
international conspiracy.119 After the PPP assumed office the GIWU applied for affiliation to the
WFTU; however, the application was withdrawn as a result of political developments in Guiana
in October.120 Importantly, MPCA campaign material and the public discourse surrounding the
election influenced British and especially American interpretations of Guianese politics for the
rest of the 1950s.
Political developments, however, comprised only a part of the broader struggle to shape
the institutional nature of Guianese society and labor struggles centered on the debate continued
throughout and after the campaign. MPCA leaders negotiated what Robert Alexander referred to
as “some real gains” including $3 million for sugar workers in late 1952 and an agreement that
assured laborers most of the added profits from increased sugar prices in the United Kingdom in
early 1953. MPCA President Lionel Luckhoo also participated in the first ICFTU World
Congress for Plantation Workers negotiated wage increases for rice workers after he took over
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the position in early 1953.121 Nonetheless, inflation offset the benefits of small advances in wage
rates and the oppressive conditions under which workers labored in the colony remained
unchanged.122 Shakoor and MPCA Vice-President Rupert Tello continued negotiations with the
rice board arguing for modifications to the wage scale in June 1953 but eventually conceded that
foul weather undermined crop production and precluded immediate changes to workers’ pay.123
Minor work stoppages occurred in June and July before they were settled through government
intervention.124 Thus, despite some gains, the colony’s dire poverty left many workers
discontented with the MPCA.
MPCA-negotiated improvements expanded beyond the agricultural sector as well. In
June 1953 Justin Yee and Claude Archer of the Electrical Workers Branch of the MPCA noted
negotiated improvements in their industry since 1950, including overtime pay; however, they
explained to Alexander that they continued to face difficulties in organizing since employers
refused to support a closed shop. Yee and Archer also hinted at future employer-MPCA
collaboration to counter the PPP. The unionists suspected that employers regretted their
dismissal of MPCA demands since workers responded with support for the PPP. Yee and Archer
expected PPP agitation to increase with the introduction of legislation to demand recognition of
new unions similar to the proposal Jagan introduced the previous year.
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Yee and Archers’ opposition to the PPP’s anticipated legislation is important. The
MPCA’s electrical union leaders suggested a bill recognizing new unions would lead to
perpetual changing of bargaining agents and workers shifting union loyalties as new leaders
made promises to encourage desertion from existing trade unions. Yee and Archer’s fears
mirrored TUC criticisms that Guianese labor unrest and the introduction of new unions
weakened the institutional stability necessary for effective trade union negotiation with
employers. MPCA-TUC reproaches discounted the possibility that a new union could effectively
bargain and retain worker loyalty while highlighting the difficulty of retaining workers’ support
in a colony with deep poverty and little leverage with which to negotiate.125 Moreover, as Yee
noted in an interview with Alexander the following year, many workers left the MPCA and
joined the BGLU after the PPP won office. They hoped that affiliation with a union led by
Ashton Chase, the PPP Minister of Labor would prove effective at obtaining the check-off where
MPCA efforts had failed.126 Thus, as the PPP established itself in office, it became clear that the
primary issue facing Guianese society was addressing the question of worker representation,
especially on the sugar estates.
Beyond domestic issues, the PPP’s election gave pro-WFTU trade unionists an
opportunity to increase overt connections to the Eastern-bloc international and in early 1953 the
PPP sent delegates to the Vienna Convention of the WFTU.127 The Legislative Council passed a
subversive literature ban on February 27, 1953, two months before the elections to block WFTU
literature from entering British Guiana; however, Cheddi Jagan arranged for materials to

125

Robert Alexander interview with J. Yee and Claude Archer, President Electrical Workers Branch of MPCA, June
3, 1953, RG 18-003, International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files, 1944-1973, Box 2, Alexander, Robert,
1953, GMMA.
126
Robert Alexander interview with J. Yee, President Demerara Electric Company Branch of MPCA, June 29, 1954,
RG 18-003, International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files, 1944-1973, Box 2, Alexander, Robert, 1954,
GMMA.
127
Chase, A History of Trade Unionism in Guyana, 105.

201

continue to be sent secretly into the colony through early 1953.128 It is unclear the extent to
which the bill inhibited PPP-WFTU correspondence; however, British intelligence concluded
that the PPP was no longer receiving WFTU material in mid-May. Nonetheless, British
intelligence sources expected that the WFTU was preparing to send new supplies in the wake of
the PPP’s electoral victory and the PPP government moved to repeal the ban on subversive
literature once in office.129
WFTU involvement in British Guiana went beyond the distribution of literature. Colonial
officials accused Eric Huntley, a member of the PPP General Council and postal worker with
connections to the WFTU, of authoring a controversial memorandum on British Guiana farm
workers in the United States and distributing “communist literature.” Huntley’s political
organizing and his participation in a protest during Princess Mary’s visit to British Guiana
resulted in the decision to remove him from his civil service position. Governor Savage
orchestrated Huntley’s firing after he was absent without leave for two days to participate in PPP
organizing on sugar estates.130 In response, WFTU General Secretary Willi Baumgart wrote a
letter of protest to the Guianese Postmaster General in April 1953 criticizing the decision to
cause Huntley to “lose his base of existence” for engaging in “a primary democratic right of
freely asserting his opinion.”131 The WFTU affiliated Trades Union International of the Postal,
Telegraph, Telephone and Radio Workers followed with the submission of a complaint to the
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Director General of the ILO in August.132 Huntley’s case is further evidence of the developing
relationship between the left-coalition and the WFTU.
American labor leaders sent Alexander to British Guiana in the wake of the PPP’s victory
fearing the possibility that communists where in the process of taking control of a British colony.
Alexander’s studies and AFL analyses played an important role in shaping American views on
British Guiana after the State Department closed the United States consulate in Georgetown in
early 1953 content to save money. Thereafter, Washington officials obtained information on
British Guiana from the consul in Trinidad.133 Alexander’s letter to Jay Lovestone summarizing
his findings drew several important conclusions. Alexander informed Lovestone that the MPCA
was “our organization” in contrast to the BGLU and FUGE which associated with the WFTU
and the PPP. The Jagans, Alexander suggested, were communists but the PPP was not a
disciplined Communist Party. Alexander concluded that the State Department’s decision to
remove the Consulate was “suicidal” given the dire situation in a key area of the Caribbean and
that Lovestone should discuss the situation with the State Department, which Stephen Rabe notes
Lovestone apparently did. Alexander also noted that he hoped to see the Assistant Secretary of
Latin American Affairs when he returned.134
The closing of the consulate directly impacted the MPCA since Guianese labor leaders
opposed to the PPP used the office of the Vice Consul to obtain information about Janet Jagan’s
past in the United States and to obtain educational films for the MPCA library. The lost
connection likely contributed to Alexander’s suggestion that the ICFTU should increase financial
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support for the MPCA.135 Alexander reinforced Eliazer’s conclusion from 1951 that the MPCA’s
organizational difficulties derived from financial weakness. He suggested that MPCA leaders
risked losing their recently purchased car due to the ICFTU’s failure to provide promised funds
to pay for it. Without the automobile, Alexander noted, MPCA leaders organizational efforts
would be severely restricted.136 Alexander’s final conclusion is significant since it suggests
ORIT and ICFTU assistance to affiliated Guianese unions was limited in the early 1950s and
MPCA leaders viewed American labor representatives as a conduit through which they could
obtain material resources.
Alexander compiled a series of interviews in June 1953, and an examination of several of
those conversations helps explain the prism through which American labor leaders understood
British Guiana’s trade union conflict and its relationship to political development in the colony
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Rupert Tello, Vice President of the MCPA, emphasized
his commitment to free enterprise and an opposition to the GIWU, which he suggested was able
to call frequent walk-off strikes because it did not pay strike benefits. If Tello’s criticism is
accurate it belies the fact that the GIWU compelled sugar workers cooperation without always
being able to offer financial incentives and therefore that the GIWU was, as it claimed, supported
more than the MPCA among sugar workers.137 Moreover, Tello’s statement confirmed to
Alexander that the MPCA was committed to perpetuating the free market capitalism that
American labor leaders were hoping to spread as part of their version of institutional
decolonization in British Guiana.
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Conversely, Cheddi Jagan expressed to Alexander a hesitation to foreign development
projects and argued that the Guianese should consider the possibility of establishing a planned
economy similar to the Soviet Union. Jagan referenced a recent UN report to suggest that the
Soviet Union’s development outpaced that of capitalist democracies. Jagan noted that the PPP
did not plan immediate nationalization but suggested that the party would consider
nationalization of sugar and bauxite if such a policy seemed beneficial in the future. He further
criticized the ICFTU’s attempts to remove WFTU affiliated organizations from the CLC, to
which the PPP belonged.138 Jagan did not claim to be a communist; however, his articulation of
an economic development plan and international labor relations suggested that the direction in
which the PPP planned to take the colony conflicted with American labor leaders’ regional
objectives
GIWU President J.P. Lachmansingh told Alexander that the PPP government, in which
he was a minister, had an international position best understood in trade union terms. The
government, he suggested, “sympathized more with the WFTU than with the ICFTU” though it
received no funding from either organization and had loyalties only to British Guiana.
Lachmansingh further noted that the GIWU was not opposed to working with the ICFTU;
however, he suggested that when the ICFTU had come to British Guiana, they never met with
him.139 Ashton Chase’s work on Guianese unionism supports Lachmansingh’s position and
suggests that PPP leaders “supported the point of view that in the interest of unity the unions
should avoid affiliating to either the WFTU or the ICFTU” so that they could be more flexible
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and “willing to accept aid from both.”140 The possibility of GIWU cooperation with the ICFTU is
unclear. Eliazer claimed to have met with Lachmansingh for four hours during his ORIT visit in
1951 contrary to Lachmansingh’s suggestion that ORIT and ICFTU officials ignored his
organization. More importantly, it is uncertain whether Lachmansingh and the GIWU would or
could have cooperated with the ICFTU and ORIT given their connection to the PPP, whose goals
were incompatible with the purpose of the Western labor organizations. Chase and
Lachmansingh represented the center-left part of the PPP’s left-coalition and evidence suggests
that the party’s left-wing wielded considerably more influence in 1953.
In Alexander’s interview with Hubert Critchlow, Critchlow suggested that the PPP
refused to pay his pension if he spoke against the Party.141 The conflict between Critchlow and
the Jagans ran deeper than mere ideological positions and reached back to a 1945 debate on
universal suffrage which political scientist David Hinds suggests was undermined by ethnic
rivalries. Critchlow opposed universal suffrage which would have given the East Indian
population an electoral majority since and altered political influence in the colony since most
East Indians remained disenfranchised in the mid-1940s.142 The extent to which Alexander
understood the complexities of Guianese politics is unclear; however, his conclusions were
confident and carried considerable weight among American labor leaders assessing policy
toward British Guiana. Critchlow’s assertion in particular convinced American labor leaders that
the PPP sought to subvert trade unions’ independence to pave the way for authoritarian forms of
government. Thus, Alexander’s interview with the founder of British Guiana’s first trade union
reinforced American labor leaders’ views that the PPP sought to destroy free labor.
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Finally Alexander turned to Commissioner of Labor William Bissell for an evaluation of
Guianese labor relations. Bissell suggested that workers failed to appreciate the usefulness of
organized labor unconnected to the Legislative Assembly and that as a result pro-government
unions undermined the MPCA. He emphasized the need to build unions and the machinery for
collective bargaining and also suggested, in what is a revealing expression of colonial thought,
that Guianese workers had a tendency for dependence on government in the same way masters
had previous cared for slaves or indentured servants.143 Bissell, the colonial authority on
Guianese organized labor, confirmed to American labor leaders that establishing an institutional
framework for post-colonial Guiana depended on active efforts to support the MPCA against
more popular unions acting in collaboration with the PPP.
Labor Conflict and the Suspension of the Waddington Constitution
The PPP continued advocating the introduction of trade union methods designed to aid
Guiana’s transition to socialism throughout the summer of 1953 while the TUC prepared to
further its assistance to affiliated unions in the colony. In a speech to the World Congress of
Women in Copenhagen in June, excerpted in the PPP’s periodical Thunder, Janet Jagan took care
to note the lessons she learned from trade unionists during a visit to Rumania, specifically the
“difference in the functions of trade unions existing in capitalist countries and those in the
socialist countries.”144 The following month she further explained the benefits of Rumanian
socialism and contrasted the shocking differences between workers’ standard of living in the
socialist republic with that of workers in British Guiana.145 Perhaps taking note of Jagan’s
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writing the TUC allocated $3,000 toward an organizing campaign in British Guiana in July,
though the money seems not to have been disseminated in the colony.146
Colin Palmer’s Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power provides the most detailed
explanation of negotiations and conflict between the SPA, GIWU, and PPP between June and
October 1953. Palmer notes that on June 13, Aston Chase, the PPP Minister of Labor, met with
W.A. Macnie, managing director for the SPA and recommended that the SPA recognize the
GIWU, claiming that his office was overwhelmed with complaints from sugar workers who
distrusted MPCA leadership. J.P. Lachmansingh, GIWU President and PPP Minister of Health,
met informally with Macnie on July 13, warning him that some PPP and GIWU leaders hoped to
gain recognition through industrial action rather than negotiation even though Lachmansingh
opposed that strategy. On July 20 the SPA’s board of directors agreed that recognition of a PPP
sponsored union was inevitable, though they preferred an “amalgamation” of the MPCA and
GIWU similar to the policy Bissell suggested consistently since 1945. On July 21, Chase
formally requested recognition of the GIWU apparently disregarding the suggestion of
combining the MPCA and GIWU, a request the SPA responded to on August 20. Palmer
suggests that the SPA’s response included a reassertion of the demand for amalgamation.147
Clem Seecharan argues that the SPA proposal agreed to recognize the GIWU the field workers
who made up the majority of the plantation workforce with the understanding that the MPCA
would continue to represent sugar factory workers.148
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While the SPA, PPP, and GIWU discussed the representation of sugar workers
throughout the summer, British officials monitored developments in the colony. In July 1953
W.H. Ingrams, Advisor on Overseas Information sent a top secret report to J.H. Peck in which he
described the political situation in British Guiana. Ingrams argued that the PPP program was
extremely left-wing in a manner that would be “acceptable to Communist tactics and ideology,”
but that the Party did not openly advocate communism, unity with the Soviet Union to progress
toward socialism, or even secession from the Commonwealth. However, based on Jagan’s
Legislative Council speeches Ingrams expected the PPP to advocate for immediate selfgovernment, secession from the Commonwealth, and close relations with the Soviet Union as
time passed and the Party failed to achieve its objectives. While commending the achievements
of institution-building in British Guiana, Ingrams suggested that the Jagans and the PPP exerted
considerable influence over a number of important unions, including the colonial trade union
center BGTUC, giving the communist voice “fairly effective control in the major trade unions.”
He concluded that covert activities were “inevitable in the interests of the people themselves
quite as much as in ours” and that “if we believe in the necessity and rightness of guiding people
to self-government, we must also believe in the rightness of establishing as firmly as we can the
way of life which we consider valuable as offering in the long run the best sort of life to the
individual.” Ingrams’s recommendations included assisting trade unions and developing a covert
front organization to combat Guianese communism.149
British intelligence reports disagreed on the extent of communism in British Guiana,
though the Special Branch (MI5) emphasized that the PPP’s international communist contacts
suggested a communist core at the center of the PPP. MI5 reports noted foreign newspaper
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articles suggesting that Janet Jagan was a Moscow-trained agent and intercepted letters from
Caribbean Communists, such as Desmond Buckle, congratulating the Jagans on establishing a
communist government in 1953.150 British intelligence reports determined that the PPP was
divided into communist and non-communist leadership severely strained along ideological lines.
A May 1953 report from the Security Liaison Office in Jamaica to the Director General of MI5
divided the PPP into “Communist” and “Moderate ‘self-government’” sections that hinted at the
possibility of manipulating ideological differences within the Guianese leadership to establish a
government amenable to British objectives.151 The contents of the report drew from information
from the commissioner of police in British Guiana. The account formed the basis of the Colonial
Office interpretation of Guianese leaders until the late 1950s, and Foreign Office and American
views into the 1960s.152 On July 7 the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) informed Governor
Savage that a message from Sydney King to the WFTU confirmed his collaboration with
international communists and in mid-July colonial officials agreed that it might be necessary to
suspend the constitution.153
In a report titled “Propaganda and Special Operations in British Guiana,” Ingrams
acknowledged that Soviet communist connections were incidental and that anti-communist
programs needed to be designed to meet domestic challenges. He suggested that the most
effective program of “political warfare” against domestic “political extremism” would be to find
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and exploit the ideological line that divided the members of the PPP and launch a propaganda
campaign designed to “meet the threat of British Guiana falling under Communist influence or
control.”154 Ingrams suggested that the program “might be used for advising and guiding any
non-governmental operations.” Since the MPCA did not conform to PPP policy, Ingrams
advocated increased support for the MPCA, which he noted was affiliated to ORIT and the
ICFTU “with no practical advantage to be gained” from the relationship. He argued that “what is
really necessary is that the British TUC itself should take a much more direct interest in the
Caribbean Trade Unions.” Ingrams’s emphasized that “If there is scope for organizing trade
unions or for guiding existing unions it seems highly desirable to try to interest TUC direct (and
not via ICFTU) from inside the colony.”155 Thus, in July 1953 British intelligence officials began
planning to use the MPCA as a weapon in a program of political warfare against the GIWU and
PPP.
Colonial governor Alfred Savage agreed with Ingrams’s “penetrating analysis of the
background situation” in British Guiana, though he suggested that Ingrams underestimated the
PPP’s efforts to subvert the Constitution and some specific leaders use of their position to
“further the Communist cause in every way possible.”156 R.H. Young, an Assistant Public
Relations Adviser in the Colonial Office, wrote to Savage on August 27 emphasizing that the
most effective way to counter communist infiltration was a program designed to convince
colonists of the benefits of affiliation with Great Britain rather than to attack Communism since
few Guianese leaders admitted to being communists.157 Young’s suggestions hinted at the
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possibility of building political opposition within British Guiana, though the most direct means
of offering political resistance to the PPP and simultaneously convincing the Guianese of the
practical benefits of maintaining relations with Great Britain was through the pro-British trade
unions. Labor unrest erupted two days after Young’s telegram before Savage could implement a
program to counter the PPP. Meanwhile, William Maddox, the American Consul in Port-ofSpain, Trinidad, reported to the State Department on July 30 that exploitation of differences of
ideological viewpoints within the PPP was a development that “will be watched closely,”
particularly the schism between Forbes Burnham and PPP leadership.158
Maddox’s assessment confirmed Robert Alexander’s conclusion that the disagreement
between Burnham and Jagan may be “the rock upon which the bark of the PPP splits.”159
Maddox’s report was an evaluation of PPP efforts to reform the secondary educational system
that is outside the scope of this dissertation; nonetheless, brief attention to his criticism of the
program is illuminating. Maddox discussed the “well-known” communist tendencies of leading
Party members, specifically Brindley Benn, as well as the incorporation of Eastern European
publications in Guianese schools. More telling, however, is Maddox’s conclusion that “the
prescription of a Government-approved text-book for a course in Civics will ensure that young
students receive inculcation in P.P.P. doctrines—nationalist, anti-imperialist, and socialist, even
when not communist.”160 Alfred Savage expressed a similar fear that “the foundations of society
are being attacked insidiously almost without check,” specifically criticizing the establishment of
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a Pioneer Youth Movement as a PPP alternative to the Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, and YMCA. 161
Thus, a great deal of Anglo-American opposition to the PPP derived from a general hesitation
toward the decolonization of Guianese institutions in a manner that challenged Anglo-American
objectives with potential economic socialization and international communist associations the
most aggressive forms of institutional reorganization. PPP leaders noted this dynamic in a
pamphlet entitled “History of the PPP” which suggested that the labor bill and educational
reforms were the two issues that most angered “the former ruling clique.”162
Thus by late-August 1953 the PPP increasingly pressured for the establishment of a
reorganized system of labor relations based on party-led trade unions that could assist in moving
toward the establishment of socialism in the colony. British officials from several agencies
watched uneasily considering how they might act to strengthen the institutions designed to
counter social revolution in British Guiana. In this context of labor unrest and conflict between
the colonial administration, British economic interests, and Guianese nationalists for control of
the institutions of organized labor, the left-coalition of Guianese leaders began an aggressive
push in August 1953 that coordinated industrial protest and legislative action in an attempt to
break the labor movement from external control.
On August 31, the GIWU called a strike, the goals of which were initially unclear and not
negotiated prior to the walk-off. Participants and scholars struggled to explain the GIWU’s
motives; however, they generally agree that Sydney King, the PPP Minister for Communications
and Works, attended a GIWU meeting on August 30 and played a central role in initiating the
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strike.163 King occupied an important position within the PPP as one of the most left-leaning
party members and an acknowledged communist. Clem Seecharan suggests that after speaking
with King the only logical explanation behind his actions seemed to be as a means of keeping the
PPP focused on the class struggle at a time when racial issues threatened to undermine the
party’s unity. Seecharan also suggests that King’s instigation of the strike may have been an
effort to continue waging a struggle against the institutional framework of colonial capitalism.164
The SPA accused the strike of being politically motivated since negotiations with Chase toward a
settlement were ongoing and it is noteworthy that Chase criticized the decision to strike as illconceived “extreme left-adventurism” within the PPP in a 1994 book.165 Colin Palmer suggests
that GIWU leaders’ decision resulted from overconfidence that they could force a showdown to
win their demands without compromising because they had PPP support.166 In response, the SPA
immediately began mobilizing opposition to the strike in British Guiana and London through the
West India Committee while refusing Savage’s request that the sugar producers resume the
scuttled negotiations with Chase.167
According to Ashton Chase, strike leaders articulated two goals, better wages and
working conditions for Guianese workers and unconditional recognition of the GIWU for all
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field and factory workers formerly represented by the MPCA in mid-September.168 Palmer,
however, suggests that the GIWU did not include recognition in its initial list of demands when
they were presented on September 5, though he acknowledges it was clearly the central issue.
William Christensen of the State Department’s Office of British Commonwealth and Northern
European Affairs cabled his superior, Hayden Raynor, on September 18 and noted that PPP
ministers offered different reasons for the strike. According to Christensen, Lachmansingh
suggested the strike was for recognition while King insisted it was a disagreement over working
conditions.169 Colonial Office and State Department officials expressed considerable suspicion
that the PPP instigated the strike as a means of subverting the Waddington Constitution as a
result of the union’s uncertainty over the purpose of a strike called with active negotiations and
tentative compromises underway.170
Meanwhile, the MPCA did not comment on the unrest until September 17 when they
criticized GIWU failure to follow trade union procedures and for encouraging disorder.171
MPCA leaders defended their previous collective bargaining agreements arguing that the sugar
industry could not sustain more drastic wage increases and criticized the strike as a blatant effort
for recognition of a rival organization. Maddox reported on the MPCA position to the State
Department in mid-September and noted his worry over the involvement of GIWU leaders who
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were also ministers in the PPP government.172 Palmer notes that Savage’s efforts to end the strike
failed because of PPP-GIWU collaboration in forcing the issue of unqualified recognition and
the SPA’s refusal to concede to GIWU demands until the strike was ended.173 He suggests that
GIWU tactics, particularly initiating the strike while negotiations were ongoing, divided the PPP
since some party leaders, including Chase and Lachmansingh disagreed with the strike.
Moreover, Palmer suggests that the turmoil and the union’s inconsistent explanations for the
strike convinced domestic opponents that the strike was communist inspired and not based on
trade union issues.174
Colonial officials concluded in mid-September that the constitutional suspension they
began discussing in July was necessary since “an important section of the People’s Progressive
Party” was “trying to turn the territory into a Republic completely independent of the United
Kingdom with a Communist political bias and leaning towards Russia rather than the West in
international affairs.” J.W. Vernon of the Colonial Office argued that the PPP was “increasing
their hold over labor through the trade unions they control” to achieve their subversive objective
and he elaborated on possible justifications for suspension while acknowledging that the action
itself was undemocratic. Vernon suggested that intervention could be justified based on five
broad ideas. First he suggested that financial consequences derived from the PPP’s economic
policy justified colonial intervention to “protect them from their own folly.” Second, Vernon
suggested that PPP policies obstructed raw material exports and thus were an international issue
requiring the governor to intervene. Third, he suggested that British failure to act would
encourage “communism in other B.W.I. territories would have serious repercussions.” Forth, he
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argued that “the appearance of an overtly communist regime in British Guiana and its use as a
communist centre would embarrass the U.K.” and inhibit relations with the United States and in
the Western Hemisphere. Finally, Vernon insisted that the establishment of a communist
government would undermine “law, order, justice and democratic rights as we know them.”
Vernon concluded that the sugar strike “may well provide an opportunity” to justify suspension
of the constitution and that “there can be no doubt any such opportunity should be vigorously
seized.” Failure to intervene, he argued, would make it “necessary to take action on a matter
which is trivial in itself but which is felt to be the ‘sticking point’ beyond which Ministers cannot
be allowed to go.”175 Thus, the Colonial Office began searching for an incident to justify the
PPP’s removal and the re-imposition of direct rule in British Guiana as PPP efforts gain control
of institutionalized labor peaked in intensity.
On September 22, several other unions joined the sugar workers walking off of their jobs
in sympathy strikes while Savage worried that the protests would continue to spread to workers
in other occupations throughout the colony.176 Significantly, Cheddi Jagan, Chief Minister of the
government and head of the PPP, and Forbes Burnham, the second highest-ranking member of
the party, led the sympathy strikers. Writing from Trinidad, however, Maddox noted that
“Reports generally agree that large numbers of sugar workers had to be threatened and cajoled to
join the strike.” 177 Most Guianese news sources during the early 1950s were financed by sugar
companies or the PPP and the objectivity of reports making it out of the colony is open to
question; however, American policymakers depended on Guianese news sources since there was
no consul in British Guiana and British officials often intentionally offered only limited
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information about the colony. Consequently, American officials operated under the assumption
that the PPP was using force to mobilize workers in the colony and reports to that end reached at
least Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles sent Maddox copies of United States labor law
on September 28 when it became clear that the PPP leaders planned to introduce legislation to
achieve the institutional changes the strike failed to produce.178
PPP leaders, United States government officials, and American labor leaders’ responded
to the crisis consistently with their overall objectives. Janet Jagan argued that the MPCA’s
failure to push for more drastic improvements evidenced their position as a “company union”
insufficiently militant in its demand for workers’ rights and thus had to be replaced. The GIWU
and BGTUC agreed that conditions on sugar estates were deplorable and that more effective
negotiating was necessary. 179 Additionally, PPP leaders argued that trade unionists should be
appointed to chair committees in its government rather private citizens who were likely to be
employed by influential businesses as a means of weighing policy in favor of the working class,
procuring meaningful social change, and creating a balanced legislative environment.180 William
Christenson warned the State Department that the thought of the strikes generating instability in
the rest of the Caribbean was “disturbing to contemplate.” Christenson also expressed concern
about the financial impact of unrest on British Guiana.181
American labor leaders expressed concern regarding the failure to follow accepted
negotiating practices and more importantly the attempt to try and force the SPA to recognize the
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GIWU as the sole negotiating agent of workers which would displace the MPCA and directly
challenge ORIT and American labor influence in the colony. American labor leaders also
expressed concern that the relationship between the GIWU and PPP government did not allow
for trade unions’ independence. The president of the GIWU, for example, Dr. Lachmansingh,
held the position of Minister of Health and Housing and was a ranking member of the PPP.
Moreover, Lachmansingh had been temporarily expelled from the PPP in August 1951 for acting
against a decision of the party’s General Council while president of the GIWU, further calling
into question the independence of his union from the PPP.182 PPP leaders argued that attempts to
establish a unified, decolonized Guianese movement to increase pressure on the sugar producers
for improved working conditions necessitated the removal of the existing union. However,
efforts to remove the MPCA generated instability, which conflicted with the interests of the
United States government while both the removal of an ORIT affiliated organization and the
system of trade union-government relations the PPP pursued conflicted with the aims of
American organized labor. Failure to force capitulation from the SPA by the time the strike was
called off on September 24 drove the PPP to pursue the legislative action that was used as the
justification for British suspension of the constitution on October 9.
The PPP proposed a Labor Relations Bill similar to Cheddi Jagan’s proposed legislation
introduced in 1949 and 1952 as a result of the impasse between the GIWU and sugar
producers.183 PPP leaders argued that the bill was based on the 1935 Wagner Act that was the
basis of labor law in the United States; however, Cheddi Jagan noted in hindsight that the bill
differed from American legislation in that it did not incorporate the “Taft-Hartley portion” of
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amendments that altered American labor relations in 1947.184 More importantly, as Colin Palmer
notes, the bill deviated considerably from British trade union practices.185 The manner in which
the bill was proposed and the legislation’s implications on government-labor relations led to
dysfunction in the Guianese government and solidified British and American labor leaders’
opposition. George Woodcock, Assistant General Secretary of the TUC, noted that the PPP
introduced the bill without consulting the trade unions or employers, presented the legislation
with no discussion, and proposed it as a consequence of the failed GIWU strike.186 Robert
Alexander was exceptional among labor leaders in the 1950s in comparing the American and
Guianese legislation favorably; however, he interpreted the PPP’s legislative tactics as evidence
of a militant plot to take control of the labor movement.187
Ashton Chase authored the legislation and on September 24 Chase and Burnham moved
to suspend the Standing Rules and Orders of the House to allow the bill to be introduced and
passed on the same day. Sir Eustance Woolford, Speaker of the House, refused the motion and
ruled that the proposal would follow normal legislative procedures. When Burnham suggested
that normal procedures on his particular request were to submit the proposal to the House,
Woolford refused and insisted “that is the case in ordinary matters” but “in the case of this bill he
did not think hasty action was advisable.” In response, Burnham and most of the PPP ministers
and other party representatives walked out of the proceedings in protest to the ruling and
proceeded to rally a crowd of several thousand who had gathered outside the building. 188 The
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noise from the ensuing protests forced the legislature to suspend its activities for the remainder
of the day and instability resulting from the shutdown worried American officials that the recent
tensions could erupt into a more widespread crisis.189 On September 29 the Standing Rules were
suspended and the debate over the bill began in the legislature.190
On September 24, the day the PPP walked out of the legislature, Oliver Lyttleton,
Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to Savage expressing his conviction that the PPP was
“seeking a one party totalitarian control of the country and a link-up with Russia which we
obviously cannot contemplate.” Lyttleton argued that reports of the mid-September sympathy
strikes “complete[d] the justification for immediate action” and that “I have decided this latest
development makes a break inevitable and that we must now act against” the PPP ministers. He
suggested Savage “place the dangerous leaders of the PPP under restraint and raid their premises
for incriminating documents” as soon as adequate forces were available to maintain law and
order.191 Lyttleton wrote a memorandum to the Colonial Office on September 25, which he sent
on September 30, to make arrangements for troops and to prepare the legal justification for
emergency powers necessary to secure British Guiana after a suspension of the constitution in
early October.192 Thus, the British officials decided to suspend the constitution in British Guiana
before the Labor Relations Bill was introduced in the House of Assembly and the suspension
order was coupled with a directive from Lyttleton to detain PPP leaders and curtail civil liberties.
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The bill itself generated further controversy that is illuminating in its implications in the
debate for institutional decolonization in British Guiana after 1953. Maddox pointed out that,
despite similarities between American labor practices and the bill’s proposed methods for
recognizing unions, the legislation appropriated considerably more discretionary powers in the
hands of the Minister of Labor, Ashton Chase, than what was permitted under the American
model. The bill also proposed giving more power to the Minister than Jagan’s proposed 1952 bill
which vested discretionary powers in the hands of a British official, the Commissioner of Labor.
In light of the fact that three of the six ministers retained positions as presidents of trade unions
and a forth was an active protagonist in the strikes, Maddox informed the State Department that
impartiality and neutral enforcement “could hardly be expected.”193 Passage of the bill, Maddox
concluded, “would almost certainly” result in “the establishment or consolidation of PPP
controlled trade unions in every major occupation.”194
Leo Despres argues in Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana that
the bill effectively gave the Minister of Labor, and thus the PPP, “control of the whole trade
union movement,” and the Marxists within the party access to the Guianese masses necessary “to
control the nationalist movement almost completely.”195 Stephen Rabe disagrees with criticisms
of the bill and argues in U.S. Intervention in British Guiana that even if the bill sought the
replacement of the MPCA with the GIWU, it was democratically sound. Moreover, Rabe argues
that bill’s requirement of a 65% vote of workers for certification of a union, rather than the 51%
required in the United States, made the bill more rigid than American law.196 In confronting
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WFTU allegations in the United Nations, however, the British government suggested that the bill
compelled employers to recognize all unions supported by 52% of workers in an industry.197
Cheddi Jagan suggested that the bill varied in the percentage of votes required to achieve union
recognition between 52% and 65% in a statement to the London press; however, he did not
explain the discrepancy.198
The TUC also opposed the content of the Labor Relations Bill. George Woodcock argued
that the bill was objectionable to British trade union principles particularly in its empowerment
of the Minister of Labor to determine who was classified as a worker for purposes of the ballot to
determine recognition. Woodcock also argued that the bill’s justification of mechanisms to
determine jurisdictional disputes between “rival unions” obscured that its purpose was to replace
the MPCA, which he noted was an established and not a rival union. He further argued that the
bill’s claims to be based on United States labor legislation ignored that American labor laws did
not permit jurisdictional strikes for recognition where a union was already recognized. Finally,
Woodcock pointed out that United States law limited the length of strikes and allowed national
security imperatives to be used to end labor protest.199
It is significant that, as Jagan noted, the PPP’s bill did not include the Taft-Hartley
amendments that altered United States labor law in 1947 and which American labor leaders
referred to as a “slave labor law.”200 Nelson Lichtenstein suggests in The Most Dangerous Man
in Detroit that the 1935 Wagner Act on which the Guianese bill was loosely based was possibly
the most radical piece of legislation in United States history—and as Jagan noted the American
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labor law was altered in 1947.201 Moreover, as Jennifer Luff argues in Commonsense
Anticommunism, most unionists in the United States supported the Wagner Act; however, many
influential labor leaders across the political spectrum expressed skepticism at the degree of state
oversight in the legislation. Many labor conservatives, she argues, offered only tentative support
for the bill or opposed aspects of it outright. At the same time, the general public’s support for
the Wagner Act was inconsistent.202 Considering the broader context of the United States law
suggests that it is misleading to reduce American policymakers’ and labor leaders’ opposition to
the Guianese bill to merely a simplistic attack on the PPP. In fact, similarities between the
Guianese bill and the Wagner Act may have acted to reinforce some American labor leaders’
suspicions that the PPP was moving toward an unacceptable centralization of authority in the
state. Thus, the PPP’s trade union ideology reinforced American preconceptions about its
political orientation.
Most importantly, the PPP’s bill was passed in a colonial territory in a Cold War context
rather than at the height of the depression in the United States and Anglo-American objections to
the bill are most effectively understood in that context. As Gerald Horne notes in Cold War in a
Hot Zone even though the bill was democratically-based and democratically-proposed, the
concept of colonial democracy was the “ultimate oxymoron” and the Colonial Office never
intended the introduction of the Waddington Constitution to be the advent of complete selfgovernment in British Guiana.203 Thus, the bill was objectionable to British and American trade
union leaders because it assumed a degree of self-determination and labor militancy beyond what
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was acceptable to British and American officials while attempting to establish a form of trade
unionism that differed considerably from British or American trade union practices. In other
words, it sought to decolonize labor institutions from the capitalist-British model of labor
relations rather than decolonize Guianese society within the British model.
The Labor Relations Bill was eventually introduced on September 29 and passed on
October 8; however, the culmination of tensions and fear of communist infiltration in the British
Guianese government resulted in the landing of British soldiers and suspension of the
Constitution the following day.204 Within two weeks British and American government officials
began discussing how to strengthen the MPCA and initially suggested working through the
ICFTU.205 The intervention, rationalized in a 1954 White Paper as necessary to stop a communist
takeover of the colony, was in part a response to fear of communist expansion into British
Guiana; however, it was more broadly a reluctance to grant independence to a territory without
first establishing the structural mechanisms through which the British could retain post-colonial
control.
Response to the Suspension and Conclusions
PPP actions during their 133 days in office in 1953 are most effectively understood as the
culmination of a seven-year-long effort to alter the institutional basis of organized labor in
British Guiana. PPP leaders’ actions were consistent with the program left-leaning Guianese
leaders’ undertook beginning in 1946 and were not a momentary spurt of overzealous activity by
newly empowered colonial ministers. The Guianese left pursued a form of institutional
reorganization, which necessitated a fundamental break from the Colonial Office’s instilled trade
204
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union practices as a precursor to the establishment of Guianese socialism. PPP leaders pursued a
cooperative but party centered relationship with trade unions that retained connections to the
WFTU and did not affiliate with the ICFTU or ORIT. Their pursuit of institutional
reorganization and the development of a unity between the House of Assembly and militant
minded labor organizations was a necessity in their push for deeper reforms. However, not all of
the left-coalition agreed with the methods employed in seeking to supplant the MPCA in 1953
and schisms emerged within the PPP based on leaders’ seeming attempt to subordinate the trade
union movement to the party.
Such a unification of party, government, and labor, however, was anathema to American
labor leaders and British officials. The combination of the emerging government-labor
relationship based on an explicitly stated intention to pursue social revolution convinced
American officials observing the situation that there existed an existential threat to the capitalist
system in British Guiana. While the United States government was not party to the suspension,
Maddox approvingly speculated that Savage would consider instituting a state of emergency by
September 23.206 Thus, American labor leaders opposed what they deemed to be subversion of
independent labor and both labor leaders and American government officials concluded that the
PPP was a threat to foreign capital investment and democratic government.
The TUC’s role in the aftermath of the constitution’s suspension is significant. The
Colonial Office aggressively sought cooperation from British labor and implored them to play a
larger role in the colony in July 1953; however, British officials’ expectations for the TUC role
in British Guiana drifted toward the pursuit of political subversion rather than institutionbuilding. In October Oliver Lyttleton reminded Vincent Tewson of the TUC’s objection to the

206

Cabinet Minute, October 6, 1953, CAB/195/11, BNA; William Maddox to John Foster Dulles, September 23,
1953, 841D.062/9-2353, Central Decimal Files, Box 4814, RG 59, NARA II.

226

Labor Bill’s proposed empowerment of the Minister of Labor and PPP contacts with the WFTU
when he asked TUC General Secretary to nominate one of the three members of the Commission
of Inquiry appointed to investigate the crisis and determine the Colonial Office’s course of action
in British Guiana. Lyttleton’s direct appeal to the TUC underscores the importance the Colonial
Office placed on the TUC’s role in decolonization.207 The TUC also indirectly supported the
suspension on October 29 when the General Council issued a circular to all affiliated unions
opposing Cheddi Jagan’s attempt to speak to trade unionists in London. The circular articulated
several points of opposition to the PPP government including ministers’ affiliation with the
WFTU and the Labor Relations Bill. TUC leaders also dismissed the Caribbean Labor Congress
through which Jagan reached out to British unions as a communist-controlled organization.208
Discussions in the State Department also tended toward the conclusion that the situation
in British Guiana necessitated “a special effort…to strengthen the anti-communist trade union
forces as a major part of strengthening of democratic forces in opposition to the Communists.”
State Department officials determined that “it is imperative that the Manpower Citizens
Association be strengthened” and that “outside assistance might best take the form of assignment
by the British TUC of a competent representative, preferably under ICFTU auspices to work
directly with the non-communist trade union forces in Guiana.” Lincoln Gordon, Chief of the
United States Mutual Security Agency mission in the United Kingdom, suggested he meet with
Sir Arthur Deakin of the British Transport Workers to discuss the matter when Deakin was in
Washington for the International Transport Workers meeting.209 William Christensen met with
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James Barry of the Bureau of the Budget on November 13 to begin discussions of funding
Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) programs in the colony at the request of Archie
Campbell of the British Embassy. Christensen suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff “highly
valued” the strategically important Caribbean region and that technical assistance could help
counter communism in the volatile area.210 Thus, in late 1953 both the Colonial Office and State
Department encouraged the TUC to increase its role in institutional decolonization in British
Guiana while working to increase American influence in the colony.
In November, the TUC issued a second circular to affiliated unions reserving judgment
on the colonial policy in Guiana but criticizing the PPP “which had no scruples in seeking to
subject trade unions to their own political ends” and appointing Assistant General Secretary
George Woodcock to the Commission of Inquiry.211 The PPP’s attempt at institutional
reorganization through domestic labor relations and international associations contributed to the
TUC’s ambiguous response to the regressive policy toward British Guiana in London. In
discussing the suspension with Winston Churchill on October 13, Lyttleton assured the Prime
Minister that opposition from the Labor Party in the House of Commons “would not be united in
condemning the action which the Government had taken in this matter” because of PPP policy
toward the trade union movement and association with the WFTU.212 Thus, the PPP’s trade
union policies impacted British domestic politics and shaped the response from the Labor Party
toward the regressive actions of colonial officials.
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Conversely, American trade unionists had been actively involved in British Guiana
throughout 1953 and thought their government was remiss in underappreciating the potential for
communist subversion in the colony, Maddox’s discussions with the State Department
notwithstanding. It is also significant that the GIWU remained the strongest union in the colony
despite early TUC, Colonial Office, AFL, ICFTU, and ORIT financing for programs designed to
strengthen the MPCA.
Ultimately, the PPP’s ascension and the conflicts that led to the suspension of the
constitution in 1953 are best understood as part of institutional decolonization. Guianese leaders
conflicted over the nature of their increasingly autonomous society and sought to establish the
institutional structures that would fortify the social and political-economic institutions necessary
for the type of post-colonial system they envisioned for the territory. A left-coalition led efforts
to institutionally restructure the colony intending to break from Anglo-American control through
the establishment of socialism in British Guiana and increased affiliation with Eastern-bloc
countries and international organizations abroad. Their objective was to establish mechanisms
that could be used as the base for social revolution in the colony.
Domestic opponents of the PPP worked to build institutions based on British or American
models to establish a capitalist-democratic system in which their organizations could exact
reforms from employers. Simultaneously, British and American policymakers and labor leaders,
especially in the Colonial Office and AFL, sought to establish British-modeled trade unions and
integrate colonial unions into Western-capitalist international labor organizations. A period of
conflict between Guianese leaders and external actors unfolded between 1946 and 1953 that
culminated when the PPP assumed office and began the process of institutional decolonization
on its terms. Domestic opponents and British officials resisted the left-coalition’s efforts by
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forcefully removing the PPP government from power and dissolving left-led trade unionism in
British Guiana. Pointedly, Oliver Lyttleton admitted to Prime Minister Winston Churchill on
October 13 that there was no threat of a Communist coup and that the constitution was
suspended “to secure law & order while Comm. Ministers were removed.”213 Thus, the Colonial
Office’s fear was not that the PPP was about to directly impose a communist government in
British Guiana, but that the institutions holding Guianese society together were incapable of
inhibiting the PPP from progressing toward that end with popular support over time.
The first phase of institutional decolonization that began with the expansion of Colonial
Office-TUC programs and the establishment of the PAC in 1946 ended when colonial officials
realized the institutional structures they established in coordination with the MPCA and likeminded colonists were not a strong enough bulwark to stop the push for the greater social
changes advanced by the left-coalition of Guianese leaders. The suspension of the Waddington
Constitution disrupted left-coalition efforts at joining legislative and trade union activity to
restructure Guianese society and set the stage for the second phase of institutional decolonization
in British Guiana between 1954 and 1957.
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Chapter 6: Checking the Excesses of Democracy: International Institution-Building in
British Guiana from 1954 to 1957
The paradoxical effort to establish democratic institutions for the purpose of changing the
will of the Guianese people shaped Anglo-American institution-building projects in British
Guiana between 1954 and 1957. The Guianese labor movement made progress toward
establishing functional capitalist-democratic trade unions despite Anglo-American efforts to use
institution-building to expand their respective nations’ influence and weaken Jagan. Nonetheless,
the Jagan faction of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) achieved electoral victory in August
1957. Anglo-American labor leaders and policymakers lamented the election’s outcome;
however, British and American interpretations of the institution-building effort differed. Colonial
officials and British trade union leaders considered the programs a qualified success while
American political and labor leaders concluded that institution-building efforts were a failure.
Consequently, Colonial Office and TUC activities in British Guiana differed from American
activities in the colony after August 1957.
George Woodcock, Assistant General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress (TUC),
was one of three members of the Robertson Commission that investigated the Waddington
Constitution’s suspension in October 1953. Woodcock played a critical role in designing and
implementing British development efforts in Guiana between 1954 and 1957. His retrospective
explanation of colonial trade unions as “effective checks on the excess of democracy”
illuminates the purpose and negative consequences of Anglo-American involvement in the
Guianese labor movement during the second phase of institutional decolonization in British
Guiana.1 A British-appointed interim government administered British Guiana between October
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1953 and August 1957 and during that time myriad international actors carried out programs
designed to strengthen moderate, pro-Western trade unions and counter the popular appeal of the
left-wing of the PPP. Institution-building efforts aimed at strengthening the foundations of
democracy and capitalism in British Guiana; however, as Philip Rogers of the Colonial Office
bluntly acknowledged, the primary objective of colonial policy in British Guiana after October
1953 was “to go hard at it and smash [the PPP] completely.”2
Therefore, Woodcock’s emphasis on the Guianese labor movement’s role in protecting
British interests in preparation for Guianese independence rather than as an expression of
democratic voice in a capitalist society conformed to widely-held British plans regarding the
most effective means of decolonizing colonial institutions. The institution-building project in
British Guiana reinforced Secretary of State for the Colonies James Griffiths’ late-1951
statements arguing that British colonial policy aimed at “as rapidly as possible build[ing] up in
each territory the institutions which its circumstances require” to give colonial peoples “ a sense
of belonging” in preparation for self-government.3 Ultimately, the Colonial Office engaged in
institution-building to establish a capitalist-democratic political-economic system that protected
British interests in British Guiana in the long-term; however, the promotion of democracy was
contingent on the preservation of Britain’s economic, strategic, and political interests.
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Analysis of TUC records heretofore unexamined and their juxtaposition with previously
scrutinized materials suggests that Guianese unionists aggressively courted Western support and
drove the process of institution-building in British Guiana to a greater degree than is represented
in the existing scholarship. Close reading of the TUC materials also suggests that the literature
does not adequately quantify the gains moderate unionists made within the existing politicaleconomic system between 1954 and 1957. Nonetheless, international efforts did not alleviate
Guiana’s poverty rapidly enough to undermine the PPP’s electoral support. At the same time,
increased transnational connections slowly alienated pro-Western trade union leaders from
workers even as international relationships financially and legally stabilized the movement.
Consequently, the PPP returned to the head of government after elections in August 1957 and the
strengthened trade union movement turned to anti-democratic practices to oppose the PPP.
The second phase of institutional decolonization in British Guiana that took place
between 1954 and 1961 was the most important period in determining the colony’s future.
During the seven year period, Guianese trade union leaders and Anglo-American trade unionists,
government officials, and employers established important legislative and procedural advances
that strengthened the reformist labor movement in the colony. At the same time, MPCA leaders’
exclusion of PPP members from participation in the union, and the AFL-CIO’s short-sighted
institution-building tactics, contributed to alienating an anti-democratic reformist labor
movement from its constituents in British Guiana. Meanwhile, the PPP’s inability to work from
within the sugar union fueled the drive for an alternative union and political action to replace the
MPCA. Thus, the third phase of institutional decolonization that unfolded between 1962 and
1964 was a direct result of failed institution-building in the second half of the 1950s.
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Nonetheless, most scholarly historical studies of British Guiana’s decolonization focus on
the 1953 suspension of the Waddington Constitution and covert American subversion of the PPP
government between 1961 and 1964. The political scientist Matthew Lange points out there is a
strong correlation between the nature of colonial rule and long-term development, political
inclusivity, and stability in post-colonial societies. Specifically, Lange argues that directly ruled
colonies such as British Guiana tended to establish effective bureaucratic and institutional
structures. Guyana, Lange argues, is exceptional as a consequence of radical changes to the
colony’s trajectory during the last two decades of colonial rule, what this dissertation refers to as
the process of institutional decolonization.4 Throughout the second half of the 1950s British and
American labor, political, and business leaders cooperated to build the Guianese trade union
movement in order to establish the institutional framework for a capitalist, democratic postcolonial Guiana. Anglo-American leaders further aimed to integrate the Guianese labor
movement into the Western liberal capitalist system in order to protect British and American
interests.
The historiography on the period between 1954 and 1959 explores the objectives of
various parties involved in Guianese decolonization; however, it focuses on external efforts to
counter popular support for Cheddi Jagan and the PPP. The most prominent study, Stephen
Rabe’s U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, argues that British and American policymakers’
interpreted Jagan’s anti-colonial Marxism through a Cold War prism and determined to destroy
the PPP.5 Similarly, Colin Palmer notes in Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power that the
Robertson Commission, which investigated the Waddington Constitution’s suspension,
recommended a period of “marking time in the advance toward self-government” to pursue
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social and economic development and undermine Jagan’s popularity.6 Palmer echoes Rabe’s
argument and suggests that various groups attempted to build power and oppose the Cheddi
Jagan-led faction of the PPP between 1953 and 1960.7 Spencer Mawby’s Ordering Independence
agrees with Rabe and Palmer that anti-communism shaped British interpretations of Jagan’s
Marxism; however, Mawby notes that British trade unionists also opposed Jagan and the PPP out
of a fear of disorderly decolonization.8 Thus, Mawby argues that the Colonial Office and TUC
cooperated to decelerate decolonization and transition colonies to independence in a manner that
protected British imperatives.9
Clem Seecharan expands on Rabe’s argument, pointing out that Booker Brothers
chairman Jock Campbell aggressively opposed the PPP and tried to establish an anti-Jagan
alternative to the party between 1953 and 1956. However, Seecharan differs from Rabe and
Palmer in arguing that Campbell agreed to work with Cheddi Jagan after the 1957 election and
that Jagan’s doctrinaire Marxism undermined Campbell’s reform efforts leading to conflict
between the PPP and British and American officials.10 Seecharan’s analysis of Booker Brothers’
efforts to support the Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA) on the sugar estates is important
in acknowledging that institution-building efforts brought together employers, trade unions, and
government agencies. British-owned businesses shared broad objectives with the Colonial Office
and TUC in institution-building, though employers were inconsistent in supporting institution-
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building efforts. The close association hints at the conservative nature of British programs that
failed to address Guianese workers’ fundamental needs. In addition to British actors, American
trade unionists and foreign operations officials, as well as representatives of the Western
international labor organizations—the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), and Caribbean Area
Division of ORIT (CADORIT)—also contributed to Guianese institution-building between 1954
and 1957.
Rabe suggests that, despite broadly shared objectives, colonial officials expressed
considerable reservations regarding American influence in British Guiana before the Suez Crisis
and Cuban Revolution ultimately undermined Anglo-American cooperation.11 Anglo-American
competition in British Guiana was consistent with broader rivalry for post-colonial influence
during the Eisenhower administration that complicated cooperative efforts in British colonies,
particularly in labor movements, as Joey Long argues in Safe for Decolonization.12 Nonetheless,
Anglo-American power struggles did not preclude cooperation in British Guiana. Ultimately, the
increased American role in British Guiana after 1953 is most effectively contextualized as part of
a broader expansion of United States influence in the Caribbean that began in the 1930s and
increased considerably during the mid-1950s. Carey Fraser’s Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism,
Gerald Horne’s Cold War in a Hot Zone, and Jason Parker’s Brother’s Keeper all have
considered the dynamics shaping the West Indies’ transition from British colonies to independent
nations within what Parker refers to as an “American Lake.”13 Joey Long argues that a similar
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process unfolded in Singapore where American and British officials and labor leaders clashed at
times over tactics while agreeing on broad objectives as United States influence expanded in the
1950s.14
Most importantly, Palmer argues that the PPP’s Guianese opponents advocated
limitations on political advancement and civil liberties even more aggressively than did British
officials.15 Palmer’s analysis challenges Rabe’s depictions of anti-Jagan unionists as “timid” and
“lethargic,” characterizations that TUC records suggest obscure the assertiveness of Guianese
who courted external support and worked for improvements within the context of a British model
of unionism.16 Nonetheless, Palmer suggests that the Colonial Office lamented Jagan’s expanded
influence on sugar estates as early as mid-1955.17 The Jagans gained followers throughout the
period. However, the PPP’s political influence did not translate into a trade union presence
because of Anglo-American support for the MPCA, and MPCA leaders’ anti-democratic
measures within the union.
Origins and Background of the Second Phase of Institutional Decolonization in British
Guiana
The second phase of institutional decolonization in British Guiana began with the
suspension of the Waddington Constitution in October 1953 as a way for the Colonial Office to
remove suspected communists from government and regain control of the Guianese labor
movement after trade union conflict disrupted the colony. Colonial Officials described the
suspension as an opportunity to address the poverty and weak institutional structures that
allowed the PPP to win political power and radically challenge the Guianese social order. Two
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days after the suspension Governor Alfred Savage argued that a new constitution needed to be
implemented and that the next phase of British rule should be of constructive progress rather
than “marking time.”18 The Robertson Commission appropriated the phrase marking time to
argue in favor of a period of pause in the advance toward self-government; however, it too
emphasized that the interim government’s purpose was to promote social and political
development to alter the views of the Guianese electorate. Thus, the official British objective
between the October 1953 suspension and the 1957 elections was to provide time for institution
building to develop a capitalist system economically and politically connected to the British
Commonwealth as British Guiana advanced toward self-government.19
Colonial authorities levied a series of authoritarian measures to cripple the PPP in
October 1953, including restricting freedom of speech and movement, while establishing an
interim government designed to work in coordination with Anglo-American development and
institution-building projects.20 The State Department and Colonial Office pushed to considerably
increase British and American labor involvement in developing a pro-Western labor movement
in the colony beginning in late 1953. Anglo-American trade union leaders traveled to British
Guiana in early 1954 to evaluate the situation and in mid-1954 a variety of British and American
institution-building programs began to take form. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) trained, financed, and advised Guianese trade union
leaders independently as well as in coordination with the United States government. Most
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significantly, the TUC made British Guiana the first colony in which it undertook a full-scale
institution-building effort. 21
British and American-led institution building projects in British Guiana were cautiously
cooperative from their inception. Immediately following the suspension of the Waddington
Constitution, Lincoln Gordon, Chief of the United States Mutual Security Agency mission in the
United Kingdom, suggested allowing the TUC to take the lead in creating pro-Western trade
unions aligned with the ICFTU and its hemispheric affiliate, ORIT.22 British and American
institution-building tactics differed and aimed to advance national interests resulting in interunion rivalry between the AFL-CIO and TUC. British government officials broadly criticized
American institution-building projects in colonial areas in the late-1950s, suggesting that AFLCIO activities impeded trade union development. British trade unionists and government
officials alleged American labor leaders’ international agenda was an extension of official
American policy as defined in the State Department and pursued through the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). Most importantly, British officials accused American labor leaders of using
bribery to build up privileged local leaders rather than constructing organized labor movements
from the bottom up.23 Nonetheless, Anglo-American cooperation in British Guiana persisted
despite British disagreement with AFL-CIO methods and anxiety regarding expanded American
influence in British Guiana at the institutional level.
21
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In addition to British and American collaboration, the suspension of the Waddington
constitution led to a flurry of activity as Guianese activists and British employers responded to
the crisis and labor unrest continued unabated. On October 10 the PPP initiated work stoppages
on several sugar estates in protest of the suspension and the strikes lasted several weeks.24 Within
days of its removal the PPP began printing and distributing handbills and propaganda through
underground channels and initiated a program of civil resistance that led to the arrest of several
prominent party members.25 Booker Brothers chairman Jock Campbell introduced several
Guianese politicians to Labor and Conservative Party leaders in late October with assistance
from the Colonial Office. Campbell suggested publicizing the exchange in London would help
organize an “opposition” to counter the PPP.26 PPP contact with the World Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU) continued until Governor Alfred Savage banned all entry and distribution of
WFTU publications on December 16.27
Most importantly, conflicts between Guianese unionists persisted as they had in the late
1940s in what British Guiana’s first Guianese Labor Commissioner James Ramphal referred to
as a “continuous state of inter-union war.”28 The British Guiana Trade Union Council (BGTUC)
disbanded in October 1953 citing communist infiltration and reorganized in early 1954 without
the participation of the British Guiana Labor Union (BGLU) or Guiana Industrial Workers’
Union (GIWU). The BGLU and GIWU, two of the most important unions in the colony, refused
to affiliate as a result of the reformed BGTUC’s clause disallowing association with the
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Caribbean Labor Congress (CLC) or WFTU.29 The MPCA continued pressing the Sugar
Producers’ Association (SPA) for a minimum weekly wage throughout November though no
agreement was reached.30 MPCA General Secretary Sheik Shakoor traveled to Trinidad and met
with Frank Walcott, Chairman of CADORIT, to discuss the situation in British Guiana in late
December 1953. CADORIT officials noted the MPCA’s failure to secure workers’ support and
determined that the union’s weakness derived from conservatism in the face of considerable
poverty. Rather than overhauling the MPCA or suggesting policy changes, CADORIT produced
10,000 pamphlets commending the MPCA’s aim of helping workers obtain economic security
and political freedom in an attempt to help the Guianese sugar union gain grassroots support.31
CADORIT likely understated the MPCA’s weakness and inefficiency in late 1953. Colin
Palmer notes that increases in cost-of-living surpassed sugar workers’ modest wage gains
between 1938 and 1954 providing evidence that material conditions for workers declined over
time despite the MPCA’s officially recognized position as workers’ bargaining agent.32 Palmer
argues that MPCA leaders’ policy proposals further undermined the union’s efforts to win the
support of sugar workers. Palmer notes that the MPCA was part of the Joint Trade Union
Committee (JTUC) along with the British Guiana Headmen’s Union, the British Guiana Sugar
Estates Clerks Association, and the British Guiana and West Indies Sugar Boilers Union. The
JTUC ostensibly acted as the unified representative of the colony’s 33,000 sugar estate workers
in the early 1950s; however, the JTUC argued for policies that disempowered its constituency
29
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despite negotiating for minor improvements to workers’ material conditions. Specifically, the
JTUC argued for property or income restrictions to determine suffrage as a means of limiting
sugar workers’ influence in electoral politics. The JTUC’s policy aimed at undermining the PPP
after the Waddington Constitution’s suspension in 1953. Thus, as Colin Palmer argues, the
MPCA was not merely cautious in advancing workers’ interests, its leaders consciously acted
against them.33
Anglo-American efforts to strengthen the MPCA and pro-Western trade unions beginning
in 1954 benefited from several changes in Guianese labor leadership and the GIWU’s
considerable loss of influence after the PPP’s removal.34 First, the Colonial Office promoted
Ramphal to Commissioner of Labor after repeated demands for “Guianization” of official
positions despite skepticism that his East Indian background compromised his impartiality.35
Notwithstanding colonial officials’ initial uncertainty, Ramphal advocated a form of Guianese
organized labor based on British trade unionism, encouraged educational exchanges between
Guianese and British trade unionists, and won George Woodcock’s approbation for his overall
cooperation with the TUC.36
Second, Rupert Tello, former president of the MPCA, ascended to the position of General
Secretary in the BGTUC in 1955 and assumed a position in the interim government.37 Governor
Ralph Grey acknowledged in 1960 that the TUC and Colonial Office exaggerated Tello’s local
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stature.38 However, Tello played a central role in establishing connections between the BGTUC
and the TUC, AFL-CIO, ORIT, and CADORIT. More significantly, Tello convinced British and
American trade union leaders and government officials of his prominence in the Guianese labor
movement and his shared views regarding the importance of capitalist development and free
enterprise.39 Anglo-American officials’ trust allowed Tello to influence international
interpretations of Guianese labor and political developments and use his overseas connections to
pursue his own political objectives between 1954 and 1957.
Finally, Richard Ishmael became the MPCA’s new president in early 1954. Ishmael, an
East Indian Guianese educated at Gettysburg College in the United States, was an early member
of the PPP who claimed that he left the party as a result of Cheddi Jagan’s communist views.40
Rabe notes that British officials regularly criticized Ishmael as an opportunist maneuvering for a
future political position. However, as Colin Palmer suggests, Ishmael was an aggressive
advocate of Guianese workers during the early part of his career.41 British officials’ and rival
Guianese leaders’ criticisms obscured Ishmael’s activism as head of the MPCA between 1954
and 1957 as well as the advancements the MPCA secured for sugar workers. As a result scholars
fail to fully appreciate the importance of the MPCA’s policy shift after the August 1957 elections
and the paradoxical effect of external assistance on the MPCA’s strength. Most importantly,
superficial analyses of Ishmael inaccurately suggest that weak leadership undermined the MPCA
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and fail to appreciate that the union’s limitations were a reflection of the unequal distribution of
power in Guiana and sugar workers’ support for radical change.42
Ramphal suggested in 1954 that Ishmael was driven to overhaul the union, convinced that
“the whole internal organization [was] rotten,” and that Ishmael’s tenure represented a “new
phase in the history of the MPCA.”43 In June 1954 Robert Alexander compiled Guianese
analyses of Ishmael’s initial impact as head of the MPCA and his interviews suggested that the
new MPCA president was an aggressive leader who engaged sugar workers on the plantations,
held illegal meetings, severely criticized sugar producers, and pressed the SPA for considerable
improvements to working conditions.44 Jane Phillips-Gay, Secretary of the GIWU, the MPCA’s
rival union, dismissed Ishmael’s chance at wooing workers from her organization and criticized
his motives as self-serving. Nonetheless, Phillips-Gay acknowledged that Ishmael was active in
traveling the country meeting with workers.45 At least some sugar workers expressed confidence
in his willingness to fight on their behalf and to serve as a break from previously suspect MPCA
leadership. Several workers Alexander interviewed suggested that they would return to the
MPCA if Ishmael’s reform efforts succeeded, despite their general skepticism of the union.46
J.P. Lachmansingh, President of the GIWU, noted that Ishmael attacked sugar producers
so aggressively that the SPA censored him in the union’s journal, the Labor Advocate.47 MPCA
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General Secretary Sheik Shakoor confirmed that Ishmael wrote inflammatory articles against the
SPA in the Labor Advocate that angered sugar producers who were allowed through contract to
censor articles in the periodical.48 At the same time, colonial officials expressed concern that
Ishmael’s aggressive tactics disrupted relations with the SPA.49 Alfred Thorne, editor of the
Guiana Graphic, described Ishmael as a rash leader who “alienated employers.”50 Eventually
Shakoor, Tello, and other MPCA leaders called for Ishmael’s suspension as a result of his efforts
to rapidly reform the union.51 Shakoor retreated from his position when Ishmael agreed to
moderate his methods. Nonetheless, Ishmael continued to use tactics that colonial officials and
TUC leaders considered irrationally aggressive.52 Ultimately, Ishmael’s tenure as MPCA
President changed the nature of MPCA leadership and contributed to the organization’s growth
in the mid-1950s.
Ishmael, however, included a political objective for the MPCA that dovetailed with
British aims to undermine the PPP. Ishmael admitted that he pursued the MPCA’s presidency to
obtain the opportunity to build the organization into an effective mechanism through which to
defeat his former party. Nonetheless, Ishmael told Alexander that he was willing to cooperate
with the PPP’s non-communist members and he suggested that the MPCA needed grassroots
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support to make external assistance effective.53 Crucially, Ishmael supported British trade union
methods. Thus, British and American efforts to strengthen the MPCA coincided with the
emergence of a new leader who shared their vision of institution-building and who had tentative
support from sugar workers.
American Foreign Policy toward British Guiana during the Eisenhower Administration
The U.S. policy of institution-building in British Guiana between 1954 and 1957 was torn
between the guided expansion of democratic mechanisms within Guianese society and the
development of a capitalist labor movement based on business unionism. In contrast to the
Truman administration, which focused its attention on Europe and Asia, President Eisenhower
and his advisors were increasingly concerned with Latin America.54 High-ranking American
officials discussed British Guiana at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting on October 8,
1953. According to CIA director Allen Dulles, the British suspended the Guianese constitution in
response to the election of a communist party in the colony.55 William Christensen, the Charge
d’affaires in Trinidad and Tobago, expressed concern about the British suspension of the
Waddington Constitution in a report to the State Department in November. Specifically,
Christensen noted his apprehension about instability in the Caribbean, which the Joint Chiefs of
Staff prioritized in national security projections.56
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Meanwhile, United States diplomats supported the British use of force against the PPP in
international forums. An NSC report emphasized the importance of regional diplomatic measures
since several Latin American countries thought the question of colonialism more pressing than
allegations of communist infiltration in British Guiana. Consequently, American diplomats “took
further steps to impress on Latin American officials” that the alleged communist conspiracy in
British Guiana posed a critical threat to the hemisphere.57 United States representatives at an
Organization of American States (OAS) meeting in Caracas the following March pushed through
an anti-communist measure in anticipation of involvement in the Guatemalan coup in June while
pointedly abstaining from a vote on an anti-colonial resolution that every Latin American
Republic adopted.58 Similarly, American diplomats supported the British refusal to allow the
United Nations to debate the intervention.59
The importance of strategic resources, specifically bauxite, considerably influenced the
Eisenhower administration’s policy toward British Guiana throughout the 1950s. Bauxite, the ore
used to produce aluminum, was essential to a wide variety of civilian industries but most
importantly to military preparedness in the early Cold War.60 British representatives in the
Foreign Office noted that the Eisenhower administration impressed on them the considerable
American concern with controlling access to Guianese raw materials, though British officials
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noted the Colonial Office’s wariness of permitting an “American foothold” in the West Indian
colonies.61
In addition to concerns about American access to resources, the NSC acknowledged that
increased trade of strategic items “would break certain bottlenecks in the development of Soviet
war potential.”62 A secret evaluation of International Cooperation Administration (ICA)
programs in British Guiana noted that the colony “held important deposits of strategic raw
materials” that would represent a serious national security threat if traded to the Soviet Union.
The report also noted that its proximity to the Panama Canal made British Guiana geographically
significant.63 The reports collectively suggest that the Eisenhower administration expected a
communist or communist-friendly government in British Guiana to trade strategic materials to
the Soviet Union and increase the military potential of American’s Cold War rival.64 Moreover,
historian Michael Adamson points out that the Soviet Union pursued an economic offensive in
the developing world that focused on using technical assistance, trade, and financial aid to
61
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expand Soviet influence beginning in 1953.65 The PPP’s pursuit of economic and technical
assistance from the Eastern-bloc and an expressed desire for trade with the socialist world made
British Guiana a critical area of concern for American policymakers.66
Geopolitical threats and fear of material improvements to the Soviet military were not the
only factors shaping American policymakers response to British Guiana. Harold Stassen,
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), wrote to President Eisenhower in June
1955 arguing that the FOA played an important role in developing economic and social
institutions in the underdeveloped world as a means of protecting the American economy.
Stassen argued that increasing national output in the United States required “a great increase in
imports of foreign materials” as well as locating “new markets for some products where
domestic demand is relatively inelastic.”67 While British Guiana represented a small market,
access to Guianese materials, from the perspective of American policymakers, could prove to be
critical to the United States economy over time.68
United States policymakers also considered British Guiana a potential source of
economic opportunity throughout the Eisenhower administration. Throughout the 1950s there
were persistent attempts to determine the colony’s mineral and resource wealth as the United
States anticipated the expansion of economic opportunities in the decolonizing British
Caribbean. Investors expressed interest in a wide range of possibilities, from exploiting yet to be
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discovered offshore oil deposits to expanding into untapped markets for egg crate sales.69
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed optimism about the mineral wealth and future
economic benefits the United States could attain from increased relations with the colony. Dulles
encouraged attempts to locate strategic materials, such as uranium, and labeled exploratory
studies on potential fisheries as “urgent.”70 Thus, while strategic concerns ultimately trumped
specific economic issues in British Guiana, as James Siekmeier argues, United States
policymakers viewed economic nationalism “as both more prevalent and dangerous than
communism” during the Cold War and staunch opposition to economic nationalism both pre-and
post-dated the post-World War II superpower rivalry.71
Most significantly, Eisenhower administration officials argued for a perpetuation of
informal American empire in the Western hemisphere through ideological expansion. In March
1954 John Foster Dulles clarified his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to the NSC while
explaining the background of the anti-communist resolution he advocated at the OAS meeting in
Caracas. With the Guatemalan crisis in which CIA-backed opponents of President Jacobo
Arbenz ultimately forced him to flee very much on his mind, Dulles argued that the resolution
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expanded the American assertion of influence in the Western Hemisphere to include outlawing
foreign ideologies in the American Republics.72 The Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, signed on
March 28, argued that “the domination or control of the political institutions of any American
state by the international communist movement extending to this hemisphere the political system
of an extra continental power” constituted an existential threat to every country in the region. 73
Crucially, the declaration confirmed that American efforts to counter subversion could not be
considered intervention since the threat of communist control of political institutions in the
American republics was tantamount to external aggression against the United States.74 Thus, the
declaration provided a legal justification for a wide array of American programs aimed at
controlling the direction of Guianese labor unions.75
Moreover, despite Eisenhower’s skepticism, Vice President Richard Nixon and Allen
Dulles convinced the NSC that specific U.S. domestic legislation should be aimed at countering
subversives in labor unions because such legal justifications could assist in “combatting
Communist control of labor unions in foreign countries.”76 On August 6 the NSC articulated its
commitment to countering communism’s “creeping expansion” in the hemisphere through AFL-
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CIO-FOA programs for economic growth, political support, and covert operations, specifically in
Latin America.77
NSC officials argued throughout 1954 for continued support for NSC 162/2, which
argued that underdeveloped countries needed to be guided toward “orderly development into
more stable and responsible nations” within the Western capitalist system through “all feasible
measures.” United States policymakers perceived a revolution of rising expectations in the Third
World. NSC members argued that failure to harness that revolution would result in
underdeveloped nations and former colonies being absorbed into the Soviet system and tipping
the world balance of power against the United States.78 Thus, United States policymakers
concluded that national security, economic growth, and ideological expansion could be achieved
in British Guiana through cooperation with conservative elements of the American labor
movement.
The relationship between the AFL, CIO, and the United States government in foreign
policy evolved in the early 1950s as the State Department attempted to exert greater influence
over labor leaders’ involvement in foreign countries.79 A number of prominent labor leaders
argued that Eisenhower administration officials abused arbitrary powers in labor-government
programs and deemphasized labor organizations’ role in foreign operations creating a schism
between government officials and labor leaders in 1953.80 However, as Stephen Rabe argues in
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Eisenhower and Latin America, the Eisenhower administration continued previous
administrations’ consultation with labor leaders such as George Meany and Serafino Romualdi
and secretly financed international labor programs that dovetailed with State Department aims.
The administration also encouraged the advancement of United States foreign policy objectives
through international labor organizations, most importantly ORIT.81 Eisenhower policymakers
initiated a foreign policy program that called for increased AFL-CIO involvement in foreign
operations, a policy that several members of the administration including Secretary of State
Dulles and FOA Director Stassen reflected on positively in 1955.82 Nonetheless, the Eisenhower
administration decreased the direct influence of the AFL and CIO in policymaking through
bureaucratic reorganization aimed at increasing the institutionalized nature of labor-government
cooperation in foreign operations to assure that AFL-CIO overseas programs were subordinated
to State Department policy.
The Eisenhower administration policy included Dulles’s renewal of State Departmentlabor relationships in August 1953, the appointment of James Mitchell as Secretary of Labor in
early October 1953, and Stassen’s re-establishment of the FOA Office of Labor Affairs in early
1954.83 Improved relations between labor leaders and government official increased government-
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labor cooperation beginning in 1954. Dulles met with Meany and CIO President Walter Reuther
to discuss international relations in August and Mitchell’s appointment was the impetus for
improved relations between the Department of Labor and American labor leaders.84 Meanwhile,
Mitchell wrote to Meany in late November 1953 to explain that he viewed the Department of
Labor’s responsibilities in international relations as among its most important duties and stated
his intention to reactivate the Department of Labor Trade Union Advisory Committee on
International Affairs.85 Discussions at the CIO convention in November 1953 further
underscored the shift in Executive policy toward greater official collaboration between the
American labor movement and the United States government in foreign relations.86 CIO
delegates noted that American foreign operations programs severely de-emphasized labor
participation in the early 1950s; however, Dulles suggested that policymakers would renew an
alliance with trade unions in the international sphere during his address to the convention. The
Eisenhower administration’s increased participation with American trade unions coincided with
a shift in program emphasis toward less developed areas.87 Secretary Dulles specifically
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emphasized the importance of State Department relations with American organized labor in
stemming the spread of communist ideas into colonial and underdeveloped areas of the world.88
At the same time, cooperation between labor leaders and policymakers in foreign
operations changed under the Eisenhower administration’s 1953 Reorganization Plan number
seven that created the FOA as the State Department’s administrative arm for U.S. foreign
assistance to developing countries. The plan centralized programs to ensure conformity to State
Department objectives and coordination with official policy established through the
recommendations of the Security Council to the President.89 Congressional debates on the plan’s
ratification acknowledged that appropriation requests from the FOA and its participants could
influence policymaking in small ways and give labor leaders an indirect avenue through which
they could help formulate policy decisions. However, the reorganization established a clear line
of authority that increased the State Department’s influence over foreign policy based on what
Undersecretary of State General Walter Bedell Smith called “a certain amount of willing
subordination” to the Secretary of State.90 Edwin Martin, Special Assistant to the Secretary for
Mutual Security Affairs, also acknowledged that the FOA “while independent, is subject to the
88
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control and supervision and domination of the State Department.”91 Several labor leaders
criticized the State Department’s influence in labor programs and argued that subordination to
government officials compromised the independence of AFL-CIO actions.92
Nonetheless, Undersecretary of State for Administration Donald Lourie noted that
educational exchange programs involving “direct face-to-face communication and contact
between the people and institutions of the United States” and other countries were more integral
to foreign relations than complex, large-scale operations. He suggested that person-to-person
programs were particularly effective because they delegated significant portions of
administration to private organizations such as the AFL and CIO.93 Robert Murphy, Deputy
Undersecretary of State, echoed Lourie’s view and noted that “more and more labor has come to
accept and play its role in the development of the institutions of democracy the world over.”94
Harold Stassen suggested that the FOA planned to “maximize a people-to-people relationship
parallel to the government-to-government relationship” while “expanding support for voluntary
non-governmental organizations.”95 FOA head Stassen also argued that as programs gave new
attention to the need for economic, social, and institutional reforms in underdeveloped areas and

91

Statement of Hon. Donold B. Lourie, Under Secretary of State For Administration; Accompanied by Edwin M.
Martin, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs, et. al., Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and 8 of
1953 (Foreign Operations Administration) (United States Information Agency), Hearings before the Committee on
Government Operations House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1st Session on H.J. Res. 261 and H.J. Res. 262,
June 22, 23, and 24, 1953 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), 58.
92
FOA Labor Affairs Progress Reports, 1955, Office of the President-George Meany (1948-1960), Box 15, State
Department: Foreign Operations Administration, Handbook, Labor Committee, 1955, GMMA.
93
Statement of Hon. Donald B. Lourie, Undersecretary of State for Administration, Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and
8 of 1953 (Foreign Operations Administration) (United States Information Agency), Hearings before the Committee
on Government Operations House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1st Session on H.J. Res. 261 and H.J. Res.
262, June 22, 23, and 24, 1953 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), 41.
94
Foreign Operations Administration Labor Committee Memorandum, January 31, 1955, RG 1-027, Office of the
President-George Meany (1948-1960), Box 15, State Department: Foreign Operations Administration, Documents,
1955, GMMA.
95
Harold Stassen to All FOA Missions, September 1955, Administration-Organization, 1953-1955 (FOA), Dennis
A. FitzGerald Papers, 1945-1969, Box 38, DDEL; See Also: MSA Press Release, January 15, 1952, AdministrationOrganization, 1953-1955 (FOA), Dennis A. FitzGerald Papers, 1945-1969, Box 38, DDEL.

256

that “the problems of labor have received increased attention.”96 Thus, labor leaders assumed an
increasing role in foreign operations programs, were able to use FOA funding to enhance their
international operations, and influenced policymaking through foreign operations channels;
however, coordination with official policy limited the independence of AFL-CIO programs.
Changes in foreign operations programs in the mid-1950s illuminate the increased
significance United States policymakers placed on involvement in underdeveloped countries.
The Eisenhower administration assumed increasing responsibility for perpetuating the
international capitalist system and, as Michael Adamson argues, restoring “the liberal
international political economy” that existed prior to World War I.97 FOA and International
Cooperation Administration (ICA) programs were conceived as temporary measures designed to
advance underdeveloped economies as a means of countering communism’s appeal and limiting
Soviet influence in the third world; however, Adamson suggests that “promoting global
capitalism” was the long-term objective.98 Furthermore, Adamson argues that the Eisenhower
administration used foreign aid programs to address perceived threats to national security, rather
than to promote economic development. However, Adamson suggests that the Eisenhower
administration’s policy ultimately “strengthen[ed] the institutional basis for liberalizing the
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international political economy.”99 American-dominated international financial institutions, and
U.S. economic policies, gradually pressured developing world countries into reducing public
spending and accepting greater privatization. Nonetheless, FOA and ICA programs failed to
strengthen the democratic institutions necessary to complement financial liberalization.
As such, AFL-CIO policies designed and implemented through the FOA inherently
addressed State Department objectives while often advancing American labor leaders’
international objectives. A wide range of FOA programs in British Guiana began in May 1954
and continued under the ICA when it replaced the FOA in 1955. Significantly, Eisenhower
explained to Secretary Dulles that the ICA was necessary because the FOA was “regarded by
many as merely a temporary unit of Government, established solely to meet certain short-term
economic and military requirements.” The ICA, Eisenhower noted, reflected the recognition that
“the functions and the need for cooperative development of economic and military strength
among the free nations are continuing and integral parts of the fabric of our international
relations.”100
Despite Eisenhower’s ideals, scholars and contemporaries generally agree that the
administration’s foreign aid programs failed to promote effective economic development in the
Third World.101 Likewise, the FOA, ICA, and later the American Institute of Free Labor
Development (AIFLD), failed to solidify a position for reformist, pro-U.S. trade unions in British
Guiana. Dennis FitzGerald, Deputy Director of the FOA and the most consistent administrator in
its successor organizations, argued that FOA officials thought that the State Department looked
99
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upon the aid agencies “as just a kind of convenient device by which you avoided the whole
responsibility for anything that went wrong” while “order[ing] it to do what the State Department
wanted done.” FitzGerald also reflected that the administration’s perspective on technical
assistance grew increasingly cynical by the late 1950s.102 FOA and ICA programs in British
Guiana overwhelmingly targeted development in PPP strongholds to undermine the Jagans’
support. Nonetheless, institution-building programs in the field of organized labor provided
crucial funding to the MPCA and later the BGTUC. Tello’s and Ishmael’s participation in ICA
programs between 1954 and 1957 established important connections between Guianese and
American trade unionists that played a central role in the third phase of Guianese institutional
decolonization after 1962. Connections between Guianese and American trade unionists
remained after the ICA suspended its programs in British Guiana after elections in 1957 returned
the PPP to power and the initial contract to run operations through the University of Maryland
expired.103
Anglo-American Institution Building
British and American labor and political leaders and their representatives in international
labor organizations initiated a variety of institution-building projects in British Guiana beginning
in mid-1954, intensifying in early 1955, and drawing down between 1957 and 1958 after failing
to alter the colony’s political outlook.104 British officials resisted American influence over
British Guiana’s institutional development, complicating attempts to coordinate institution102
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building efforts. However, financial weakness limited British capabilities and American financial
strength increasingly allowed the AFL-CIO and State Department to influence British Guiana in
the mid-1950s. Moreover, colonial officials reappraised policies in British Guiana at the same
time the Suez Crisis exposed British vulnerability on the international stage. However, as
Stephen Rabe argues, British retreat from institution building in British Guiana began at the
same time as the Suez Crisis and was not a consequence of the debacle.105
A variety of important developments unfolded in British Guiana between 1954 and 1957
before institution-building efforts tapered off. Among the most important were the MPCA’s
acquisition of a check-off system on sugar estates, the affiliation of several Guianese unions with
ORIT, CADORIT, and the ICFTU, and the development of important relationships between proWestern Guianese leaders and British and American trade union and political leaders.
Authoritarian British rule in Guiana limited opposition to Western institution-building efforts
between 1954 and August 1957. Nonetheless, the Jagan faction of the PPP, with brief assistance
from the WFTU, resisted Anglo-American institution building and sought to advance its
representatives in Guianese trade unions.
At a session of the ORIT Executive Committee in January 1954, committee members
passed a resolution condemning colonial administrators’ slow and insufficient efforts to improve
working and living conditions in British Guiana. ORIT representatives suggested that inaction
created an opening for communists to use the banner of anti-colonialism to “deform the will of
non-independent peoples” in the Western Hemisphere. The committee resolved to provide
greater assistance and help create the conditions necessary for self-government.106 Anglo-
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American labor leaders supported the Colonial Office’s decision to suspend the Waddington
Constitution as a necessary measure that provided the opportunity to improve Guianese
economic and social conditions and build viable, pro-Western trade unions, though the AFL-CIO
and Western international labor organizations occasionally criticized British institution-building
efforts as ineffective.107 Thus, regional labor leaders articulated a commitment to strengthening
pro-Western trade unions and integrating them into ORIT.
At the same time, the WFTU defended Guianese leaders who advocated lessened
Guianese integration into the Western system. The Waddington Constitution’s suspension
eliminated the possibility of direct affiliation of the PPP-aligned GIWU to the WFTU; however,
the limited but important relationship between the left-wing of the PPP and the communist labor
international continued into 1954. British officials expressed deep concern regarding WFTU
support for the PPP in international forums and moderate Guianese leaders continued to warn
that the WFTU’s influence in the colony represented a formidable threat.108
In March 1954 the WFTU filed a complaint against the British government to the
Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) alleging that British actions in British Guiana
violated trade union rights and were part of a general attack on the rights and freedoms of the
Guianese population.109 Specifically, the WFTU criticized British censorship of the
organization’s literature sent to the colony. The British government generally considered
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“blanket” banning of literature in its territories indefensible and specific legislation in British
Guiana only allowed for individual pieces of literature to be withheld; however, officials made
an exception in the case of WFTU publications entering the colony. Colonial governor Alfred
Savage’s December 1953 ban on WFTU material argued that WFTU literature was Soviet
propaganda and not trade union material, echoing former MPCA General Secretary and
Legislative Council Member Lionel Luckhoo’s 1952 subversive literature law.110 Oliver
Lyttleton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, supported the measure despite Prime Minister
Winston Churchill’s skepticism regarding the measure’s necessity.111
British officials also contested the WFTU’s allegation that Savage’s censorship violated
Guianese unions’ right to affiliate with the international organization of their choosing since no
Guianese union was formally affiliated to the WFTU.112 However, colonial officials and TUC
leaders cited informal connections between the WFTU and colonial unions as evidence of
communist infiltration and used them to justify actions against the unions.113 Finally, colonial
officials argued that British Guiana’s colonial status precluded the protection of trade union
rights under International Labor Organization (ILO) rules.114 However, a retrospective TUC
report noted that the Colonial Office and TUC established the Commonwealth Advisory
Committee in 1937 “to improve the conditions of workers in the colonies, in part through the
application of the ILO Conventions.”115 Therefore, British officials created a circular and
paradoxical defense that rationalized inhibiting all Guianese connections with the WFTU as a
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means of minimizing Eastern-bloc contacts and assuring Guianese unions’ integration into
Western labor organizations.
Delegates at the ILO convention in November 1954 dismissed the WFTU’s complaint
arguing that Savage’s ban was a political action undertaken to deal with local circumstances and
not a violation of trade union rights.116 Nonetheless, several Guianese unions continued their
loose association with the communist-international. In early 1954 the GIWU sent a message of
support to Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala at the urging of the WFTU and the BGLU requested that
the reformed BGTUC rescind its ban on unions affiliated to the WFTU.117 Ultimately the failed
protest in the UN weakened the positions of the GIWU and the WFTU in British Guiana.118
Despite the WFTU’s diminished influence in the colony, British and American labor
leaders expressed concern that the communist international was intensifying its programs.
Anglo-American institution-building increased as a result of suspicions that the WFTU was
using relationships between communist parties and democratic trade unions in underdeveloped
countries to promote Soviet foreign policy.119 Serafino Romualdi, the AFL representative to
ORIT, visited British Guiana for four days in April 1954 to determine the state of trade unionism
in the colony and reported his findings to George Meany and ICFTU General Secretary J.H.
Oldenbroek. Romualdi noted that various forms of assistance from the ICFTU, ORIT, TUC,
AFL, and United States Information Service (USIS) helped the MPCA survive in the midst of the
116
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colony’s political turmoil and in the face of challenges from the rival GIWU. Romualdi strongly
urged, as did George Woodcock of the TUC who visited British Guiana the previous week, that
ORIT or the ICFTU provide a trade union advisor to help build the movement among the rankand-file. Romualdi criticized the “second string individuals” leading the anti-communist labor
movement and concluded that there remained a dire need for external training of Guianese
unionists since almost the entire labor force of the colony still supported leaders suspected of
being communists.120 Romualdi’s contemporaries in the Western international labor movement
also took action in British Guiana. CADORIT Secretary Ken Sterling and Charles Millard, acting
National Director of the Steelworkers’ Union of Canada, traveled to British Guiana to facilitate
affiliation between the British Guiana Mine Workers’ Union and the Canadian union in early
1954.121
High-ranking American policymakers finalized plans for operations in British Guiana
while Romualdi visited the colony. On April 23 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained
FOA plans to send Guianese trainees to Puerto Rico in a letter to William Maddox, the American
Consul General in Trinidad tasked with overseeing British Guiana.122 The British and American
governments agreed to terms for the initiation of a variety of technical assistance programs in
June, though Dulles noted that FOA personnel began cooperating with interested Guianese prior
to the official agreement. FOA programs began immediately and according to Dulles were “well
underway” by August.123 The State Department expected technical assistance in British Guiana
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to continue until June 30, 1959 but allowed for early termination with thirty days-notice
depending on local developments.124 The initial FOA programs ignored institution-building and
complemented Colonial Office plans to use economic development to undermine the PPP’s
appeal. However, Romualdi and Ernst Schwarz, the CIO’s Latin American representative, helped
draft a labor program for British Guiana as FOA programs expanded in the colony in early
1955.125
At the same time FOA programs began in late June 1954, Robert Alexander returned to
the United States from a fact-finding trip in Latin America. Alexander sent a copy of his findings
to Jay Lovestone and Lovestone forwarded the report Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), the
AFL’s covert anti-communist arm. Alexander argued that the suspension of the Waddington
Constitution created an opportunity to build the MPCA because “the fight to displace the PPP
will be decided in the trade union field” and that it was crucial to move quickly in strengthening
the PPP’s opponents. Alexander warned that international support for anti-PPP trade unions
since the suspension was insufficient and time was being wasted. He encouraged the AFL and
ORIT to provide financial assistance to the MPCA since the union’s finances were dependent on
Booker Brothers’ advertising. Alexander argued that the MPCA required financial independence
from Booker Brothers to initiate a militant union campaign and gain workers’ support. Finally,
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Alexander recommended that the FTUC send propaganda that emphasized anti-communism
while providing material on how to run a trade union.126
British planning for Guianese institution-building increased in the summer of 1954 as
well. Alfred Savage informed the Colonial Office in June that he considered the development of
non-communist, pro-British trade unionism a matter “of paramount importance.” Savage warned
of vulnerability in the sugar industry; however, he suggested that the industry was open to British
influence since the MPCA and GIWU remained insolvent.127 After consulting Woodcock and
Romualdi, Savage concluded that Guianese unions required the presence of British trade union
leadership and in June he requested that the TUC supply an exceptionally respected unionist to
advise Guianese unions for an extended period.128 Acting on his advice, representatives of the
Colonial Office approached the TUC to discuss expanding efforts in the field of organized labor
in June. Five members of the Colonial Office met with Woodcock on July 1 to deliberate on how
to most effectively build Guianese trade unionism.129 Woodcock and colonial officials outlined
general ideas for a program of assistance and established a formal agreement for cooperation in
July.130
British institution-building in Guiana expanded to include employers later in the summer.
In August the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, held a series of talks
with the TUC and Overseas Employers’ Federation (OEF) in which he encouraged increased
non-governmental cooperation in developing colonial trade unions and underscored the
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importance of colonial institution-building.131 Colonial Office, TUC, and OEF collaboration in
supporting the MPCA between 1954 and 1957 contributed considerably to the process of
institution building. Together, British governmental, business, and workers’ organizations
cooperated to protect British investors and promote pro-British capitalism in British Guiana.
In contrast to the FOA’s emphasis on organized labor’s acceptance of official policy,
N.D. Watson of the Colonial Office emphasized the importance of allowing the TUC to act
independently of British policy even if TUC autonomy occasionally led to decisions with which
that the Colonial Office disproved.132 The TUC sometimes exercised its independence in
implementing the program as was the case when British trade unionists rejected Savage’s
suggestion of encouraging amalgamation between the GIWU and MPCA. At the same time, the
Colonial Office consistently coordinated efforts with Woodcock and TUC General Secretary
Vincent Tewson. Moreover, colonial officials developed covert means to provide financing for
TUC expenses through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. TUC leaders described the
relationship with the British officials as beneficial; however, Woodcock and Tewson emphasized
the need to obscure connections between their organization and the Colonial Office. Specifically,
Woodcock and Tewson argued that the PPP and British trade unionists opposed to the project
would use evidence of collaboration with the colonial office to undermine the program.133 Thus,
the TUC and Colonial Office coordinated their efforts and trade unionists’ plan did not challenge
broad governmental objectives despite rhetoric to the contrary.

131

N.L. Mayle to Alfred Savage, August 4, 1954, CO 859-773, BNA.
N.D. Watson, Colonial Office Minute, October 12, 1954, CO 859-773, BNA.
133
N.A. Mayle, Colonial Office Minute to Mr. Rogers and Mr. Watson, December 23, 1954, CO 859-773, BNA;
“Note of Meeting to Discuss Trade Unionism in British Guiana,” July 1, 1954, CO 859-773, BNA; N.L. Mayle to
Alfred Savage, August 4, 1954, CO 859-773, BNA; N.D. Watson to Sir T. Lloyd and N.L. Mayle, December 16,
1954, CO 859-773, BNA; Trades Union Congress, “Colonial Work of the T.U.C.,” June 6, 1956, Marjorie
Nicholson Files, Box 15, Trade Unions+Colonies, TUCLC; Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 51-52.
132

267

TUC leaders expressed agreement with their counterparts in the Colonial Office, as well
as American labor leaders and policymakers, that the PPP’s removal created an opportunity to
build Western institutions in British Guiana.134 In July the TUC General Council agreed to make
Guiana the first territory to receive direct financial assistance from British trade unionists,
initiating what it considered its “most important major attempt to help an individual union,” the
“special effort made to establish an effective trade union in the British Guiana sugar industry.”135
The TUC General Council allocated £3,000 ($8,600) to support organizing efforts in British
Guiana, giving the colony a third of all financial aid distributed for colonial territories as part of a
larger prioritization of the Caribbean area.136 TUC leaders justified the effort by arguing that
British West Indian trade unions were the most advanced in the colonies. More importantly, the
General Council expressed a desire to use institution-building in British Guiana as a model for
the rest of the Empire.137 According to Stephen Rabe, TUC funding for the MPCA totaled about
$15,000 when it was distributed in the first six months of 1955.138
At its meeting in December, the Council offered to send Andrew Dalgleish, a retired
TUC official with experience advising colonial unions in Africa and the Middle East, to advise
Guianese unions. The TUC offered to pay Dalgleish’s expenses and agreed to provide further
funding for MPCA organization.139 TUC leaders coordinated their decision with the highest
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ranking colonial officials. After coming to a decision, Tewson assured Lennox-Boyd that
Dalgleish was an extraordinary choice for “the most difficult mission which we have ever asked
a person to undertake.”140 Meanwhile, George Woodcock sent a detailed explanation to N.L.
Mayle in the Colonial Office and assured him that the General Council would determine the
allocation of TUC funding in British Guiana. Thus, TUC leaders limited the degree to which the
Guianese unions, or even Dalgleish, could challenge official objectives. Woodcock also
reassured Mayle that Dalgleish would stay in touch with British officials in Guiana while
remaining “at arms-length” to avoid appearing too closely associated with the British appointed
Guianese government.141 Tewson, Woodcock, and Lennox-Boyd met again on January 10 to
discuss the TUC’s plans for British Guiana before Woodcock left for the colony to initiate the
program.142
British and American efforts to build the Guianese trade union movement intensified in
early 1955 in conjunction with Ishmael’s re-election as President of the MPCA and Shakoor’s
resignation as General Secretary.143 Woodcock and Dalgleish visited British Guiana in January
to gather information and finalize the TUC program. Initially, the TUC provided funding for the
General Secretary and an Assistant General Secretary of the MPCA and helped organize six
Regional Officers.144 The Colonial Office encouraged efforts to institutionalize the labor
movement’s participation in government as well. Specifically, Governor Savage established a
Give Advice,” and “£3,000 British T.U.C. Grant for MPCA,” February 21-March 1, 1955, F2384, British Guiana,
Guiana Diary, 1955 Jan to 1957 Jun, TUCLC; Rabe U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 52.
140
Vincent Tewson to Alan Lennox-Boyd, December 16, 1954, CO 859-773, BNA.
141
George Woodcock to N.L. Mayle, December 23, 1954, CO 859-773, BNA.
142
N.L. Mayle to Mr. Stacpoole, January 11, 1955, CO 859-773, BNA.
143
British Guiana Government Information Services, Guiana Diary, “Mr. R. Ishmael Re-elected President of
M.P.C.A.,” February 22-25, “M.P.C.A. General Secretary Tenders Resignation,” March 2-5, 1955, F2384, British
Guiana, Guiana Diary, 1955 Jan to 1957 Jun, TUCLC.1955, F2384, British Guiana, Guiana Diary, 1955 Jan to 1957
Jun, TUCLC.
144
Secretary of State for the Colonies to Alfred Savage, March 13, 1955, CO 859-773, BNA; British Guiana
Government Information Services, Guiana Diary, “T.U.C. Advisor Returns to B.G.,” November 17-20, 1955,
F2384, British Guiana, Guiana Diary, 1955 Jan to 1957 Jun, TUCLC; TUC Pamphlet, “What the TUC is Doing,”
Spring 1956, Trade Unions and Colonies 932.5, Box 15, Marjorie Nicholson Files, TUCLC.

269

labor advisory board that included various trade unions and important unionists, including
Ashton Chase, the former PPP Minister of Labor. In doing so, the Colonial Office expressed
hope that it could coordinate colonial policy, legislative efforts, and the TUC’s support for the
MPCA into a systemically strong capitalist labor movement.145
During his visit Woodcock explained the TUC plan to the BGTUC and met with the
SPA, Chamber of Commerce, and Shipping Association, arguing that employers could only
avoid legislative interference in labor problems if the colony developed strong trade unions. The
sugar producers acknowledged that they would have difficulty securing cooperation from some
estate managers but agreed to support the program. However, the Chamber of Commerce and
Shipping Association resisted Woodcock’s proposal and the Shipping Association refused to
negotiate with the Forbes Burnham-led BGLU.146 Moreover, N.L. Mayle lamented in a letter to
Alfred Savage that the Guianese press “misinterpret[ed]” British actions as merely anticommunist.147
During his extended visits to British Guiana in 1955 and 1956 Dalgleish advised
Guianese unionists to focus on industrial questions and refrain from political connections.148
Dalgleish also met with Robert Alexander to discuss the MPCA’s progress, keeping the AFL-
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CIO informed as to the TUC’s plans and analysis of the situation.149 The MPCA used British
funding and advice to create regional offices and invite applications for a five-week training
course in industrial relations conducted through the University College of the West Indies. 150
Kenedon Steins, the American Vice Consul in Trinidad, reported optimistically on the TUC
effort to the State Department, though he expressed minor concern that TUC assistance might be
“bungled by mismanagement” or backfire as a result of excessive interference in MPCA
affairs.151
The TUC General Council discussed its program in British Guiana at the TUC Annual
Meeting in September 1955. Woodcock explained his study’s conclusions and the TUC plans for
British Guiana, noting that institution-building depended on organizational efforts and training
more so than financial aid. However, Woodcock suggested that seasonal fluctuations in the
Guianese labor force and the wide dispersal of plantations made the sugar industry an exception
to general policy and he suggested that there could be no expectation of financial stability for
unions dependent on plantation employment. The General Council accepted Woodcock’s
assessment; however, some members in attendance disagreed with his analysis. W.P. Blair of the
Electrical Trades Union argued that the TUC’s financial support of the MPCA amounted to
taking sides in a dispute between rival unions and that doing so was harmful to the trade union
movement in British Guiana as well as in Great Britain. Blair cited the Robertson Commission
report, which acknowledged the legitimacy of several GIWU accusations against the MPCA,
specifically its weakness and subservience to employers. Blair argued that workers were justified
149
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in supporting the GIWU and that the Council erred in choosing the MPCA as the organization on
which to build an effective trade union movement. Nonetheless, the TUC agreed to allocate
British funds for MPCA field officers and organizational equipment with the objective of
displacing the GIWU and establishing a viable sugar union aligned with British labor.152
Like the TUC, the AFL-CIO expanded its efforts in British Guiana in early 1955. The
FOA Office of Labor Affairs developed a labor program for British Guiana in January in
consultation with Romualdi and Schwarz.153 While emphasizing the need for immediate
attention, the program articulated short-term and long-term objectives, beginning with a six to
eight week labor seminar in Georgetown financed through the FOA. American labor leaders
insisted on including a clause in the proposal calling for coordination with the TUC and possibly
the Colonial Welfare and Development Board. The FOA program also stressed the need for
Schwarz’s and Romualdi’s participation as lecturers at the seminar.154 FOA labor officials
anticipated using the seminar to assist American labor leaders in selecting Guianese unionists for
further training in the United States.155 The planned person-to-person exchange was part of the
broader FOA labor program expected to directly counteract communist influence and infiltration
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in developing countries.156 Eugene Clay, the FOA’s Director for the Northern Division of Latin
America, forwarded the proposal to Savage, on January 10.157
Despite the appeal for cooperation and initial optimism about the program, colonial
officials’ expressed strong reluctance to allowing increased American influence over the
development of colonial institutions and general concern about conflicting British and American
interests in the colony.158 On April 12, N.L. Mayle questioned the proposal’s desirability as a
result of the “American influence that will be exercised over the proposed course.”159 LennoxBoyd forwarded a summary of Mayle’s concerns to Savage on May 10 and suggested that the
Colonial Office needed to see the final proposal before officially contacting the TUC.160 Mayle’s
detailed response to Savage on May 16 noted the Colonial Office’s “extreme apprehension about
the risk of possible influence of American lecturers in the trade union field in British Guiana.”
Mayle noted that the Colonial Office did not want to jeopardize relations with the FOA and
acknowledged that flatly rejecting the labor program was unlikely from an official perspective
because of the importance of preserving strong Anglo-American diplomatic relations. Woodcock
shared Mayle’s position on behalf of the TUC.161
Mayle was adamant that trade union training should remain “firmly in British hands;”
however, he suggested calling on the FOA to provide necessary financing. He emphasized the
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need for British trade unionists to use the seminar as a means of developing the Guianese unions
based on British trade union methods and suggested that Schwarz and Romualdi might
participate for a limited time as visiting speakers while the TUC provided the primary lecturers.
Mayle also suggested that the Colonial Office would approve the program after adjustments
addressed British concerns and if it eliminated the proposal to send Guianese unionists to the
United States or Great Britain after the seminar.162 Specifically, Mayle and Woodcock argued
that the additional expense involved in sending Guianese unionists to Great Britain could be
inhibiting since the TUC was already financing a program in British Guiana.
More importantly, Mayle suggested that Guianese unionists needed to remain in the
colony to effectively build their organizations from the ground up, a criticism that is illuminating
since it was echoed inside the FOA.163 George Delaney, International Representative of the AFL,
argued that FOA labor programs would be more efficient if American trade unionists worked in
other countries. Moreover, Delaney suggested that bringing foreign unionists to the United States
mirrored communist methods in addition to being ineffective.164 Similarly, Dennis FitzGerald,
Deputy Director of the FOA, argued in an oral history taken in 1976 that the Eisenhower
administration’s emphasis on training foreign technicians in the United States rather than sending
American technicians to foreign countries inhibited FOA and ICA programs’ effectiveness.165
The tactical disagreement created minor tension between British and American officials as well
as between some American trade unionists and United States government officials. Nonetheless,
efforts to advance the program continued and compromises allowed it to move forward.

162

N.L. Mayle to Alfred Savage, May 16, 1955, CO 859-773, BNA.
N.L. Mayle to Alfred Savage, March 9, 1955, CO 859-773, BNA.
164
Foreign Operations Administration Labor Committee, Labor Committee Meeting Summary Minutes, January 25,
1955, RG 18-007, International Affairs Department (CIO), Director’s Files (Mike Ross), 1945-1955, Agencies SubSeries 4: Foreign Operations Administration, Box 3, FOA Labor Committee: Minutes, 1955, GMMA.
165
Interview with Dennis FitzGerald by Dr. Thomas Soapes, May 26, 1976, DDEL.
163

274

Mayle’s response to the FOA labor program on behalf of the Colonial Office is
illuminating in several additional ways. It suggests that British officials expected to retain
influence in post-colonial areas through institutional structures while acknowledging Britain’s
financial limitations in the process of decolonization. TUC leaders echoed official concerns
acknowledging the need for programs to counter WFTU influence while expressing fear that lack
of funds enfeebled their efforts. Specifically, TUC leaders expressed concern that inconsistent
funding led to incomplete programs that irritated colonial labor and made matters worse.166
Furthermore, Mayle’s response suggests that American institution-building efforts in colonial
territories inherently extended American influence through institutional mechanisms. Colonial
officials suggested pursuing a two-pronged effort with the TUC program focused on institutionbuilding and the FOA education program helping undermine Communist and WFTU influence in
the colony.167 Financial issues and debates about trade union methods continued as AngloAmerican institution-building evolved in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Over time, Guianese
unionists became caught in the middle, expressing a desire to perpetuate British trade union
practices while increasingly dependent on American financial assistance.
American officials expressed sympathy for British concerns and Dulles instructed
American representatives in the Caribbean to refrain from initiating the program until the TUC
sent assurances that they did not view the project “as an intrusion on its functions by the U.S.
Government.” Dulles expected that adjustments to the program after further consultations with
British officials and ORIT representatives and he sent an updated version of the proposal
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addressing Mayle’s concerns in May.168 American involvement in British Guiana advanced in
other areas while officials discussed the details of the FOA proposal. In April USIS finalized
plans to build a reading room in the basement of the old consulate to provide material, including
trade union films and literature. British officials agreed to the program despite strong
apprehension about its being directed from Trinidad rather than by officials involved in the dayto-day affairs of the Guianese, as well as the possibility that Guianese confronted with American
wealth would become disillusioned with their own situation.169
After an Executive Order replaced the FOA with the ICA in May 1955, William Maddox,
the American Consul General in Trinidad, informed the State Department that Savage placed
“great value” on the project and encouraged that the plan move forward. Maddox agreed with
State Department plans to identify left-wing PPP activists and exclude them from training.
However, he acknowledged that there would be a possible advantage to “including an ‘insecure’
person or so in the seminar,” suggesting that the Consul general considered the possibility that
institution-building programs could spread American labor ideals.170 Maddox’s tentative
acknowledgement that the trade union movement might benefit from collaboration between
Guianese leaders of opposing political views represented a rare occasion in which an American
official suggested engagement with the PPP’s left-wing. Nonetheless, American government
officials and policymakers in some circles echoed Maddox’s hesitant recommendation of
cooperation with the PPP several times in the ensuing years, suggesting that American
governmental officials did not fully agree about how to most effectively confront Cheddi Jagan
168

Department of State Instruction to Port-of-Spain and USOM, Georgetown, “Proposed Seminar in Workers’
Education in British Guiana,” May 27, 1955, 841D.06-5-2755, Box 4451, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1955-1959,
NARA II; Rabe, U.S Intervention in British Guiana, 56.
169
William Maddox to Department of State, April 13, 1955, 122.413/4-1355, Box 717, RG 59, Central Decimal
File, 1955-1959, NARA II.
170
William Maddox to Department of State, June 7, 1955, 841D.06/6-755, Box 4451, RG 59, Central Decimal File,
1955-1959, NARA II; “Proposed Seminar in Workers’ Education in British Guiana,” May 27, 1955, 841D.06-52755, Box 4451, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 1955-1959, NARA II.

276

in the late 1950s. Just as significantly, there is no evidence that American labor leaders shared
Maddox’s perspective or considered working with members of the PPP. Thus, American labor
leaders’ opposed Cheddi Jagan earlier and more definitively than government officials and used
their influence in the United States to promote opposition leaders. Ultimately, AFL-CIO pressure
contributed to the Kennedy administration’s conclusion to support covert action and diplomatic
pressure to remove Jagan beginning in 1962.171
Stassen cabled FOA operatives on June 24 and explained that development needed to be
coordinated with Dalgleish since the TUC held primary responsibility for implementing the labor
program. Additionally, Dalgleish was also expected to commit to a full-time teaching role during
the seminar.172 Woodcock assured the United States Labor Attaché in Trinidad that the TUC
would approve cooperation; however, he disagreed with the FOA proposal that ORIT should
participate in selecting the program’s candidates. Woodcock argued that Dalgleish and Ramphal
were most familiar with the local situation in British Guiana and should be responsible for
determining the participants.173 The ICA eventually implemented the proposed FOA program in
1956; however, as early as September 1955 Dulles expressed a “lack of interest in the
Caribbean” and the State Department committed to gradually “tapering off” aid programs in the
British West Indies.174
Thus, British and American labor and political leaders collaborated in pursuing
institution-building in British Guiana despite British concerns about expanding American
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influence over Guianese institutional structures and disagreements regarding the most effective
tactics to employ in the colony. The TUC most consistently worked to build Guianese trade
unions but financial limitations restricted the extent of solely British programs. American trade
union leaders campaigned for greater involvement in the colony but American government
officials constrained AFL-CIO efforts to allow the TUC to play the primary role in the colony
and to preserve diplomatic collaboration with Great Britain. Moreover, American government
officials hoped to achieve political objectives through economic development programs with
minimal investment in the field of organized labor.175
Guianese Activism and Internationalism
British and American institution-building efforts focused on strengthening selected
Guianese unions and institutionalizing the colony’s labor movement. Consequently, British and
American programs tried to increase grassroots support for the MPCA through improved
organization while training unionists to effectively negotiate with employers for improved
wages, benefits, and working conditions. Moreover, institution-building efforts provided the
MPCA with financial stability with the expectation that the union’s fiscal independence would
increase as membership grew.
Anglo-American institution-building efforts contained a final and crucial feature, the
integration of Guianese trade unionists into Western international labor organizations. Several
Guianese labor leaders enthusiastically cooperated with the Anglo-American institution-building
efforts, particularly in seeking integration with the ICFTU, ORIT, and CADORIT. In early April
175
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1954, as Anglo-American institution-building efforts began in British Guiana, the MPCA sent
Richard Ishmael and Rupert Tello to a CADORIT conference in Trinidad. Ishmael also attended
an ORIT conference in Costa Rica later that month and an ICFTU conference in May.176
BGTUC President A.T. Gibson joined the MPCA members at the Trinidad conference.177
Guianese labor leaders’ use of international connections in early 1954 remained consistent
between 1954 and 1957 and considerably influenced the labor movement’s development during
the period. However, Guianese labor leaders engaged in local struggles as well in seeking to
develop their organizations.
Ishmael, the MPCA president, used his connections to the American labor movement to
offset the costs of travel to the ORIT conference in Costa Rica in 1954. During the meeting,
Ishmael appealed to regional trade unionists for greater assistance for workers in British Guiana
though his speech focused on themes of particular concern to American trade union leaders.178
Ishmael acknowledged that aid from the ICFTU and ORIT strengthened his organization and
emphasized his pride in the MPCA’s association with “the free trade union movement and the
free world against the unrelenting and viscous onslaught of world communism.” However,
Ishmael suggested that assuaging Caribbean workers’ frustrations and defeating communism’s
appeal required greater assistance from international trade union organizations to facilitate

176

British Guiana Government Information Services, Guiana Diary, “M.P.C.A. Selects Representatives for ORIT
Talks,” March 2-5, 1955, F2384, British Guiana, Guiana Diary, 1955 Jan to 1957 Jun, TUCLC; British Guiana
Government Information Services, Guiana Diary, “Hon’ble R.C. Tello Re-elected President of B.M.U.,” April 7-10,
1955, F2384, British Guiana, Guiana Diary, 1955 Jan to 1957 Jun, TUCLC; “A Note on MPCA Developments,”
April 1955, CO 859-773, BNA.
177
British Guiana Government Information Services, Guiana Diary, “Labor Leaders for Trinidad Conference,” April
3-6, 1955, F2384, British Guiana, Guiana Diary, 1955 Jan to 1957 Jun, TUCLC.
178
Robert Alexander to Serafino Romualdi, April 11, 1955 and Asela Hernandez, ORIT Secretary to Robert
Alexander, April 18, 1955 (translated by author), RG 18-009, International Affairs Department, Staff Files, Serafino
Romualdi’s Files, 1945-1961, Box 3, Alexander, Robert J., 1955, GMMA.

279

Guianese unions’ integration into a Western labor network.179 Dalgleish assumed some of
Ishmael’s duties in the MPCA to facilitate Guianese participation in the 1954 international
conference and Ishmael’s subsequent visits to Great Britain and the United States.180
Ishmael and Tello’s efforts contributed to the ICFTU and CADORIT decision to hold a
conference of Sugar and Plantation Workers in British Guiana in early August that was widely
attended and lauded by regional labor leaders. The conference examined plantation workers’
social and economic status while stressing the importance of collaborative efforts between
workers, managers, and employers in supporting the capitalist system.181 Having increased
connections with Western labor internationals, the MPCA claimed responsibility for a one-day
strike on the sugar estates in the fall of 1955 to generate support among field workers. BGLU
president Forbes Burnham suggested that the strike was a “clever success” since workers began
walking off the job before the MPCA issued a strike call.182 Regardless of whether the MPCA
initiated or reacted to the walk-off, the union enhanced its image as a result of the protest.
Moreover, the MPCA’s international connections increased and its fiscal and organizational
position slowly improved in late 1955.
While MPCA leaders increased cooperation with international labor organizations and
British and American institution-building projects, the GIWU’s left-coalition collapsed and
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altered the nature of decolonization efforts among organized labor. In February 1955 the PPP
split into two factions, one led by Cheddi and Janet Jagan and the other by Forbes Burnham.
Conflicts over political ideology, personal rivalry between Burnham and the Jagans, racial
tensions inherent in the considerably segregated nature of Guianese employment, and British
attempts to create a schism in the party all contributed to the division.183 Regardless of the
reasons, the separation led to British and especially American support for the Burnham faction
and increasingly intensified racial politics.184 American labor leaders were among the most
consistent and most vocal of Burnham’s Anglo-American political supporters; however, they
wavered in their views of Burnham in the context of the Guianese labor movement. Robert
Alexander reported to Jay Lovestone in February 1956 that Burnham “is someone with whom we
can work,” a view generally unchallenged in American labor circles. Nonetheless, American
labor leaders strongly supported Rupert Tello’s faction in the BGTUC, a block of labor leaders
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who conflicted with what CADORIT leaders referred to as the “Burnham-Ishmael-[Andrew]
Jackson block.”185
Most significantly, differences of political ideology and international alignment split the
PPP and decimated the left coalition’s efforts in the organized labor movement. GIWU President
J.P. Lachmansingh aligned the union with the PPP’s Burnham faction, which Burnham portrayed
as a center-left coalition opposed to association with the Eastern-bloc. Burnham’s faction, which
became the People’s National Congress (PNC) after the 1957 elections, claimed that the Jagan
faction was made up of doctrinaire Marxists committed to international communism rather than
Guianese nationalism. The GIWU continued to exist until at least 1959; however, the majority of
sugar workers remained loyal to the Jagan faction of the PPP.186 Despite the support, the Jagan
faction had no labor organization with which to organize sugar workers and lost further ground
in the labor movement when Cheddi Jagan resigned as president of the Sawmill Workers’ Union
(SWU) amidst controversy in late 1955.187 As a result, the Jagan faction shifted strategies and

185

Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, 57-58; Robert Alexander to Jay Lovestone, February 14, 1956, RG 18003: International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files, 1944-1973, Box 3, Alexander, Robert, 1955, GMMA;
CADORIT Information Bulletin, October 1956, RG 18-009: International Affairs Department Staff Files: Serafino
Romualdi’s Files, 1945-1961, Box 1, Caribbean Area, 1953-1956, GMMA. Tello also disagreed strongly with
Burnham’s attempt to affiliate the BGTUC to the PNC. See: A. John Cope to Department of State, August 15, 1958,
841D.062/8-1558, Central Decimal Files, Box 4814, RG 59, NARA II.
186
Robert Alexander interview with J.P. Lachmansingh, February 4, 1956, RG 18-003: International Affairs
Department, Jay Lovestone Files, 1944-1973, Box 3, Alexander, Robert, 1955, GMMA; Patrick Renison to
Secretary of State for the Colonies, “Report of the Proceedings of the Registrar of Trade Unions,” September 29,
1959, CO 859/1151, BNA. The Burnham-faction of the PPP publicly argued that their split with the Jagan-faction
grew out of disagreement over the desire of some party members to prioritize “an international reputation for being
communists” at the expense of the nationalist struggle. See also: Forbes Burnham, “Where do we go from here?”
Thunder, April 16, 1955 in C.A. Nascimento R.A. Burrowes, eds., Forbes Burnham, A Destiny to Mould: Selected
Speeches by the Prime Minister of Guyana (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970), 3-8.
187
“Eastern Caribbean and British Guiana Security Review,” October 1-December 31, 1955, CO 1035-16; Robert
Alexander, “Communist Power Cracks in British Guiana,” undated (June 1956); Robert Alexander to Jay Lovestone,
February 14, 1956; Robert Alexander interview with Alfred Thorne, Assistant Professor of Economics at University
of Puerto Rico, January 28, 1956; Robert Alexander interview with Mr. Adams, Labor Inspector, February 5, 1956;
Robert Alexander with Rupert Tello, February 4-5, 1956; Robert Alexander interview with Eric Huntley, February
4, 1956, RG 18-003: International Affairs Department, Jay Lovestone Files, 1944-1973, Box 3, Alexander, Robert,
1955, GMMA.

282

encouraged workers to join the MPCA while organizing efforts to have PPP men ascend to
prominent positions in the organization.188
Colonial officials expressed considerable concern about the possibility of Jagan faction
integration with the MPCA. Savage’s letters to Lennox-Boyd altered between warnings that the
Jagans were infiltrating the MPCA with Ishmael’s assistance to dismissals of the reports as
rumors promoted by the Burnham faction.189 Rivalry between MPCA leadership and the Jagan
faction contributed to a political disconnect between union leadership and the rank-and-file in the
sugar industry. Despite conflict over control of the union, the MPCA and PPP pursued some
similar domestic policies. In November 1956, for example, the MPCA requested the Governor
initiate a plan to acquire sugar companies’ unused land for redistribution to ease the frustrations
of impoverished workers.190 Cheddi Jagan’s writings argued for similar land redistribution and
Jagan advocated those policies in the Legislative Council early in his political career.191 The PPP
split did not alter Anglo-American efforts to build the MPCA since the GIWU retained its
sympathy for the WFTU and it was unclear whether Lachmansingh would be able to command
the support of sugar workers absent an alliance with Jagan.192
The BGTUC continued its reorganization while the MPCA and TUC collaborated to
build a sugar union and the GIWU disintegrated. The BGTUC promoted a fifteen minute weekly
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radio broadcast to explain its purpose and functions beginning in late November 1955 and
obtained affiliation to the ICFTU on January 1, 1956, after the MPCA joined the BGTUC.193
Moreover, the BGTUC grew considerably, increasing from a five-union membership in April
1955 to twenty-five unions and up to 21,000 members in early 1956. The union held an eight-day
training conference for its expanded membership in February 1956.194 Nonetheless, Tello
requested that Romualdi send education and propaganda material to counter “subversive
literature” infiltrating the colony. He also pleaded for financial assistance claiming that his
organization had no funding and that he personally paid ORIT and ICFTU affiliation fees.
Moreover, Tello noted that TUC funds were allocated for the MPCA and that ICFTU assistance
was slow in forthcoming. Consequently, Tello warned that the BGTUC required American aid to
address its fragile financial position.195 Romualdi contacted John D. Connors, Director of the
AFL-CIO Department of Education to request the American union send propaganda material to
Tello, though Romualdi suggested that Tello write to the ICFTU directly to obtain financial
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aid.196 Tello followed Romualdi’s advice and the ICFTU sent $1000 to the BGTUC in late 1956
or early 1957.197
Meanwhile, Ishmael initiated a plan in early 1956 to further rehabilitate the MPCA’s
improving image among workers and expressed hope that assistance from the ICFTU, ORIT,
TUC, and AFL-CIO would provide the leverage needed to achieve substantial concessions from
employers.198 The MPCA President instigated a strike for wage concessions and purposefully
antagonized the SPA at the negotiating table causing discussions to fail. He then requested
assistance from TUC and AFL-CIO associates in compiling studies countering SPA claims that
the sugar industry could not afford wage increases. Ishmael informed Robert Alexander of his
plan in advance of its implementation and Alexander wrote to Jay Lovestone suggesting that the
AFL-CIO inform British Guiana’s new governor, Patrick Renison, that the American labor
movement supported the strike.199 John Wall of the TUC Economic and Research Department
was sent to British Guiana at the MPCA’s request in August to testify on the sugar workers’
behalf.200 Despite Wall’s assistance, the Committee of Enquiry ruled in favor of a ten percent
cost of living increase in sugar workers’ wages retroactive to January 1, a compromise
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significantly closer to the SPA’s proposed seven percent increase than the MPCA’s demand of a
twenty-five percent raise.201
Anglo-American institution-building efforts in British Guiana expanded and evolved in
1956 while Guianese labor leaders increased their collaboration with regional labor
organizations. In April, the ICA held the trade union seminar that the FOA initially proposed in
1955. A variety of Guianese, American, and British speakers gave lectures and forty Guianese
students participated in the meetings.202 At the same time, the TUC continued its role in British
Guiana as part of a broad effort to expand its role in decolonizing British territories.203 Despite
British and American efforts, regional labor leaders expressed skepticism regarding the
effectiveness of Anglo-American institution-building.
CADORIT leaders met in Barbados in April and discussed the ways Caribbean trade
unions could confront potential communist threats in the region while advancing workers’
interests. BGTUC General Secretary Rupert Tello, who served on CADORIT’s administrative
committee, suggested that the ICFTU should work through Caribbean labor leaders rather than
the TUC to make international participation in the Caribbean labor movement more effective.
Tello further proposed that CADORIT should reorganize into a “more independent
organization.” Most interestingly, Tello criticized external financing of Guianese unions as
ineffective. In British Guiana, he argued, “persons who got no help were able to build real trade
unions, while those who got help had not been able to do so” because external funding weakened
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workers’ sense of investment in their unions. Suriname’s Leo Eliazer, who was also a member of
ORIT’s Executive Board, agreed with Tello and suggested that it might be possible to develop a
regional labor federation independent of ORIT and the ICFTU through which Caribbean
unionists could build their organizations. 204
Despite appeals for regional solidarity and loosened ties with the heavily AngloAmerican influenced Western international labor movement, fear of communism and personal
rivalries reinforced Caribbean labor’s connections to ORIT and the ICFTU. At the same meeting,
Eliazer suggested that communist influence in neighboring British Guiana threatened Suriname
and he pressured Romualdi to provide funds promised for use in confronting regional
communism. Tello echoed Eliazer’s fear of communism and appears to have tentatively accepted
CADORIT involvement in British Guiana, hinting at Shakoor’s “green-light[ing]” activities in
the colony.205
More significantly, Tello appealed to ORIT to intervene in the BGTUC’s July elections
when it appeared he might lose his position as General Secretary. Tello wrote to Romualdi and
ORIT General Secretary Luis Alberto Monge warning that, if Romualdi or Robert Alexander
could not convince Ishmael to alter his nomination of the “communist” Andrew Jackson, Jackson
could win the election. Jackson’s election, Tello argued, would lead to a communist takeover of
the Guianese labor movement.206 Jackson, who was initially left off the BGTUC ballot under
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suspicious circumstances, won the right to have his name added after contesting the BGTUC
ballot in the Guianese courts. Romualdi pressured Ishmael, arguing that Jackson’s participation
in a 1953 WFTU conference and in strikes against the MPCA, as well as his association with the
Jagans, were evidence that his “election would be a blow to free trade unionism.” Tello
adamantly affirmed in a letter to Romualdi that his concern was not personal but sincere fear for
the BGTUC. The validity of Tello’s claims is unclear; however, it is significant that Romualdi’s
information about developments in British Guiana was gleaned almost entirely from Tello and
Alexander. Romualdi copied nearly verbatim from Tello’s letter—at Tello’s request— in writing
to encourage Ishmael to withdrawal Jackson’s nomination.207
While the connection between Jackson and the Jagan faction is not certain, in August
1956 the Jagan faction registered the British Guiana Sugar Workers Union (BGSWU) rather than
continue seek integration into the MPCA.208 It is possible that the Jagan faction interpreted the
BGTUC elections as proof of corruption within the labor movement and concluded that
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integration into the MPCA would be impossible. Regardless, the possibility of rapprochement
within the labor-left decreased considerably with the founding of the BGSWU.
Romualdi’s intercession did not convince Ishmael to withdraw his nomination of
Jackson; however, Tello won the election and immediately traveled to Great Britain, Canada, and
the United States to study Modern Labor Practices after the election.209 The United Steelworkers
of America welcomed Tello as a guest during his two weeks in Canada, and during a three week
visit to the United States Romualdi introduced him to high-ranking members of the AFL-CIO.
The ICA organized Tello’s visit and gave him the opportunity to meet with a variety of
representatives of the United States government during his three-week course.210 During his
travels, Tello arranged for Monge and Harry Pollak of the AFL-CIO Department of International
Affairs to visit British Guiana in 1957.211 Meanwhile, the BGTUC’s new President, Joseph
Pollydore, also left British Guiana after the election and traveled to an ORIT seminar in Mexico
City.212 Tello’s travels, like the FOA proposal in 1955, elicited fear of increased American
influence in British Guiana among colonial officials. Patrick Renison commented in a letter to
the Colonial Office that despite Tello’s “good impression” in the United Kingdom “some of the
gilt has been rubbed off in the U.S.” Renison “fear[ed] this is almost inevitable when ICFTU,
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CADORIT, etc. are able to be so much more free with their money and promises than can be the
TUC and the unions in the U.K.”213
Discussions at the CADORIT conference, Romualdi’s involvement in the BGTUC
elections, and BGTUC leaders’ post-election travels illuminate several important dynamics that
influenced the process of institutional decolonization in British Guiana during the mid-1950s.
First, Caribbean labor leaders collaborated at a regional level to confront perceived communist
threats in their territories and to undercut labor rivals. British and American labor and political
leaders occasionally encouraged opposition to left-leaders; however, they did not impose such
hostility on the Caribbean labor movement. Second, Caribbean trade unions used AFL-CIO
funding and associations as leverage to undermine labor rivals and perceived communists, both
overtly and covertly, often levying allegations of communist associations against rivals to exploit
American anti-communism.
Third, CADORIT leaders worked with Western international labor organizations and
Anglo-American trade unions but did not express confidence in institution-building projects
organized and financed from sources external to the region. Caribbean labor leaders regularly
argued that developing grassroots support for labor organizations was the key to trade unions’
success even as those organizations became dependent on British and American funding. Forth,
British and American labor organizations and Western internationals rapidly integrated newly
elected labor leaders into training programs with the objective of transposing Western labor
practices in the colony, suggesting that institution-building programs were dynamic and
adaptable. Fifth, several issues plagued Anglo-American training programs in the mid-1950s
beginning with Tello’s fear that external involvement in Guianese unions could create financial
dependency. Internationalizing the Guianese labor movement also removed key labor leaders
213
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from British Guiana for extended periods at crucial points in time, in Tello’s case immediately
after a contested election.214 Finally, British officials expressed considerable concern at the
influx of American influence while accepting the need for cooperation with the United States
government and the AFL-CIO in confronting challenges to British interests from left-wing
Caribbean trade unionists. Anglo-American rivalry influenced Caribbean decolonization at both
the diplomatic and non-governmental level.
Legislative actions in British Guiana beginning on December 20, 1956 initiated the
process toward new general elections in August 1957 and a return to partial self-government
under the Renison Constitution.215 The imminent political change increased the significance of
institution-building efforts and British attempts to establish the MPCA and Anglo-American
elements in the BGTUC at the center of the Guianese labor movement. Nineteen members of the
TUC, OEF, and Colonial Office met on January 3, 1957 to evaluate the institution-building effort
in British Guiana and to consider its future in light of the coming Guianese elections. George
Woodcock complimented Booker Brothers efforts to cooperate with the MPCA’s Regional
Officers in building union membership on the sugar estates and supported Ishmael’s request for a
check-off as an exceptional measure to address the union’s financial difficulties. However, Mr.
Eccles, speaking on behalf of the OEF, contested the establishment of a check-off with the
MPCA as a result of Ishmael’s “unreasonable dealings,” though Eccles thought it possible to
have a check-off with smaller estate unions. The committee expressed general apprehension at
the prospect of solidifying Ishmael’s position, suggesting that he too aggressively challenged the
214
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SPA’s interests. At the same time, committee members reaffirmed the importance of preserving
the MPCA given the likelihood that the Jagan faction of the PPP would win a majority at the
polls later in the year.216
Despite suggesting that the MPCA had developed “as well as could be expected,”
Woodcock doubted the union would withstand the political attacks he expected during the
electoral process. Woodcock argued that “if by the end of the year the MPCA still exist[s] it
would be a real victory.” Eccles suggested that the MPCA’s position deteriorated since
Woodcock’s visit making its position in advance of the election even more precarious than the
TUC realized. A TUC report in May confirmed that the MPCA claimed only fifteen percent of
sugar workers as members of the union despite institution-building efforts.217 Woodcock and
Eccles agreed that Ishmael’s antagonizing estate managers and disunity in the labor movement
resulting from conflict between Ishmael and Tello most significantly inhibited the Guianese trade
unions’ effective development. Regardless, British and American labor leaders and government
officials widely agreed that Tello was the most effective trade union leader in the colony.
Ironically, given his support for Tello, Woodcock noted that the Ishmael-Tello rivalry
originated with Tello’s maneuvers in 1953 and that Ishmael was justified in his hostility.
Specifically, Tello formed a breakaway union and re-started the BGTUC against TUC advice
after he lost his position in the MPCA to Ishmael in 1953. Furthermore, Tello’s position in the
interim government compromised his reputation among sugar workers. Woodcock suggested that
Tello might be more effective working for CADORIT rather than in British Guiana as a result of
his weakened prestige. Eccles disagreed, arguing that Tello was too “responsible and
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experienced” to lose to an organization “preaching the doctrines of American trade unionism,”
echoing the consistent British fear of American ideas taking hold in the colony. In his final
analysis, Woodcock reiterated Tello’s theme at the CADORIT meeting the previous April and
recommended against financial assistance for the BGTUC with the expectation that aid would
encourage “laziness and incompetence” from the “weak and incompetent organization.”218
Despite Woodcock’s skepticism, the TUC General Council expressed satisfaction with reports of
the MPCA’s development and wage and benefit increases for sugar workers in early 1957. As a
result, the TUC continued to send £220 grants to the Guianese union throughout the year.219
The TUC, OEF, and Colonial Office meeting illuminates one additional aspect of the
British institution-building project in Guiana as it stood in 1957 prior to the election that has not
been previously addressed. Specifically, it suggests that TUC leaders attempted to directly
influence Guianese politics. Discussions regarding Tello suggest that TUC representatives
encouraged his participation in the Legislative Council and that Woodcock offered general
advice on how he should act in his position. Despite reservations, the TUC supported Tello’s
dual participation in politics and organized labor rendering inconsistent claims that the British
union did not support connections between trade unions and politics in the colonies. Colonial
officials and TUC leaders cited labor-party connections as a central aspect of their argument
against the PPP and TUC support for Tello suggests that British labor leaders accepted colonial
unionists’ involvement in politics if they advanced British objectives.220
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In addition to trade union vulnerability, the persistence of sugar workers’ strikes suggests
that ongoing tension between workers and employers contributed to instability in Guianese labor
relations. Ishmael planned a colony-wide strike of sugar workers to protest unemployment on
sugar estates and low wages among factory workers after winning re-election in the MPCA in
February 1957. The MPCA president rescinded the strike call on February 12 or 13 at the behest
of Commissioner of Labor Ramphal, perhaps hinting at Ishmael’s turn toward a slightly less
aggressive stance in labor relations. Despite the reversal, workers on at least two estates struck
and police dispersed striking workers at Skelton using tear gas and a Greener gun, injuring
thirteen. In the aftermath of the violence, the MPCA held a 48-hour strike across the colony and
strikers at Skelton reassembled to strike for three additional weeks. More telling, an estate
colonial official noted that workers at Skelton had “one of the best management/labor
relationships of any estate.” Intelligence reports noted that no political parties were involved in
the strikes; however, both the Jagan and Burnham factions aggressively criticized the colonial
government in the aftermath of the violence. Thus, institution-building efforts failed to alter
severely depressed conditions and intelligence officials feared that political attacks against the
colonial government, SPA, and MPCA would increase as the election neared.221
The TUC sent its representative to Trinidad, Martin Pounder, to British Guiana in May to
evaluate the MPCA and assist the Guianese sugar workers in negotiating with the SPA in an
attempt to achieve a negotiating victory for an anti-Jagan group prior to the election. The
negotiations resulted in the MPCA’s acceptance, under protest, of a seven and one-half percent
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increase in the cost-of-living allowance and the colony’s first sickness benefit plan. Nonetheless,
the MCPA petitioned the governor to increase the sugar’s local selling price to support a more
substantial wage increase. Pounder suggested the union grew slightly as a result of intermittent
wage gains, increasing its membership from just over 1,600 in 1955 to about 4,600 in mid1957.222 British intelligence reports suggested that sugar workers reacted positively to the
increase and that “the atmosphere on the estates is better than it has been for some time.” Of
greater concern to colonial officials were reports that the Jagan faction abandoned its plan to
build the BGSWU after an ineffective year of organization in order to return to a strategy of
“penetrating” the MPCA.223 Most significantly, the MPCA obtained a check-off system in the
early summer, automatically enrolling sugar workers in the union.224
Thus, two years of institution-building helped the MPCA achieve notable advances.
However, efforts to build a strong sugar workers’ union remained incomplete. Criticisms of the
MPCA are accurate in noting the organization’s conservatism and inability to overcome planters
hold on the economy to meaningfully address workers’ dire poverty. However, scholarly
condemnation of the union underappreciates the significance of precedent-setting advances such
as the colony’s first sickness benefit plan and the initiation of a check-off system on the sugar
estates.225 The BGSWU’s failure to gain popularity among sugar workers suggests that the
MPCA gained at least some support as a mechanism for negotiating with employers. Ishmael’s
position in particular was uncertain and somewhat paradoxical. British employers and trade
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union leaders did not think he was the “responsible” leader they needed to head the sugar
workers union and either believed or accused him of using his position in the MPCA merely as a
means of political advancement. However, the tactics that led British leaders to view Ishmael as
irresponsible improved the union’s standing among sugar workers.
While the TUC continued its efforts to build the MPCA, American labor leaders and
Western labor internationals increased their support for the BGTUC and Tello. Luis Alberto
Monge and Harry Pollak visited British Guiana in late March and early April 1957, traveling
with Tello and appearing on Radio Demerara to express support for BGTUC. Monge assured
listeners that ORIT supported the Guianese workers and planned to “intensify [ORIT’s] support
to our friends in British Guiana,” following through with a six-hundred dollar donation from
ORIT for the BGTUC in late-summer 1957.226 Pollak assured the Guianese that he would discuss
the colony’s problems with American labor leaders and “seek means to assist the trade union
movement in the area” while assuring workers that their situation could best be improved
through the establishment of a trade union movement free from political control.227 Moreover,
the United Steelworkers of America donated a public address system to the BGTUC and the
ICFTU and ORIT made small monetary contributions to assist the union in achieving financial
stability.228
A. John Cope, the former ICA representative and newly appointed American Consul in
British Guiana, reported optimistically to the State Department that Guianese unions continued
to make considerable gains in prestige and effectiveness and had improved substantially in the
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previous year.229 However, Cope warned the State Department that the Jagan faction continued
to challenge Western influence in the Guianese labor movement and cited the SWFU’s recent
suspension of its Acting General Secretary, Patrick Alleyne, a Jagan faction candidate for the
Legislative Council in the August elections. Alleyne requested assistance from the CLC in a
letter aggressively criticizing “American penetration in the trade union movement through the
ICFTU, CADORIT, and the AFL-CIO under the guise of financial and moral support” and
sending greetings to a WFTU affiliated organization. Alleyne argued in his defense that the
Executive Council of the SFWU approved the letter and that his suspension was an attempt to
undermine his candidacy in the August elections. Crucially, Cope turned to Tello for information
and Tello explained that Alleyne was acting on Cheddi Jagan’s behalf, noting that Jagan had
been General President of the SWFU from 1950 to 1956. Tello informed Cope that “leftist
sources” in Brussels provided information suggesting that Communists previously agreed to use
the CLC to fund Jagan as a reward for his commitment to the Communist cause. 230
It is unclear whether Tello passed along accurate information or used the situation as an
opportunity to solidify his own position, particularly since Alleyne’s letter also strongly
criticized the BGTUC. Nonetheless, the Alleyne letter incident provides further evidence that
Tello served as a crucial source of information for American trade union leaders and government
officials. Regardless of his motivations or the legitimacy of his claims, the BGTUC General
Secretary exercised a considerable influence on American interpretations of Guianese politics
and organized labor, especially since American officials thought the British withheld
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information.231 Secondly, the letter suggests that the PPP continued to seek cooperation with
international labor organizations that were not part of the ICFTU, ORIT, or CADORIT
increasing the internationalization of the trade union conflict in British Guiana.
The PPP won a majority of seats in the August elections, eliciting concern from
American officials who felt that despite some collaboration British officials were not entirely
cooperative in joint efforts to oppose Jagan before the election. Under-Secretary of State Robert
Murphy ominously warned the British Ambassador that the United States would protect its
interests in the Western Hemisphere despite a general reluctance to interfere in British territories.
The guarded conversation further hinted that British officials intervened to build anti-Jagan
parties and noted that British and American development projects prioritized undermining the
Jagan faction of the PPP with economic progress a secondary concern.232 Conversely, colonial
officials expressed concern at the extent of American influence in mid-1957 while criticizing the
TUC’s resistance to Colonial Office pressure for the British union play a larger role in the
colony.233
Ultimately, TUC, Colonial Office, AFL-CIO, FOA/ICA, ICFTU, ORIT, and CADORIT
institution-building efforts in British Guiana between 1954 and 1957 were somewhat effective in
developing capitalist-oriented, moderately democratic trade unions. This conclusion is
significant because the institutional foundations for a functioning society existed in an embryonic
stage in 1957 despite colonialism’s repressive nature and ongoing conflict between Guianese
who disagreed about the colony’s future political-economic and international orientation. The
231

British Embassy, Washington D.C. to Foreign Office, September 5, 1957, FO 371-126078, BNA.
British Embassy, Washington D.C. to Foreign Office, August 16, 1957, FO 371-126078, BNA. Part of the
transcript of the conversation between the British ambassador and Murphy is redacted. The conversation relating to
the redacted portion related to Murphy’s acknowledgment of cooperation and his questioning of whether the British
“were satisfied that all that was possible had been done to build up forces opposed to Jagan before the election.” See
also: Palmer, Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power, 146.
233
Colonial Office Minute, January 13, 1960 (referencing conversation from 1957), CO 1031-2952, BNA.
232

298

seeds of ethnic violence, bureaucratic dysfunction, and repressive government existed; however,
the colony was predisposed as late as 1957 toward economic development, political democracy,
and stability. As Lange suggests, developmental reforms during the 1950s were limited;
however, important advances in institutional development took place between 1954 and 1957.234
Nonetheless, important precedents in labor legislation and collective bargaining did not
alleviate sugar workers’ considerable poverty. The MPCA and BGTUC experienced improved
organization, small increases in membership, and minor improvements in funding, and obtained
some concessions from employers. However, the unions were financially unstable and dependent
on external assistance, were weakened as a result of leaders’ personal rivalries, and did not
fundamentally alter the impoverished conditions under which Guianese workers’ labored. As a
result, workers supported a change in union leadership by late 1957. While the PPP continued to
seek its own external connections to strengthen affiliated unions, evidence in British and
American archives does not suggest that there was substantial CLC and WFTU support for the
PPP during the period. When the PPP returned to power after the August 1957 elections, the PPP
continued to seek a union with which to gain support and engaged in legislative struggles that
shaped the labor movement between 1957 and 1964. However, it primarily focused on obtaining
external assistance for development and improving economic connections abroad since its base
of support and transnational labor connections were eroded.
The PPP victory in 1957 increased the Americanization of external influence in British
Guiana and the global and regional context in which it occurred was important. British and
American institution-building programs in British Guiana stalled in early 1957. While American
labor unions increased their involvement in the colony in response to the election, the TUC
dismissed colonial officials’ irritated appeals to re-establish British trade union connections in
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the colony.235 Moreover, British policymakers embraced full-scale decolonization after the Suez
Crisis in 1956 and the Cuban Revolution challenged United States hegemony in the Caribbean
after 1959.236 As a result, American policymakers’ increasingly aggressive pursuit of American
objectives at the diplomatic level complemented the slow Americanization of development and
institution building in British Guiana throughout the 1950s that portended a transition from
British to American hegemony in the colony.
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Chapter 7: The Fracturing of British Guiana, 1957-1961
British Guiana’s institutional decolonization changed as a result of domestic labor
conflicts and changes to Anglo-American institution-building between 1957 and 1961 in ways
that laid the foundation for the violence that rocked the colony from 1962 to 1965. British and
American institution-building between 1954 and 1957 contributed to the establishment of
important precedents in Guianese trade union development; however, advancements only
incrementally helped impoverished workers while generating negative side-effects that worsened
the situation for others. In part, sugar workers’ continued impoverishment contributed to the reelection of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) when the Colonial Office implemented the
Renison Constitution, named for the colonial governor Patrick Renison, establishing restricted
self-government in British Guiana in August 1957.
At the same time, the PPP’s efforts to work through the Manpower Citizens’ Association
(MPCA) underlay union president Richard Ishmael’s adoption of an authoritarian position within
the organization. Moreover, racial tensions increased dramatically as the predominantly East
Indian PPP assumed the position of employer to the colony’s public sector unions—the vast
majority of whom were Afro-Guianese. Thus, conflict between the PPP and MPCA, and tensions
between the PPP and Afro-Guianese over labor relations, fractured Guianese society between
1957 and 1961. Ultimately, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) financing of anti-PPP forces in
1962 and 1963 prolonged tense protests and allowed social unrest to be driven toward violence
for political purposes.
The most important developments in Guianese institutional decolonization between 1957
and 1961 involved the colony’s trade unionists, political leaders, and workers, rather than British
or American trade unionists in the colony. Four overlapping trends best explain these changes.

First, the PPP continued to pursue socialism in British Guiana, while Cheddi Jagan moderated
some of the party’s tactics in response to the Renison Constitution’s restrictions on Guianese
autonomy.1 Second, disagreements regarding trade unions’ institutional role and the appropriate
international orientation of the Guianese labor movement led to a significant increase in conflict
between leadership of the MPCA and the PPP. MPCA President Richard Ishmael undermined
democracy within the union while the PPP used a variety of methods to displace the union’s
leadership and eventually replace the organization altogether. Third, the PPP’s position as head
of government placed the party in opposition to the predominantly Afro-Guianese civil service
workers in ongoing debates over government employees’ wages and working conditions. As a
result, government workers became politicized against the PPP, which contributed to increasing
racial tensions within the colony. Finally, general labor unrest led to workers’ movements to
unionize throughout the colony and the struggles for recognition increased Guianese trade union
connections to the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFLCIO). Ultimately, the return of partial self-government in British Guiana contributed to moving
trade union conflicts into the political sphere, and governmental debates regarding the labor
movement shaped British and American analyses of Guianese politics.
British and American policymakers interpreted the PPP’s election differently; however,
at the highest levels policymakers agreed to oppose the PPP’s attempt at social revolution and to
prepare to suspend the constitution should the PPP pursue a course similar to that which it
followed in 1953.2 At the same time, British and American officials in Guiana and in the
International Cooperation Administration (ICA) suggested working with the PPP government as
1

Cheddi Jagan, “Straight Talk: A Living Wage,” Thunder, December 26, 1959, Cheddi Jagan Research Center
(Hereafter: CJRC).
2
Harold Macmillan Personal Minute, August 12, 1957, FO 371-126078, British National Archives, Kew,
Richmond, Surrey, (hereafter BNA). See also: E.W.A. Scarlett, to D. Williams, Colonial Attaché, Washington D.C.,
August 23, 1957, FO 371-126078, BNA.

302

a way to encourage Jagan to moderate the party’s policy further while alleviating the poverty that
underlay support for the party.3 Perhaps most importantly, institution-building programs
floundered as the Trades Union Congress (TUC) retreated from its role in the colony and
disagreement between the TUC and AFL-CIO in the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) impeded collaborative programs to develop the Guianese labor movement. As a
result, the MPCA and BGTUC grew increasingly reliant on the AFL-CIO for support, and the
American labor leaders became progressively more dependent on reformist Guianese trade
unionists in their opposition to the PPP.
The Guianese labor movement continued to grow between 1957 and 1961 in part as a
result of Anglo-American trade union and government efforts to strengthen a capitalist-oriented
labor movement in British Guiana. More importantly, Guianese labor leaders and workers
persistently struggled to establish functional trade unions and achieved significant successes
even though conflict undermined the labor movement as a whole. Nonetheless, the depth of
poverty resulting from colonialism and from the asymmetries of power between Guianese
workers and foreign capital was too severe for a moderately successful capitalist labor movement
to reform rapidly enough to generate popular support for the unions, particularly when the PPP
promoted more drastic change.
Close examination of the conflict within the labor movement over British Guiana’s
institutional framework and analysis of PPP materials suggest that the PPP continued its pursuit
of social revolution, and that the party’s governing strategy centered on advancing toward selfgovernment while altering institutionalized labor relations. Nonetheless, scholarship on the
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period between 1957 and 1961 focuses on examining the colony’s political developments and
emphasizes PPP moderation, though scholars disagree on the reasons the party’s governing
methods differed from 1953.
Leo Despres argues that the PPP temporarily cooperated with the Colonial Office out of
necessity after Cheddi Jagan concluded that the party could not pursue social revolution until it
became head of an independent government. As a result, Despres suggests that the PPP adopted
a conciliatory position designed to solidify its support among East Indians and pursue selfgovernment.4 Similarly, Clem Seecharan argues that Jagan remained committed to breaking the
capitalist system in British Guiana. Seecharan suggests that the Jagans’ uncompromising
Marxism impeded reform efforts advanced by the Colonial Office and Booker Brothers chairman
Jock Campbell despite the party’s restrained rhetoric.5 Robert Waters and Gordon Daniels’s
study of the 1964 strike also suggests that the PPP’s moderation between 1957 and 1964 was a
change in tactics meant to bide time until British withdrawal, and that it did not constitute a
change in party leaders’ ideology or in their objective of establishing communism in British
Guiana.6
Conversely, Stephen Rabe argues that Cheddi Jagan attempted to cooperate with British
and American officials while pursuing social change. More importantly, Rabe notes that British
and American interpretations of the August 12, 1957 election differed considerably. Rabe
suggests that, after the election, British officials tended toward a reevaluation of the 1953
suspension of the Waddington Constitution and acknowledged the possibility that permitting the
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Jagan government to succeed or fail on its own may have more effectively served British
interests. On the other hand, Rabe argues that American policymakers continued to uphold the
notion that the suspension was necessary. Assessments of the newly elected government, Rabe
suggests, reflected the differing interpretations of 1953. British officials prepared to work with a
seemingly moderated Jagan-led government and American officials recommitted to the AngloAmerican policy of undermining the PPP pursued since October 1953.7 Similarly, Colin Palmer
argues that Cheddi Jagan retained his Marxist values but did not attempt to govern as a Marxist
leader from 1957-1961, allowing for the possibility of cooperation between the Colonial Office
and the PPP.8
The Anglo-American Response to the 1957 Election
British and American government officials, labor leaders, and businesses invested in
Guiana argued that a labor movement dominated by the left wing of the Cheddi and Janet Jaganled PPP most directly threatened capitalism in the colony after the suspension of the Waddington
Constitution in 1953. As a result, an array of British, American, and international labor leaders
engaged in institution-building to undermine the Jagan-led faction of the PPP and the party’s
prospects for electoral victory as the colony advanced toward self-government. Ultimately,
Anglo-American institution-building programs in British Guiana between 1954 and 1957
intended to establish a liberal capitalist-oriented labor movement to protect British and American
strategic and economic interests and promote political democracy in Guyana after
independence.9 Employers’ reluctant and limited cooperation with the MPCA obscured and
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restricted the improvements achieved for unionized workers on sugar estates and increased the
dependency of Guianese unions on external financial assistance. At the same time, gains for
unionized sugar workers frequently came at the expense of displaced field workers. The MPCA’s
inability to substantially improve the lives of rural East Indians despite institutional advancement
reinforced the tendency of Guianese sugar workers to look to the PPP for political alleviation of
their impoverished condition.
At the same time, lack of cohesion between British and American labor leaders in the
ICFTU undermined organization’s usefulness as a labor international. Reformist Guianese labor
leaders trying to establish trade unions to support a capitalist economic system needed external
assistance to finance their stagnated movement and pressure employers, whose influence over
the Guianese economy and society was nearly absolute. However, the AFL-TUC conflict in the
ICFTU made it necessary for Guianese labor leaders to spend a great deal of time traveling to
England and the United States to obtain assistance the ICFTU failed to provide. British and
American uncertainty about whether to channel assistance to the Guianese unions through the
ICFTU exacerbated the problem and resulted in several of the most significant Guianese trade
unionists traveling to Western Europe and throughout Latin America rather than organizing on
the sugar plantations. Moreover, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT)
and Caribbean Area Division of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers
(CADORIT), the ICFTU’s regional associations, achieved limited success in assisting the
Guianese labor movement. Regional labor leaders attributed ORIT’s and CADORIT’s

General Records, 1957-1963, Box 13, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, RG 84,
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shortcomings to the organizations’ subordination to the AFL-CIO and TUC.10 Ultimately,
employers’ resistance to substantive changes in labor relations made the internationalization of
the labor struggle in British Guiana necessary. However, reliance on external trade unions
disrupted grassroots organizing and weakened the local nature of the labor movement while
leaving Guianese trade unions financially dependent on outside assistance.
The August 1957 elections that replaced the interim government with the Renison
Constitution laid bare institution-building’s failure to achieve British and American political
objectives.11 The new constitution served as a moderate advance toward Guianese selfgovernment which Colin Palmer suggests was effectively closer to re-establishing an
authoritarian Crown colony than providing meaningful autonomy in British Guiana. Under the
new government, fourteen of the twenty-eight seats in the Legislative Council were elected
positions and the remaining fourteen were divided between eleven members nominated by the
governor and three ex officio members. Palmer argues that the equal balance of elected
representatives and appointed positions in the Executive Council and the governor’s reserve veto
powers constituted a continuation of the period of politically “marking time.” Despite British and
American attempts to use institution building projects to increase support for the PPP’s
opposition and British gerrymandering of electoral districts prior to the August 12 election, the
Jagan faction of the PPP won nine of the fourteen seats contested and the Burnham faction won
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three.12 After the election, the Forbes Burnham-led faction ended its claim to represent the PPP
and formed the People’s National Congress (PNC).
American officials, as Rabe and Palmer suggest, expressed considerable discontent about
the Jagan faction’s electoral victory and criticized British policies between 1953 and 1957 while
threatening intervention if American interests were challenged.13 Domestic politics also
influenced the State Department’s response to the Guianese election. As Chester Pach notes in
The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War,
contentious debates and appropriations struggles regarding foreign aid programs shaped
American politics throughout the 1950s.14 In the environment of broad foreign policy debates,
the British Embassy reported to the Foreign Office on August 17 that American government
officials were “embarrassed politically in view of the Foreign Aid debate and the amount of
technical assistance” committed to British Guiana between 1954 and 1957.15 Nonetheless, an
ICA report analyzing the situation in British Guiana in 1959 suggests that American officials
held a more complex view than the State Department. The report argues that Cheddi Jagan “can
be dealt with as a Communist leader who is presently friendly and whose economic and social
policies are acceptable, whose freedom of action is circumscribed by British authority, and who
appears to be independent of ties to Russian Communism.” It is important to note that the ICA
report concluded that assisting “the British government in its efforts to encourage the
continuation of the present comparatively moderate political and economic trend of the Jagan
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Government” was “essential to our overall political and security objectives.”16 Carroll Woods,
who became the American Consul in British Guiana in September 1958, similarly encouraged a
substantial increase in ICA programs in the colony in September 1959. Woods warned the State
Department that ICA programs between 1954 and 1959 were insufficient in combatting Guianese
social maladies, including unemployment and malnutrition. Significantly, Woods warned that
Cheddi Jagan was “openly flirting” with the “Soviet bloc with approval [of the] majority [of the]
electorate.”17 Thus, at least some departments of the United States government advocated
cooperation with the PPP during the 1957-1961 government; however, American officials did
not agree on the extent to which Cheddi Jagan posed a direct threat to United States interests by
engaging the Soviet Union.
As Rabe notes, British colonial officials and investors expressed a moderation in their
opposition to the now Jagan faction-dominated PPP; however, British policy was also
inconsistent. Close reading of a note from newly appointed Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to
Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd suggests that the official British policy toward the colony
in 1957 mirrored British policy in 1953. Macmillan instructed Boyd to keep American officials
closely informed with developments in British Guiana since United States defense of British
policy in 1953 was critical “in keeping the other Latin Americans quiet.” Crucially, Macmillan
argued that retaining open lines of communication was imperative in case a similar suspension
became necessary in 1957.18 The Prime Minister’s note suggests a British policy of limiting
Guianese autonomy and a willingness to use force if challenged even if the Colonial Office
16
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employed more conciliatory rhetoric. The Colonial Office’s cooperative posture and the
difference between 1953 and 1957 were attributable to the limited nature of the 1957
constitution. As Palmer argues, the Renison Constitution included constitutional safeguards
reserving power in the governor’s hands to render impossible a PPP attempt to pursue policies
similar to 1953, and British officials took pains to impress that point on the State Department.19
The PPP’s rhetoric between 1957 and 1961 suggests that the party’s leaders understood
the constitution’s limitations and calculated their actions in a manner that contributed to British
willingness to cautiously work with the newly elected government. In 1959, Cheddi Jagan noted
in the PPP’s journal, Thunder, that the party remained committed to socialism with the objective
of progressing into the “second stage” wherein society would be based on the principle “to each
according to his need, from each according to his ability.” Nonetheless, Jagan assured readers
that as elected socialists the PPP had to accept temporary limitations. Specifically, Jagan noted
that socialism could not be implemented immediately and that because of colonialism “the PPP
is in office but not in power.”20 Jagan’s views articulated in 1959 remained consistent with his
earlier explanation of socialism as a stage on the process toward inevitable communism.21
Even so, a close examination of the PPP’s attempts to institutionally alter labor relations
suggests that the party’s moderation between 1957 and 1961 is overstated. In his autobiography,
The West on Trial, Jagan noted the limitations the Rension Constitution placed on the PPP. Jagan
also describes Renison’s encouragement of “talking out” issues on which PPP ministers and
19
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British-appointed members of the legislative bodies disagreed as a tactic the governor regularly
employed to impede the introduction of controversial legislation. Crucially, Jagan lists
legislation aimed at polling sugar workers to determine union recognition as among the
“fundamental issues” undermined through Renison’s process of talking out.22 There is no
evidence of a labor bill in archival records, likely as a result of Rension’s killing the proposal
before a one could be introduced. However, if the PPP attempted to pursue the issue as Jagan
suggests, then the party moved to introduce legislation that Jagan described in the same way as
the controversial Labor Relations Bills that preceded the British suspension of the Waddington
Constitution in 1953 and that initiated massive American-funded strikes in 1963. Therefore,
Jagan acknowledged that the PPP moderated its actions while still pursuing social revolution and
the moderation to which the party leader referred was less significant than even close
examination of legislative records suggests.
Regardless of the PPP’s commitment to social revolution, Jagan convinced colonial
officials of the party’s willingness to govern moderately. Renison informed Secretary Boyd that
he believed in Jagan’s sincere desire to establish a responsible government. Renison told Boyd
that PPP leaders understood that they could not pursue radical or fundamental changes to the
structure of the Guianese social or political-economic system at the time.23 Boyd wrote to
Renison on August 23 explaining three policymaking priorities in the colony emphasizing “the
ultimate responsibility of H.M.G. of both the legitimate interests of Commonwealth and United
States governments and legitimate outside economic interests” and the importance of preserving
British authority to protect those interests. Boyd suggested that Renison should cooperate with
Jagan while limiting the Guianese leader’s leverage in governing. Boyd suggested, for example,
22
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that Renison nominate members to the Executive Council acceptable to Jagan while insisting that
the governor should not allow Jagan himself to nominate members for the council.24 Most
importantly, Renison constantly worked to build the colony’s trade union movement as an
institutional bulwark against the possibility that the PPP would try to restructure Guianese
society after independence.25 Thus, the Prime Minister and Foreign Office did not fundamentally
alter their policy toward the PPP. Some colonial officials and British employers in Guiana
cooperated with Cheddi Jagan based on the assumption that the new government’s power was
sufficiently limited and that an institutional framework would develop to protect British
interests.26
While colonial officials continued to jealously guard their prerogatives in shaping
colonial affairs, information-sharing with United States policymakers in 1957 suggests a growing
acceptance of the expanding American role in the Caribbean.27 As Stephen Rabe suggests,
British policymakers did not discuss the suspension of the Waddington Constitution in 1953 with
American officials.28 Between 1953 and 1957 British officials staunchly refuted the notion of
American influence over policymaking toward British Guiana while courting American support
for colonial policies. Despite attempts to cooperate in institution building, American officials
expressed disappointed with a perceived dearth of shared information though British officials
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suggested that there was no such disconnect.29 Nonetheless, the decision to increase exchange of
information did not entirely alter British parochialism and Colonial Office representatives
carefully avoided giving American officials the impression that increased in shared information
were tantamount to consultation on questions of colonial policy.30 Ultimately, Anglo-American
collaboration on questions of policy toward British Guiana increased at the highest-levels while
colonial officials continued to resist American influence.
British and American policymakers and labor leaders re-evaluated the purpose and
methods of institution building programs as a result of the PPP’s victory in the 1957 election. In
early September British and American policymakers discussed how to move forward with
institution-building efforts in light of the PPP’s victory. On September 4 the British Colonial
Attaché and the British ambassador in Washington D.C. met with Robert Murphy, Deputy under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to continue Anglo-American discussions regarding the
Guianese elections. British officials noted that one of the primary American concerns was Janet
Jagan’s appointment as Minister of Labor for the new government and the possibility that she
would use her position to strengthen the Guiana Industrial Workers’ Union’s (GIWU) links to
the communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).31 The American concern
belies a lack of understanding of the Guianese labor movement. The GIWU broke from the Jagan
faction of the PPP in conjunction with the PPP’s split in January 1955 and Renison’s response to
an inquiry from the British ambassador in Washington strongly refuted the alleged claims of
GIWU-WFTU connections.32 Nonetheless, the appointment of the PPP’s General Secretary as
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Minister of Labor suggests that the PPP placed paramount importance on using the structures of
government to address workers’ needs and increase the party’s ability to shape the Guianese
labor movement. The American response to Jagan’s appointment is evidence that the State
Department considered the labor movement the heart of the struggle to determine the nature of
Guianese independence.
International Labor Developments and American Labor’s Expanded Connections in British
Guiana
Tensions between British and American labor leaders further disrupted Guianese
institution building. AFL and TUC leaders disagreed about trade union methods since the early
twentieth century and each advocated international agendas that advanced their nations’ interests,
which led to long-term tension and occasional conflict between the unions that increased with the
onset of the Cold War. The slow evolution of colonial policy toward decolonization increased
the AFL-CIO’s influence in British colonies and amplified tensions between the unions as the
1950s progressed. AFL-CIO-TUC cooperation in British Guiana was unique given the acute
Anglo-American trade union rivalry in Africa; however, the impact of trade union conflict
influenced British Guiana in two ways.33
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First, AFL-CIO conflict with the TUC undermined the establishment of an effective
internationally-supported institution building program operated through the ICFTU. Specifically,
lack of British and American cohesion in the ICFTU impeded organizational unity and sense of
shared purpose while administrative disagreements diverted attention from institution building
efforts in underdeveloped areas.34 Second, AFL-CIO-TUC tension limited cooperation between
British and American efforts in Guiana before the TUC conceded AFL-CIO predominance in the
colony after 1957. The AFL-CIO’s ascension resulted in a change to institution building tactics.
AFL-CIO policy focused on supporting individual Guianese trade union leaders and using
relationships with Guianese unions to support political objectives rather than emphasizing broadbased institution building at the grassroots level and the pursuit of economic achievements.
General international disagreements in the ICFTU further disrupted collaborative AFLCIO-TUC involvement in British Guiana. In November 1957 Charles Millard, ICFTU Director
of Organization, proposed that the TUC should aid colonies through the ICFTU as a way to end
the AFL-CIO’s policy of independently aiding colonial unions.35 CIO President Walter Reuther
expressed general agreement with the policy of ending national unions’ independent activities,
particularly after the ICFTU altered its rules to allow AFL-CIO Executive Council members to
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participate in ICFTU Executive Board meetings. Nonetheless, Reuther suggested that exceptions
could be made if independent activities were conducted within the ICFTU’s framework. 36
Labor historian Anthony Carew suggests that George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO,
and Jay Lovestone, the most influential member of the AFL-CIO’s International Affairs
Department, dismissed Millard’s call for ending independent activities despite a weak
commitment to accede to working through the ICFTU.37 At the same time, the TUC continued to
operate autonomously. Together, AFL-CIO and TUC actions suggest that advancing national
interests superseded appeals to international solidarity for British and American labor leaders.38
Moreover, ORIT policies in Latin America and the AFL-CIO’s influence in the organization
increased tensions between American trade union leaders and the international labor
movement.39 Nonetheless, the AFL-CIO-TUC efforts in British Guiana were not as contentious
as was the case in other parts of the world and Lovestone even rejected a request for aid from
Rupert Tello of the British Guiana Trade Union Council (BGTUC) in 1958 citing the AFL-CIO’s
agreement not to independently intervene in the colony.40
Guianese-American trade union relationships increased outside of institution building
projects in the mid-1950s as well, and individual American unions became involved in the
colony as part of an effort to expand organizing internationally. Not all Guianese labor struggles
unfolded in a Cold War context. Rather, some Guianese unions peacefully integrated into the
36
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Western international system. On October 15, 1957 Nick Zonarich and George Rattinger of the
United Steelworkers of America (USW) visited British Guiana in the company of Ken Sterling
of CADORIT. The trade union leaders met with officials of the British Guiana Mine Workers
Union (BGMWU) at Mackenzie.41 USW representatives had experience in Guiana, having
donated a public address system to the BGTUC in 1956 and visited the colony in March 1957.
Zonarich’s public criticism of mineworkers’ wages during his March visit initiated a backlash
from the Demerara Bauxite Company (Demba), a member of the Aluminum Limited Group of
Companies based in Canada and the United States.42 In response to Zonarich’s criticism, Demba
representatives appealed to A. John Cope, the American Consul in Georgetown, condemning
Zonarich for inaccurately suggesting that Demba paid sub-standard wages. In addition to
suggesting that Zonarich’s reproach undermined “the most happy employer-employee
relationships within the colony,” Demba’s appeal accused the American unionist of aiding local
communists, a criticism that resonated with Cope and the American Consul suggested that
United States government officials should impress on American unionists the delicacy of
Guianese labor relations to discourage similar statements during future visits.43
Hugh Roach, Public Relations Officer for Demba, leveled similar condemnations of
Zonarich and Sterling in October when he accused the men of agitating for strike action among
miners with no significant complaints. Roach argued that increasing miners’ wages would
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disrupt the existing wage pattern in the colony and lead to runaway inflation.44 Nonetheless, the
BGTUC-sponsored radio program “Union Call” assured the Guianese that Zonarich and the
USW expressed strong interest in establishing close association with Caribbean labor unions
particularly in the bauxite mining industry. The program cited Zonarich’s agreement to purchase
a high powered motor boat to assist the BGMWU in organizational efforts as evidence of the
USW’s increased support for Guianese bauxite workers.45 Thus, the motives driving American
trade union involvement in British Guiana varied; however, individual unions, as opposed to the
national front AFL-CIO, built relationships emphasizing industrial matters rather than narrow
Cold War objectives. Ultimately, efforts to integrate Guianese unions into the Western
international system continued to increase the internationalization of labor struggles in the
colony after the PPP’s election in 1957.
Guianese Trade Union Conflicts and the PPP’s Alienation from the Labor Movement
The Colonial Office, TUC, and Overseas Employers’ Federation (OEF) expressed
considerable skepticism that the MPCA would survive the political attacks expected to emerge
during the 1957 election.46 The MPCA withstood the PPP’s political attacks more effectively
than British officials predicted in mid-1957 largely as a result of President Richard Ishmael’s
anti-democratic measures to retain control of the union. Martin Pounder of the TUC visited
British Guiana in December and reported to the General Council that institution building efforts
successfully solidified the MPCA, that membership increased considerably, and that the sugar
workers’ union was prepared to be financially self-sufficient. In evaluating the union’s progress
the council noted that the MPCA won a ten-percent wage increase, an additional eight-day pay
44
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bonus during the second half of 1957, and that the colony’s first sickness benefit scheme began
on January 1, 1958. Moreover, the MPCA was able to fund three full-time field officers and
fifteen part-time assistants to aid in expanding the union’s influence.47 TUC leaders determined
that the MPCA was “in better shape than ever before” and Governor Patrick Renison argued that
the MPCA was “as good as almost any Union in the Caribbean” a year later.48
Nonetheless, conflict for control of the MPCA intensified after the PPP’s victory in the
August elections and colonial officials acknowledged that Ishmael manipulated the union to
exclude PPP influence in late 1957. In October Ishmael attempted to remove three PPP members
from the MPCA on the grounds that they no longer worked in the sugar industry.49 In January
1958 MPCA leaders rejected Balram Singh Rai’s nomination to contest the union’s presidency
as a result of his membership in the PPP. The BGTUC supported the MPCA leaders’ decision
and passed a series of resolutions aimed at undermining the PPP’s attempts to gain influence in
the MPCA.50 Consequently, Ishmael won an uncontested election to retain his position as MPCA
president after removing Rai from the ballot. MPCA leaders amended the union’s rules allowing
Ishmael to retain the presidency for three years after expressing fears that PPP members might
ascend to positions of prominence in the MPCA. MPCA rules were altered further in February to
complicate the admission of persons not directly employed in sugar industries as a way to avoid
including PPP leaders in the union. BGTUC leaders effectively endorsed the MPCA’s policies
when General Secretary Rupert Tello dismissed complaints about the new MPCA rules raised in
47
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the BGTUC.51 Thus, anti-PPP trade union leaders used their organizations as an institutional
barrier to exclude PPP members from participation in the established labor movement.
The PPP took a dual approach in responding to Ishmael’s maneuvers. First, Janet Jagan
appealed to the ICFTU in protest of the election. The American Consul in British Guiana, A.
John Cope, informed the State Department of Jagan’s appeal and speculated that she also
contacted the WFTU. Cope’s personal comments noted that only “the irregular electoral
procedure of the MPCA” kept PPP members Balram Singh Rai and Abdul Sallim from winning
the union’s election. Nonetheless, Cope dismissed Jagan’s protest as an attempt to embarrass the
MPCA and BGTUC, exacerbate personal tensions between Tello and Ishmael, and facilitate
future PPP domination of the trade union movement.52 Cope’s comments illuminate a
rationalization for anti-democratic measures as a necessary tactic to preserve democratic
institutions and United States’ interests in British Guiana that permeated American activities in
the colony.
Second, PPP leaders encouraged workers to withdraw permission for automatic
deduction of dues as part of the check-off system supporting the MPCA. Cope warned the State
Department that the PPP also renewed efforts to build the British Guiana Sugar Workers’ Union
(BGSWU) which was registered the previous year in an attempt to give the party a union to rival
the MPCA.53 Despite the PPP’s efforts the MPCA experienced a twenty percent increase in
membership in the first five months of 1958 to bring its enrollment to 11,500. The PPP returned
to a policy of encouraging qualified members to run for MPCA office despite the new rules
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designed to prevent their success in 1959. Colonial officials suggested that the PPP’s tactical
shift proved that their effort to form a new union failed.54 It is also possible that the PPP shifted
its policy in response to Renison’s scuttling Jagan’s attempt to reintroduce a labor relations bill
since the MPCA would remain the sugar workers’ official representative in the absence of
legislation to force recognition of a PPP-aligned union. Thus, the PPP’s attempt to work through
the existing institutional structure was rejected damaging the quickly disintegrating possibility of
cooperation between the colony’ most popular political party and anti-communist Guianese
leaders. Meanwhile, MPCA leaders continued to work to strengthen the union’s institutional role
while the struggle for control of the sugar union unfolded when Ishmael met with the Sugar
Producers’ Association (SPA) in November 1957 to negotiate production targets for 1958.55
Wages Council Debate
On March 22, 1958 Forbes Burnham introduced a proposal in the legislature to establish
a wages council in the sugar industry. If established, a wages council would give the government
considerable influence in setting workers’ pay rates. Supporters argued that the MPCA
ineffectively bargained on behalf of deeply impoverished Guianese sugar workers. Opponents
countered that empowering the government in wage debates interfered with collective bargaining
practices, undermined free trade unionism, and threatened the institutional structure of a postcolonial liberal capitalist democracy. Burnham’s proposal initiated a debate in the Executive
Council that lasted until 1961. The wages council debate, which Cope suggested originated with
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GIWU President and Burnham advisor J.P. Lachmansingh, is important to understanding
Guianese institutional decolonization between 1958 and 1961 for two reasons.
First, the bill’s introduction was misattributed to Janet Jagan and used as evidence of the
PPP’s attack on trade unionism independent of PPP influence. The error reinforced the notion
that the PPP uncompromisingly sought the destruction of Guianese trade unions and persisted
even after the mistake was corrected. Janet Jagan received criticism for the bill’s discussion even
when officials correctly identified Burnham as the original proponent of the legislation. Cope
informed the State Department that Burnham realized the proposal was a mistake in July and
attributed the continued conversation to PPP attempts to destroy the MPCA, thus absolving
Burnham of blame for the implications of his proposal on labor relations.56 Similarly, some
colonial officials were unclear of the bills’ origins as late as 1960 which suggests that factual
inaccuracies muddled analysis of the debate.57
Significantly, the mistake was partially attributable to information passed from Rupert
Tello to contacts in the Colonial Office and forwarded to the TUC.58 Tello also used the
allegation of “Dr. and Mrs. Jagan’s move to destroy the trade unions by means of their proposed
wages council” as the justification for requesting financial assistance from the USW during his
ICA-USW-supported “Foreign Leader” tour of the United States in the summer of 1958.59 Tello
argued that the BGTUC needed money to support organizational efforts rather than previously
emphasized educational missions to confront the alleged threat emanating from the PPP. While
appealing for American assistance, Tello assured colonial officials he sought to protect the
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integrity of British trade unionism in Guiana.60 Crucially, Tello and Burnham debated the
proposed wages council from opposing positions in the BGTUC Executive Council; therefore,
Tello was not misinformed regarding the proposal’s origin but intentionally mislead British and
American officials and trade unionists. At the same time, Burnham’s motives in proposing the
bill were also suspect and several colonial officials, including Renison, were under the
impression that the proposal was a political maneuver intended to undermine the PPP
government.61 In a discussion with Ralph Grey, who replaced Renison as governor in 1960,
Burnham suggested that his objective was to embarrass the PPP for supporting higher wages in
the sugar industry while failing to raise wages in the aftermath of the Postal Workers’ strike in
early 1958.62 It is likely that Burnham, like Tello, was insincere in his explanation since he
supported the wages councils in the BGTUC after Cope’s report. Moreover, Burnham
resubmitted the proposal in 1959 after the initial bill lapsed.63
The debate about a wages council offers a second insight into institutional decolonization
in addition to the impact of the bill’s association with Janet Jagan. Specifically, it sheds light on
the challenges Guianese political leaders faced in balancing support for trade unions as
institutions and advocacy of measures that most effectively addressed workers’ grievances. The
PPP campaign manifesto opposed wages councils that empowered the Governor to rule on pay
disagreements between workers and employers. However, the party’s opposition derived from
the notion that a British governor could hold power over wage rates and did not inherently
oppose a PPP-led government taking charge of ruling on workers’ pay.64
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After Burnham introduced the proposal, Janet Jagan supported the motion and argued
that sugar workers’ wages lagged behind other businesses in the colony that were less profitable
than sugar production despite the MPCA’s collective bargaining efforts. Jai Narine Singh, a
former member of the PPP who joined Burnham and Lachmansingh in initiating the PPP split in
1955, introduced a minimum wage bill for sugar workers to address what he considered the
MPCA’s failure to raise wages to a livable rate to counter the proposed wages council. Singh’s
proposal suggests that regardless of their disagreement on the efficacy of a wages council
Guianese leaders of opposing political viewpoints acknowledged that the MPCA ineffectively
served sugar workers despite the union’s gains.65 Nonetheless, some members of the Executive
Council suggested that the MPCA’s successful negotiations placed sugar workers in a relatively
advantageous position compared to workers in other industries with slightly higher wages but
little means of increasing them in the future.66
Janet Jagan disagreed, arguing that the MPCA efforts were futile, and that workers only
joined the union because of the check-off system, which assured non-union workers would lose
their jobs if they opted out of the organization. Moreover, she criticized the tendency to evaluate
sugar workers’ wages based on hourly rates since most field laborers did not work an eight-hour
day year round and much plantation employment was task-work. Jagan also noted that studies
suggested sugar workers made less than 80% of urban workers’ weekly wages, less than half of
bauxite workers, and that unemployment among sugar workers was higher than in other areas of
the economy.67 Nonetheless, there was unified hostility to the wages council proposal outside of
the PPP even though the bill originated with the PNC. Opposition derived from the notion that

65

British Guiana Executive Council Notes, April 3, 1959, CO 859-1150, BNA.
Extract from the unconfirmed minutes of Executive Council, February 17, 1960, CO 1031-3421, BNA
67
Extract from the unconfirmed minutes of Executive Council, February 17, 1960, CO 1031-3421, BNA; Janet
Jagan, “A May Day Review of New Labor Laws,” Thunder, May 10, 1958, CJRC.
66

324

voluntary machinery existed to address wage issues in the sugar industry eliminating the need for
a wages council. The BGTUC and SPA collectively opposed the measure and received strong
support from Renison and the Guianese Commissioner of Labor James Ramphal.68
Janet Jagan, in her capacity as Minister of Labor, solicited the BGTUC’s views on the
council after Burnham’s proposal. Upon receiving word of the BGTUC’s vehement opposition
and of Renison’s and Ramphal’s disapproval Jagan allowed the bill to lapse without
deliberation.69 Nonetheless, the debate over a wages council in the sugar industry did not end
with the expiration of Burnham’s 1958 proposal. According to Cope, BGTUC leaders were not
as unified in their opposition to the council as their report to Jagan suggested. Cope informed the
State Department that BGTUC disagreement on the issue of a wages council was so severe that
union leadership concluded it was impossible to submit an organizational position and ended the
conversation. Tello aggressively opposed the bill during the July meeting and likely submitted
the response to Jagan; however, the BGTUC General Secretary left the colony and was not
present during the final discussion in August.70
The wages council debate continued when Burnham introduced the bill again in 1959.71
Tello wrote a letter protesting Jagan’s proposed appointments to the wages council on July 13
and followed with an appeal to Renison for a meeting to protest the councils on July 23.72
Subsequently Tello wrote to Harry Pollak, Associate Inter-American representative of the AFL68
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CIO and warned him of Janet Jagan’s appointment of H.J.M. Hubbard as Chairman of the
proposed wages council. Hubbard, Tello insisted, was “a great believer in the Soviet way of life”
and staunch supporter of the PPP.73 Moreover, the BGTUC officially informed the government
of its general opposition to the appointment of nominated legislators to the wages council in late
July.74 While records suggest that Janet Jagan and the PPP supported the notion of a wages
council, Ralph Grey noted that neither Jagan nor the PPP pushed for the council when legislators
resisted and he suggested the party’s held a nuanced position on empowering the government to
address employer-employee debates. Grey also “wonder[ed] whether there is not something in
[Janet Jagan’s] story that the wages are not adequate” though he concluded the Legislative
Council did not have adequate information to draw such a conclusion.75
Meanwhile, colonial officials attempted to use the debate to aid the SPA in countering
MPCA demands to increase wages in the sugar industry. Negotiations stalled in June 1959 when
the MPCA demanded a $4 million increase in sugar workers’ pay and the SPA countered with an
offer of $750,000. Renison warned MPCA leaders through Commissioner of Labor Ramphal that
failure to agree to arbitration and compromise would suggest a failure of negotiating machinery
and be used as a justification for the PPP’s imposition of a wages council.76 Renison’s use of the
wages council debate to pressure the MPCA on behalf of the sugar producers suggests that the
nature of the colonial political-economy impeded the effectiveness of trade unions and
contributed to the extent of sugar workers’ impoverishment. Ironically, the MPCA’s inability to
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negotiate more aggressively left the union open to the charges of weakness that underlie PPP
support for the wages councils while the question of wages councils limited the possibility of the
MPCA taking a firmer stance against the SPA. Therefore, the institutional framework of labor
relations in the colony considerably impeded the MPCA’s effectiveness as a bargaining agent for
workers.
Thus, Guianese trade union leaders and government officials responsible for labor
relations disagreed considerably on the institutional mechanisms that would most effectively
address sugar workers’ impoverished conditions. Opponents of the wages council, however,
framed the debate as an attack on free trade unionism and convinced British and especially
American officials that the councils could only be interpreted as a PPP attempt to subvert the
colony’s embryonic democratic institutions.
Guianese Appeals for American Funding and Anglo-American Tensions
Anglo-American rivalry in British Guiana’s institutional decolonization continued in
1958 and Cope warned the State Department of British “anti-American” attitudes when three
members of Parliament visited the colony in May 1958. Specifically, the British MPs feared
American influence in the trade union movement and allegedly encouraged Guianese unionists to
appeal directly to the TUC rather than working with American unionists or regional affiliates of
the ICFTU. Cope argued that the TUC offered inadequate assistance and as a result American
trade union assistance remained necessary.77
Ishmael and Tello increased their efforts to appeal to the AFL-CIO and ICA as American
influence expanded in the Guianese trade union movement. Ishmael traveled in the United States
and Canada from May through August receiving training on American trade union organization
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and practices through the ICA.78 While he remained in the United States Ishmael was elected
vice-president of the BGTUC and he held the position concurrently with his role as president of
the MPCA. At the same time, the PPP publically presented a moderated position on trade
unionism in the colony. In addressing the BGTUC annual conference on June 29 Janet Jagan
argued that trade unions could not exist apart from political life but suggested that the PPP based
its views of unionism on the relationship between the British Labor Party and TUC.79 Her
advocacy of political unionism was consistent with PPP policy since its founding; however, it is
noteworthy that she appealed to British unionism to justify the PPP’s position rather than
reiterating an appeal for labor organization along socialist lines.
The contentious labor issues driving conflict between the PPP and conservative members
of the Guianese labor movement contributed to schisms within the BGTUC throughout 1958. In
addition to conflicts regarding the wages council debate, Cope noted that some members
attempted to repeal the BGTUC’s clause barring unions’ affiliation to the WFTU or CLC but that
the motion was defeated. More significantly, trade unionists disagreed on questions of political
affiliation for trade unions. Numerically there was support in the BGTUC for affiliating the
union with the PNC, a move which Burnham advocated strongly as a delegate to the BGTUC in
the summer of 1958. However, there other members proposed joining the PPP or establishing a
Labor Party and union leaders prevented a motion from being passed to propose affiliation to any
party on August 10.80
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Cope’s appraisal of the PNC’s sway in the BGTUC likely overstated the party’s influence
as evidenced in a report from Carroll Woods, Cope’s replacement as American Consul, to the
State Department in November. Woods noted that Burnham lost a November 14 bid for reelection for the presidency of the British Guiana Labor Union (BGLU) which also removed him
from a position of direct influence in the BGTUC. Samuel Walker, a waterfront worker, won the
position as Burnham’s replacement.81 In addition to illuminating the limits to Burnham’s
influence in the labor movement, the BGLU election was also significant in that it suggests the
union was relatively institutionally sound and independent of powerful political figures and
external organizations in late-1958. As an important member of the BGTUC, the democratic
nature of the BGLU suggests that some Guianese trade unions were growing in strength and
functionality at the grassroots level, even if improvements remained gradual in the late-1950s.
In the midst of internal debates, the BGTUC looked to American trade unions to address
an ongoing financial crisis owing to the inability of affiliated unions to provide funds to the
congress. Tello and Wendall Bobb of the BGTUC Executive Council attended an international
conference of the USW in September 1958 at the American union’s invitation. Tello used the
conference as an opportunity to request financial assistance from the AFL-CIO through Serafino
Romualdi, the AFL-CIO’s inter-American representative. At the same time the BGTUC, with
Cope’s support, appealed to the AFL-CIO to fund a lecture tour of the United States that
provided the opportunity to solicit further funding for the organization.82
Colonial officials noted Tello’s attendance at the conference, his request, and his
assurance that he was “anxious not to have the British way of doing things in British Guiana
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distorted by too much American influence.”83 According to A.M. Morgan of the Colonial Office,
Tello used the threat of the PPP destroying Guianese trade unions through the wages council to
justify his appeal for funding. While Tello expressed appreciation for the TUC’s educational
efforts and a desire to continue building Guianese unions in the British tradition, he
acknowledged that the TUC could not provide the funding the BGTUC required. Importantly,
Tello also noted that he could not apply for funding through the ICA, since as a United States
government entity an application needed to be submitted through the Minister of Labor, Janet
Jagan. Thus, Tello used connections with Romualdi and the Labor Attaché in Washington D. C.
to obtain funding for a three-week long “Foreign Leader” tour of the United States.84 Tello’s
increased relations with the United States disturbed colonial officials who voiced their concerns
to Renison and Marjorie Nicholson, one of the leading figures in the TUC International
Department.85 Nonetheless, Tello and the BGTUC grew closer to the AFL-CIO and increasingly
networked within the United States while warning American unionists of alleged PPP attempt to
destroy free trade unions in British Guiana.
Labor Relations between the PPP and Government Workers
Trade union conflict outside of the sugar industry increased after the 1957 elections as
well and tensions between the PPP and government workers influenced Guianese institutional
decolonization as much as any facet of the late-colonial period. The transport workers’ strike in
November 1957 portended a shift in labor conflict that resulted in disaster for the colony. On
November 23 transport workers walked off the job to protest newly imposed working conditions
and the attitude of an unpopular marine superintendent. The Transport Workers Union (TWU),
83

A.M. Morgan, Colonial Office to G.C. Wilson, Minister of Labor and National Service, Overseas Department,
October 3, 1958; C.C. Gibbs to Marjorie Nicholson, November 19, 1958, CO 859-1150, BNA.
84
A.M. Morgan, Colonial Office to G.C. Wilson, Minister of Labor and National Service, Overseas Department,
October 3, 1958, CO 859-1150, BNA.
85
C.G. Gibbs to Mr. Scarlett, November 19, 1958, CO 859-1150, BNA.

330

which Cope referred to as the most financially powerful union in the colony, initiated
negotiations with the Transport and Harbor Department to settle workers’ grievances. Most
importantly, Cope noted that Forbes Burnham, leader of the PNC, rallied to enlarge the strike to
embarrass the PPP government which was on record as favoring improved conditions for
transport workers.86
Burnham’s exploitation of the transport workers’ strike represents a crucial turning point
in British Guiana’s institutional decolonization, after which trade unions increasingly struck to
undermine governmental authority rather than to negotiate on workers’ behalf. Institution
building programs between 1954 and August 1957 employed tactics designed to build a
structural framework to promoted stability and, to a lesser extent, a functional democracy despite
the political objectives that motivated those efforts. Jagan, Burnham, and other Guianese leaders
used labor unrest to protest colonial policies as well as wages and working conditions throughout
the late 1940s and early 1950s; however, their demonstrations were not aimed at subverting an
elected government of their peers. After the transport workers’ strike in December 1957
Guianese trade unions gradually became tools of political subversion directed against other
Guianese leaders rather than foreign employers or the colonial government.
Moreover, trade union developments exacerbated the racial animus that grew steadily
since the PPP split. Increased conflict between Afro-Guianese and Guianese of East Indian
descent was partially a consequence of the Burnham and Jagan factions’ use of racial political
discourse prior to the 1957 elections. However, Walter Rodney, the Guianese historian and
political activists assassinated during the Burnham dictatorship, argued in A History of the
Guyanese Working People that colonial employment patterns and laws were most significant in
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segregating Guianese society.87 As a result of colonial employment patters the majority of rural
Guianese, especially field workers in the sugar industry were East Indian while the urban
population and the overwhelming majority of civil servants were Afro-Guianese. After the 1957
elections employment patterns shaped tensions between the PPP government and primarily AfroGuianese civil service employees increasing trade union conflict and racial schisms.88
In mid-November 1958 government workers struck again for several days in response to
a disagreement with the PPP government over the conclusions drawn by the Whitley Council, an
arbitrating body established to examine inequities in government employees’ salaries. The PPPaccepted the council’s decisions excepting the provision that government workers’ pay raises be
implemented retroactively to January 1, 1957, which party leaders claimed the government could
not afford. The strike ended when the PPP agreed to have the matter adjudicated and adhere to
the recommendations of an independent committee.89
The Whitley Council was established in 1955 in response to government workers’
disaffection with low wages; therefore, ongoing conflict between civil service workers and the
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Guianese government predated the PPP’s resumption of office in August 1957.90 Thus, the PPP
inherited a contentious situation that it could not effectively confront. Underlying racial tensions
exacerbated and amplified in response to continuing tension between civil servants and the
government. Burnham’s increasing mobilization of primarily Afro-Guianese civil servants
against the PPP and later American-backed urban strikes were therefore an exploitation of an
ongoing labor conflict. The CIA began funding anti-PPP movements in British Guiana sometime
between 1959 and 1962 through AFL-CIO connections with Guianese public service unions
established in the 1950s.91 The extent to which CIA and AFL-CIO influence exacerbated
conflicts between Afro-Guianese civil servants and the PPP government is unclear. However, it
is important to note that the tensions between public servants and the Guianese government were
considerable regardless of external meddling and preceded any attempt at covert manipulation
while acknowledging that American subversion clearly prolonged and made increasingly violent
unrest in the early 1960s.92
The MPCA, BGTUC, and International Relations
Tensions between civil service unions and the government challenged the PPP’s
influence among government workers, a group already inclined toward support for the PNC. At
the same time, the MPCA continued to build on its institutional strength. The check-off system
increased the MPCA’s membership to just fewer than 26,000 by March 1959, impressing
colonial officials who noted the organization’s relative strength compared to other colonial trade
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unions.93 Meanwhile, MPCA leaders negotiated an increase of one-third for manual sugar
workers’ pensions with the funds derived from the previous year’s sugar profits.94
In March 1959 MPCA President and BGTUC Vice President Richard Ishmael, BGTUC
General Secretary Rupert Tello, BGTUC President Cecil Cambridge, and BGTUC Executive
Council member Wendell Bobb embarked on an international tour that began with participation
at an ICFTU conference in Geneva.95 Subsequently, the Guianese trade unionists visited the
TUC General Council in Great Britain. The BGTUC delegation appealed to senior officials in
the Colonial Office for development assistance and a plan to address the colony’s substantial
unemployment with assistance from the TUC.96 The mission is also important in that it provides
further evidence that the TUC continued to support political activity for anti-PPP Guianese
unions despite rhetoric opposing political activities for colonial labor organizations. Most
importantly, the BGTUC mission was the first of its kind received by the Colonial Office,
reinforcing the significance the TUC and Colonial Office placed on supporting pro-British
Guianese trade unions.97 Thus, colonial officials and British labor leaders worked through the
BGTUC rather than the PPP despite an official policy of cooperation with the Jagan-led
government.
The BGTUC leaders left London for the United States on April 11 where they
rendezvoused with Forbes Burnham who had been traveling to several American cities
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encouraging private investment in British Guiana and criticizing the PPP government as
communist and anti-democratic. The BGTUC delegation joined Burnham’s request for private
investment and appealed for funds to support their labor activities. Woods warned the State
Department that the meeting of Guianese delegations in Washington D.C. provided “further
evidence of the very thin line between the PNC and the assertedly [sic] non-political” BGTUC.98
Connections to American labor offset the cost of Guianese labor leaders’ campaigning. The
USW covered part of the BGTUC leaders’ expenses in traveling to the United States and
Romualdi assisted Tello in procuring further funding from the AFL-CIO for lodging in
Washington D.C.99
Several State Department officials organized a meeting with Tello, Bobb, and AFL-CIO
representatives at the American union’s request on April 14. The memorandum of conversation
from the meeting notes that the AFL-CIO was “squiring” the “British Guiana Trade Unionists
around the U.S.” The conversation appears to have been short and centered on political issues,
such as Tello’s fear of political parties infiltrating Guianese unions. Interestingly, despite his
opposition to the PPP Tello encouraged the State Department officials to extend assistance to
Cheddi Jagan when he visited the United States later in the year. Tello noted his disagreement
with Jagan’s political orientation but emphasized that Guiana needed assistance to confront
poverty and deprivation and he suggested that the PPP would benefit more from continued
economic strife than from economic improvements.100 After the meeting at the State Department,
Ishmael, Tello, Cambridge, and Bobb made a final stop in Canada to visit Canadian trade
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unionists prior to their return to British Guiana where ORIT was opening a week-long training
seminar in Georgetown.101
In addition to AFL-CIO and USW assistance, contributions from leading businesses
including Booker Brothers and Demerara Bauxite eased the financial burden of sending the four
men on a trip to Europe and the United States for over a month.102 The cost left to the BGTUC is
unclear; however, the assistance of British employers and American trade unionists suggests a
continuing effort on the part of non-governmental Anglo-American organizations to integrate the
Guianese labor movement into the Western capitalist system. The BGTUC’s and MPCA’s
increased appeals for American funding and dedication to traveling internationally after the 1957
election suggests that anti-PPP trade union leaders did not expect to be able to defeat PPPsupported labor activists at the grassroots level.
Ironically, the reformist labor movement’s increasing appeals for outside funding
conflicted with Tello’s and Ishmael’s previous warnings that external financing of Guianese
unions would prove counterproductive and the extent of international travel undermined the local
involvement that initially gained Ishmael supporters on the sugar plantations.103 In 1953
Ishmael’s opponents begrudgingly acknowledged that he tirelessly traveled around the colony to
sugar plantations; however, by the late 1950s British officials consistently criticized his failure to
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travel outside of Georgetown while he was in British Guiana.104 Moreover, despite the BGTUC’s
considerable efforts at international diplomacy in mid-1959, including sponsoring several ORIT
visits to the colony, the union inconsistently participated in Guianese workers’ aggressive efforts
to unionize.105 In the midst of labor disputes in British Guiana, for example, Tello was named
CADORIT’s representative to the International Plantation Workers’ Confederation. 106 Tello led a
six-man Guianese delegation that included Ishmael to the conference in Barbados on September
17 while strikes in the colony persisted.107
Industrial Labor Unrest and Workers Protests in from 1959-1960
Guianese workers’ aggressive attempts to unionize and improve wages and conditions
continued while Guianese leaders internationalized the debate over the nature of post-colonial
trade unionism. On July 15 workers at Matthew’s Ridge walked off in protest against the African
Manganese Company’s low wages, poor living facilities, and failure to recognize the BGMWU
as miners’ bargaining agent. Substantial unrest resulted in a call for the riot squad to quell
hostilities after an attempt to dynamite the main building. The strike led to negotiations aimed at
addressing workers’ grievances and at the urging of the Department of Labor the initiation of
discussions for recognition of the BGMWU on the estate.108 The Motor Transport Workers and
Municipal Employees Union also negotiated wage increases in late 1959.109 While the unrest at
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Matthew’s Ridge calmed, tension continued between civil service employees and the PPP
government. Clerks picketed the Public Works Department on September 17 protesting delays in
wage increases.110 On September 20 the TWU passed a resolution requiring its Executive to
work with the Federation of Unions of Government Employees (FUGE) to demand a four-dollara-day minimum wage for all government employees retroactive to January 1.111 In response,
Cheddi Jagan announced a proposal on September 22 to increase minimum wages while refusing
immediate pay increases and abolishing leave passes for some categories of civil servants.112
Meanwhile, the MPCA continued negotiating precedent-setting agreements with the
SPA. Ishmael, Ramphal, and representatives from Booker Brothers and Demba agreed to the
introduction of an eight-hour workday with minimum wages for field workers on September 17,
along with cost-of-living increases retroactive to January 1, 1959, and the introduction of a
pension scheme that would begin on January 1, 1960.113 Nonetheless, MPCA gains came with an
important consequence, namely that the union accepted the “stabilization of the labor force.” The
SPA policy created a smaller labor force of regular workers who enjoyed negotiated benefits
while leaving significant numbers of sugar workers with diminishing amounts of casual
employment and no protection under MPCA-SPA agreements.114 The reduction of employment
opportunities on sugar estates coincided with a general labor crisis resulting from increases in
population that far surpassed new employment opportunities. The colony’s rising population
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represented an ongoing problem. Political scientist Matthew Lange notes, for example, that
British Guiana’s labor force increased by 100,000 while jobs increased by 10,000 between 1946
and 1960.115
The BGTUC’s acceptance of British employers’ funding also contributed to a split in the
BGTUC in May. Andrew Jackson, a PNC representative in the Legislative Council and head of
the Post Office Workers Union and FUGE, cited the acceptance of employers’ funds as part of
the reason for the withdrawal of the unions he led from the BGTUC. Carroll Woods suggested in
his report to the State Department that Jackson’s personal feud with the Postmaster General also
contributed to his decision.116 Nonetheless, anti-PPP unions relied increasingly on external
financing as British Guiana moved closer to self-government. AFL-CIO funding and diplomacy
increased Tello’s and the BGTUC’s profile in the United States while the ICFTU agreed to begin
an ongoing program of assistance through the International Solidarity Fund (ISF) to assist
BGTUC organizing in July 1959.117
Ongoing conflict between civil service workers and the PPP government superseded
tensions between Jackson and the BGTUC. The BGTUC intervened on FUGE’s behalf when
10,000 government workers struck again on December 2, 1959 after negotiations with the
government broke down. Workers returned to work on December 17 having accepted the
government’s terms on the condition that the issue would be submitted to the Whitley Council.
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At the request of the BGTUC, the TUC sent Lawrence Sapper, a full-time trade union official in
London, to assist FUGE in their negotiations in January.118 Sapper spent two weeks advising the
civil service unions and helping prepare their case which centered on pay anomalies and
protested conditions of service.119 Even as Sapper advised Guianese labor leaders some members
of the TUC suggested that British trade union involvement needed to be reduced as
decolonization progressed. Walter Hood, head of the colonial section of the TUC’s International
Department, argued in a meeting with the OEF and Colonial Office that British trade unions
could only intervene in colonial affairs at the invitation of colonial unions as British territories
approached independence. Colonial officials meeting with Hood in 1960 requested British trade
unionists’ increased participation in institution-building and suggested that the TUC’s
involvement in colonial affairs remained stagnant since mid-1957. Hood countered the reproach
and argued that the OEF was the only party in the talks that would retain direct influence in
colonies after independence and therefore should be most involved in the decolonization.120
British and American cooperation in supporting reformist, anti-PPP trade unionists
continued in March 1960 as the British government discussed a return to full internal selfgovernment in British Guiana the following August.121 British diplomats, ICA workers, and
American trade unionists developed plans to send roughly half a dozen Guianese trade unionists
to Puerto Rico and the United States for intensive training to follow-up on a seminar given in
Georgetown. Plans also called for sending either a British or American unionist to British Guiana
for a year to assist the anti-PPP unions that were expected to be “the only effective opposition to
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the pro-Communist line” of the PPP.122 Robert Buchanan, the Canadian Executive Secretary of
the International Journalists and Writers’ Union, traveled to British Guiana on behalf of the
AFL-CIO in May and presented the BGTUC with a $4,500 station wagon as a gift from ORIT.123
The TUC assisted Oxford University and Ruskin College in holding a series of week-long
summer schools for colonial unionists, including from British Guiana, during July and early
August.124
Guianese labor leaders also made changes in anticipation of the following year’s election.
In May the TWU passed a resolution overturning a forty-year-old rule and allowing the union’s
executive members to simultaneously hold positions in political parties for the first time.125 On
June 25 Woods opened the BGTUC annual conference with a speech discussing the ICA’s
considerable efforts to build the Guianese labor movement. His speech expanded into an
explanation of the “neighborly” motives that shaped American policy toward the Caribbean
appealing to Guianese workers to increase their connections to the United States.126 In June
Richard Ishmael won re-election as President of the BGTUC and Tello retained his position as
General Secretary though Colonial Office reports suggest that Tello’s influence declined
beginning in 1959.127 Additionally, the BGTUC passed a resolution permitting the Executive
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Council to take whatever stand it deemed advisable to procure a national minimum wage of four
dollars per day, a rate that the PPP government previously rejected.128 Ishmael and Tello led the
union on a picket line in protest against Kirpalini Brothers in November as a result of the firm’s
failure to respect prescribed minimum wages again seeking to gain support from rank-and-file
workers.129
Guianese connections with international labor expanded when Ishmael and Tello received
appointments to the Executive Committee of the Caribbean Congress of Labor (CCL), which
replaced CADORIT as the regional arm of Western international labor on September 25,
1960.130 In October the TUC General Council sent a representative to assist the MPCA in its
negotiations with the SPA. The negotiations resulted in a wage increase, severance pay, and a
pension scheme for sugar workers. Moreover, the agreement established a minimum wage rate
for sugar workers that exceeded the rate for unskilled government employees for the first time. 131
The compromise built on important precedents in the sugar industry’s labor relations and was
possible in part as a result of British Guiana’s record sugar production in 1960.132 The PPP-led
government, however, deemed the pension scheme unacceptable and blocked its introduction in
much more consequence” than Tello by mid-1960. Nonetheless, Grey praised Tello’s contributions to the Guianese
trade union movement. See: Ralph Grey to Angus MacKintosh, July 5, 1960, CO 1031-3421, BNA. Regardless of
the likelihood that Tello’s stature was inflated internationally relative to his local importance, this dissertation shows
that his influence with British and especially American trade union leaders and political officials is understated in
the scholarship. Ultimately, Tello’s international connections allowed him to exert considerable influence in
Guianese trade union and political debates.
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July 1961.133 Thus, the MPCA’s internationalization increased its bargaining power and
institutional position despite the tenuous support of Guianese sugar workers and the direct
opposition of the workers-supported PPP.
Conclusion
The Guianese labor movement was inherently political since its founding and AngloAmerican labor leaders’ support for Guianese trade unions exacerbated the tendency toward
using trade unions for political objectives. Institution-building efforts between 1954 and 1957
were designed to achieve political objectives through the establishment of a functionally sound
trade union movement; however, when the project failed to achieve its objective the labor
movement became increasingly corrupted and utilized to directly attack the elected PPP
government. Thus, institution-building efforts worsened the inherent weakness in the Guianese
trade unions. In turn, the politicization of labor organization that was an important aspect of
British and American labor leaders’ criticism of the PPP became more predominant.
Moreover, because of its anti-PPP nature, the institution-building program lessened the
possibility of true nation building through diplomacy and compromise between Guianese of
differing views. It is possible that no compromise would have been reached regardless since
there is evidence that the PPP received funding from the Eastern bloc, which likely inhibited
their willingness to strike agreements as well.134 Nonetheless, the PPP accurately interpreted
external involvement in the trade union movement as part of a program to destroy their party.135
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Anglo-American support for anti-democratic trade union practices to keep PPP leaders
out of the MPCA reinforced PPP suspicions and further undermined the possibility of
compromise between Guianese leaders. British and American officials and trade union leaders
explained their ideological compromise as necessary to establish the representative institutions
they argued were ideal and necessary to achieve long-term Anglo-American objectives, most
importantly the establishment of liberal-capitalist, democratic post-colonial societies. As a result,
the Guianese labor movement remained institutionally dysfunctional and anti-democratic, while
inconsistently representing Guianese workers. Moreover, the movement was highly
internationalized. British, American, and possibly Eastern-bloc imperatives shaped the internal
debates between Guianese over how to design post-colonial society. Since the colony was
institutionally dysfunctional, conflict was nearly assured when the British government agreed to
return full internal self-government and external trade autonomy to British Guiana in August
1961.136
At the same time, TUC involvement in the colony decreased between 1957 and 1961
leading British some officials to lament the lack of British trade union involvement and growing
American influence in the Caribbean. While colonial officials expressed understanding that the
United States would play a larger role in the region as colonies became independent they
encouraged the TUC to take an active interest in protecting British commercial influence after
independence.137 Nonetheless, some colonial officials argued that institution-building efforts
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proved a success and that the primary issue facing Caribbean trade unions was maintaining
newly established standards.138
The TUC’s reasons for retreat were threefold. First, British labor leaders prioritized the
ICFTU’s long-term viability and cooperation with the OEC in colonial areas undermined the
organization’s claim to support workers in the international labor body. Second, the TUC, like
the British Empire, was financially weakened after World War II and labor leaders’ argued that
cutting colonial programs was a practical necessity. Finally, TUC leaders noted that the
advancement of self-government inherently demanded decreased TUC involvement in colonial
areas. Nonetheless, the OEF and Colonial Office consistently expressed hope that the TUC
would continue to play an important role in the colonies instead of delegating an increased role
to the ICFTU. British policymakers and businesses appeals suggest that they expected
decolonization to establish political independence but preserve traditional pro-British capitalism
in the region.139 Moreover, the TUC’s withdrawal hinted that the American expansion of
influence continued to erode British power prior to the West Indian colonies independence. 140
Ultimately, the TUC’s diminished colonial influence suggested that American labor’s tactical
objectives increasingly determined the nature of external involvement in Guianese institution
building during the last phase of decolonization.
Thus, the structure and racial composition of Guianese socio-economics, British and
American support for anti-democratic pro-Western unions, and the PPP’s efforts to incorporate
trade unions into a social revolution combined to create an inescapable conflict. This conflict,
between the PPP and anti-PPP trade union movement, proved crucially important when full
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internal self-government was established as a precursor to independence in 1961.141 Because of
the AFL-CIO’s assumption of the primary role among external trade unions between 1957 and
1961, reformist, anti-PPP trade union leaders turned to American unionists more so than the
TUC when unrest broke out in 1962 and 1963. The AFL-CIO and CIA used the unrest and
American labor leaders’ connections to exacerbate conflicts and destabilize the PPP government,
and objective that dovetailed with the aims of some elements in the anti-PPP labor. Despite TUC
efforts to stabilize the government and compartmentalize labor struggles apart from politics,
diplomatic efforts at the highest levels of the American and British governments agreed to
remove the PPP through electoral changes.
Most importantly, the actions of Guianese trade unionists after 1957 proved most
significant in fueling the colony’s unrest after 1961. The MPCA increasingly had difficulty
balancing its role as an organization representing Guianese workers and its opposition to the
PPP, though the union continued to obtain important concessions for sugar workers. At the same
time predominantly Afro-Guianese urban unions mobilized politically against the PPP largely as
a consequence of ongoing disagreements over civil servants’ wages. Politicians and external
actors manipulated the racial aspects of urban opposition to the PPP; however, it is critical to
acknowledge that the labor issues underlying resentment originated organically. Each of the
participants in labor unrest increasingly looked to the outside for assistance, as did the PPP after
1961, continuing the internationalization of Guianese decolonization.
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Conclusion
“‘Time was not in [sic] our side.’ The tide of events was moving rapidly, and might well not
allow scope for the organizations and structures which we wished to see develop in Colonial
societies to grow up by the slow and sure process of natural evolution and ‘learning by
experience.’” Minutes of a confidential conference of heads of labor departments, Colonial
Office, October 5, 1951.1
Institutional Warfare and American Intervention
Ultimately, British Guiana’s political dysfunction beginning in 1962 directly resulted
from the colony’s failure to establish an institutionally functional system of labor relations
during the late colonial period. Internal labor conflicts began in 1946 between social
revolutionary labor leaders and reformists as well as between the revolutionaries and colonial
officials. The trade union conflict became internationalized throughout the 1950s, was
complicated as a result of racially divided employment demographics after 1957, and exploded
in 1962.2 Social breakdown resulted from 150 years of colonial labor relationships that
segregated society and contributed to endemic racial tensions, local ideological disagreements
that motived perpetual struggle between Guianese, and American intervention that aimed at
exploiting the situation to remove the People’s Progressive Party (PPP).3
Between 1962 and 1964 internationalized efforts to shape the colony’s post-colonial
labor relations devolved into political violence. Between 1946 and the late 1950s British officials
1
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and trade unionists worked to establish capitalist-democratic institutions in British Guiana that
were integrated into an Anglo-led system. The Trades Union Congress’s (TUC) retreat in the
colony in 1957 signified the beginning of a shift toward increased American influence over
colonial developments.4 As a result, American labor leaders’ wielded substantial influence in the
colony when the PPP won elections to determine the government expected to lead the colony to
independence in early 1962. At the same time, the Kennedy administration exerted increasing
influence over British policy in Guiana and pressured Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to delay
the colony’s exit from the empire.5
The British-led attempt at guiding Guiana toward self-government resulted in a quandary
when economic and political institutions conflicted. Guianese trade unions, particularly the
Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA), won benefits for workers and set important legislative
and collective bargaining precedents between 1954 and 1961. At the same time, mechanization
and stabilization of the workforce in the sugar industry led to record profits and the Guianese
experienced one of the most prosperous years in the colony’s history in 1961.6 Nonetheless,
industrial changes displaced many East Indian sugar workers and poor weather the following
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year undermined sugar productivity.7 Moreover, improvements for the primarily Afro-Guianese
urban laborers did not keep pace with advances on the sugar estates. The economic situation
reinforced the racialized political rhetoric Guianese politicians increasingly employed after the
PPP split in 1955. The predominantly East Indian sugar workers attributed economic
improvement to PPP policies while remaining receptive to the party’s appeal for more radical
change to offset the consequences of increasing productivity for displaced workers. Conversely,
most Afro-Guianese interpreted economic developments as evidence of PPP favoritism for East
Indians.
Racial strife played a major role in political debates in 1961 and ethnicity determined
voting patterns far more than any other factor. When the polls closed on August 21 the vast
majority of East Indians had voted for the PPP and the majority of Afro-Guianese for the Forbes
Burnham-led People’s National Congress (PNC).8 Importantly, some sugar workers continued to
support the reformist MPCA while casting ballots for the social revolutionary PPP.9 In addition
to racialized politics, however, the vast majority of East Indians had no economic motives to
shift party loyalties. Burnham’s PNC articulated a political ideology similar to the PPP’s
expressed views but specifically appealed to an Afro-Guianese constituency. The only other
party of note, the Peter D’Aguiar-led United Force (UF), remained a relatively minor party
whose conservative capitalist positions did not appeal to generate support among the colony’s
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laborers. Therefore, the PPP’s victory divided the Guianese racially and exacerbated the
“perpetual state of inter-union war” about which James Ramphal warned colonial officials in
1954.10
However, the struggle in the labor movement during the early 1960s differed from earlier
trade union conflicts in ways that contributed to political breakdown and violence. The dispute
over labor relations devolved into a multifaceted conflict based on three separate dynamics. First,
the social revolutionary PPP and the reformist MPCA struggled for control of labor institutions
in the sugar industry as a result of ideological disagreements. Second, the East Indian-dominated
PPP conflicted with Afro-Guianese labor leaders and workers positioned against the party and
who aligned with the PNC. Finally, the CIA and AFL-CIO worked through local opponents of
the PPP to undermine the Guianese government.
Stephen Rabe demonstrates that United States intervention in British Guiana in 1962 and
1963 made a mockery of the colony’s right to self-determination and played a significant part in
impeding state formation in addition to directly putting in power a dictatorial and oppressive
kleptocracy under Forbes Burnham. Rabe also shows that the Kennedy administration pressured
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan into replacing the first-past-the-post electoral system in
British Guiana with a system of proportional representation to create the conditions for the
removal of the popularly elected PPP government.11 American participation was the decisive
factor in removing the Jagan-led PPP; however, as Robert Waters argues, the American role was
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“more subtle than we knew.”12 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were only part of the
complex debate over the nature of British Guiana’s post-colonial labor organizations that tore
apart British Guiana beginning in 1962. Piero Gleijeses notes in his analysis of the Americanbacked coup in Guatemala there was no “convenient villain” singularly controlling events on the
ground.13 Similarly, the CIA/AFL-CIO role in British Guiana was part of a diverse combination
of events and actors throughout the world but centered on local conflict within the colony. Three
specific issues addressed throughout this dissertation contributed to the institutional failure that
the CIA and AFL-CIO exploited in 1962 and 1963.
First, colonialism created racially divided employment demographics that placed the
predominantly Afro-Guianese government workers against the PPP once the party became the
administrating authority in 1957. Racial tensions preceded the PPP’s founding and several
factors, including Anglo-American meddling, contributed to racializing Guianese politics.14
Nonetheless, when the PPP assumed the responsibility of governing it created an impossible
situation for the working class party. The PPP advocated on behalf of sugar workers negotiating
against foreign capitalist employers while being forced to bargain against wage increases for
civil servants since the increased pay would come from taxing other workers in the colony.15
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Civil service unions’ demands for increased wages preceded the PPP’s assumption of power;
however, once Cheddi Jagan took the reins of government the unions turned their disillusion
against the party.16 The racialized nature of the dispute intensified the divisions between East
Indians and Afro-Guianese but it remained a class dispute at its core.
The first major strike against the PPP in February 1962 began in response to a PPP
budget that included a compulsory savings plan designed to generate necessary development
capital for the government. The budget was democratically constructed, practical if unappealing,
and not at all radical.17 There is definitive evidence that the AFL-CIO and CIA supported antiPPP demonstrators, though the extent of American assistance is strongly contested.18
Nonetheless, protests cannot be divorced from the broader context. Civil service workers had
been in conflict with the administrating authorities in Georgetown for eight years. In October
1961 government workers requested a hearing from the Whitley Council in attempt to negotiate a
pay increase and apparently received no response prior to the protests.19 Thus, the 1962 strikes
are most effectively understood as a complex demonstration in which different motives drove
various actors. The disillusionment grew largely out of a long-term sense of frustration toward
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several administrations in Georgetown that did not increase pay for civil servants.20 At the same
time, Burnham and other political leaders clearly used workers’ disappointment to further their
own political objectives and the CIA and AFL-CIO likely took advantage of the disturbances to
prolong unrest and destabilize the PPP. While it is possible that the CIA contributed to the timing
of the strike in addition to providing funds for protesters, it is important to acknowledge that
underlying domestic tensions were structural and had been gesticulating since the Interim
government—and indirectly for over a century.
Second, ideological differences created an immutable struggle between the PPP’s social
revolutionary intentions as the head of an elected government and the largest union in the colony.
The conflict between PPP leaders and the MPCA that began when Jagan left the union in 1945
exploded after the PPP’s election in 1961. The PPP formed the Guiana Sugar Workers’ Union in
1961, which became the Guiana Agricultural Workers’ Union (GAWU), and in 1963, the party
again introduced a Labor Relations Bill designed to legally replace the MPCA with the partyaffiliated organization.21 Brindley Benn, a member of the PPP executive council and Minister of
Natural Resources openly stated that his party remained committed to removing MPCA president
Richard Ishmael after the elections.22
Ishmael immediately traveled to the United States in response to the election and
received a warm welcome from the AFL-CIO. Importantly, Ishmael intimated to AFL-CIO
representatives in a “very confidential” conversation that he would support efforts to delay
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independence until Jagan could be removed from office.23 The MPCA president’s trip
corresponded with Cheddi Jagan’s official visit as head of state in what proved to be a fateful
meeting with President John F. Kennedy.24 By the time the two men returned to Guiana the
Kennedy administration determined against offering development aid to Jagan and presumably
the AFL-CIO agreed to increase support for the MPCA.25 The MPCA president also appealed for
aid from the ICFTU and the international labor organization forwarded the request to the AFLCIO.26 While Ishmael and Jagan engaged in international diplomacy, sugar workers continued to
struggle for small improvements and to cope with displacement in British Guiana. The result was
a clash between the democratically supported political party pursuing social revolution with
increased ties to the Eastern bloc and the legally entrenched and anti-democratic reformist trade
union that advocated capitalism and had integrated into the Western system.
Compromise between the PPP and MPCA was impossible because as Osmond Dyce,
Secretary Treasurer of the American-affiliated Caribbean Congress of Labor (CCL) explained,
“The problem in British Guiana is not just another question of one union raiding the other. It
involves a fundamental struggle between two systems of trade unionism and must be treated as
such.”27 Time had passed too rapidly for Anglo-American officials, labor leaders, and employers
to construct a democratically-run reformist labor movement amenable to Western interests in the
sugar industry. In 1963 the MPCA struck against the PPP in opposition to a proposed Labor
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Relations Bill providing the CIA and AFL-CIO with the opportunity to exploit the unrest by
financially supporting protests against the PPP.28
Third, the conflict over Guianese labor institutions was internationalized throughout the
1950s. Immediately after the PPP’s re-election in August 1961 labor leaders on both sides of the
ideological debate turned to outside actors for assistance rather than negotiating internally.
External appeals suggest that the internationalization of the Guianese labor struggle contributed
to an institutional breakdown before the unrest began in 1962. The motives of Guianese labor
leaders and rank-and-file workers merged with the objectives of external actors to frame the
conflict after the PPP’s election. Striking workers could prolong their protests since they had
financial support; however, the strikes’ aims evolved to address concerns of external actors as
well as Guianese workers.
The AFL-CIO’s displacement of the TUC as the most influential external actor in the
Guianese labor movement was crucial in shaping the MPCA-PPP conflict in 1963. Specifically,
American labor leaders’ emphasis on removing the PPP took precedence over the TUC’s efforts
to salvage labor relations and solidify a functional movement that would reduce the appeal of
social revolution. Most importantly, the MPCA and British Guiana Trades Union Congress
(BGTUC) continued to strike despite TUC mediation and the PPP’s compromise on all of the
major points of protest.29 CIA, AFL-CIO, and some Guianese labor leaders’ aim of subverting
the PPP government supplanted Guianese reformist trade unions’ opposition to the bill’s
provisions as the justification for the strike. The attempt to integrate the Guianese labor
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movement into the Western system for mutual benefit degenerated into a symbiotic relationship
that allowed the MPCA and CIA to collaborate in a policy of overthrowing the PPP in 1963.
Ultimately, both internal and external factors contributed to institutional dysfunction. The
series of strikes that destabilized the PPP government are most effectively understood as a third
phase of conflict in the process of institutional decolonization in which dysfunctional labor
relations led to systemic collapse in British Guiana. However, the context and small differences
between the various strikes illuminate an important complexity. The 1962 strikes, as Rabe and
Palmer note, were irrational if understood as a response to the PPP financial plan; however, the
budget debate became a tangible symbol of more deeply-held disagreements between the PPP
and the Afro-Guianese community. As Robert Waters and Gordon Daniels note, the budget’s
austerity measures fell hardest on urban Afro-Guianese laborers and it is significant that the
MPCA played virtually no role in the strike.30 Conversely, the BGTUC easily mobilized urban
workers, many of whom had been engaged in conflicts with the government in Georgetown for
since 1954. Thus, broad disillusionment between Afro-Guianese workers and the PPP played the
most significant role in generating a backlash to the budget initiating the strike, which the CIA
then used to mobilize anti-PPP sentiment.31 The unrest in 1962 was far from unexpected, new, or
external in origin, though the ongoing turmoil and extent of destruction increased as a result of
American involvement.
Similarly, the 1963 Labor Relations bill was, like the 1953 bill, designed to give sugar
workers the opportunity to choose the union of their choice. Western labor leaders acknowledged
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as much and noted that the MPCA would not win a referendum among sugar workers.32
Nonetheless, the bill was coupled with the GAWU’s campaign encouraging workers to withdraw
from the MPCA and the PPP’s attempt to decertify the MPCA and fourteen other unions.33 At
the same time the Labor Relations Bill again codified provisions that would have allowed the
PPP to exercise considerable influence over the process of certifying unions. Reformist labor
leaders in the MPCA and BGTUC rejected empowering the government in such a manner in
addition to their ideological opposition to the relationship between the PPP and GAWU. BGTUC
president Brentnol Blackmon warned AFL-CIO president George Meany that the bill would act
as a “beachhead for the subversion of all democratic institutions on the continent.”34 Federation
of Unions of Government Employees (FUGE) president and PNC General Secretary Andrew
Jackson also protested the bill and specifically warned the United Nations (UN) that he did not
think the bill was similar to the American Wagner Act regardless of the PPP’s protestations.35
Reformist labor leaders’ resistance to the Labor Relations Bills in 1953 and 1963 resulted
from two factors. First, the PPP’s 1963 bill targeted a broader section of the workforce. Waters
and Daniels note that the PPP created competing civil service and mining unions in addition to
creating the GAWU.36 Second, American funding supported the strikers, encouraged Guianese
unionists to continue protesting, and shifted the discourse from criticism of the bill’s provisions
to a referendum on the PPP government. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that even
32
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though American funding allowed the strikes to continue the protesters themselves were
Guianese and they were motivated to strike for domestic reasons. Thus, the unrest in Guiana
already existed and the conditions were ripe for Anglo-American manipulation. Finally, the 1964
strikes, as Waters and Daniels have shown, were primarily a PPP effort to generate support for
the government in advance of elections designed to remove the party from power and very likely
were undertaken with Cuban aid.37 Ultimately, the labor conflicts that undermined Guiana were
internationalized but grounded in domestic disputes.
There was a substantial capitalist, pro-Western current in Guianese politics; however,
parties based on those ideals only acquired a small amount of support. The MPCA made
considerable gains in negotiating benefits and securing a large base of membership between
1954 and 1961 and evidence suggests that Ishmael achieved as much as was possible in
extracting concessions from the Sugar Producers’ Association (SPA). Indeed, the SPA frequently
considered his demands irrational and his positions nearly undermined any cooperation between
the union and employers in the late 1950s.38 Nonetheless, the depth of poverty and asymmetries
of power in employer-employee relations meant that reform within the existing system could not
effectively addressed workers’ demands rapidly enough to undermine support for a popular
leader offering fundamental systemic changes, especially after racial conflict distorted the
political environment. Some sugar workers continued to support both the MPCA and PPP;
however, many shifted allegiance to the GAWU and the PPP retained overwhelming grassroots
loyalty among East Indians. The colony’s institutional framework collapsed when the MPCA
joined unions of urban workers uncompromisingly opposed to the PPP.
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Diplomacy between the PPP and United States could have resolved tensions enough to
minimize American intervention absent the Cuban revolution, which polarized American foreign
policy and emboldened the PPP. Nonetheless, such an accord was unlikely to resolve labor
conflicts since the ongoing conflict to determine the nature of Guyana’s post-colonial institutions
persisted. American, British, and Guianese political and labor leaders were too committed to the
outcome of the trade union struggle to compromise and the issue at stake was more fundamental
than diplomatic or trade agreements that could vacillate over time. The structure of Guyana’s
institutions would determine the political-economic system on which post-colonial society would
be based, and the nature of the political-economic system would shape transnational relations
more than superficial diplomatic overtures.
The Lessons of British Guiana for Post-War United States Foreign Policy
The Anglo-American manipulation of Guianese sovereignty achieved American goals. It
is clear that the aims of policymakers and labor leaders in the United States were secured as an
outcome of intervention in the colony in 1962 and 1963. Self-determination and democracy were
powerful ideals but remained the least important objectives for the United States government and
AFL-CIO in hemispheric relations. The short-term objective of removing Jagan from office
came to pass when Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys imposed a system of proportional
representation and held elections in December 1964.39 The new electoral system allowed a
coalition between the PNC and UF to head the government when Guyana became independent
two years later despite the PPP’s accrual of the plurality of votes.40
In the long-term the Eisenhower administration made clear that it intended to secure
access to Guianese raw materials, strictly limit the colony’s trade outside the Western sphere,
39
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and vigorously oppose the entrance of communist ideas into the hemisphere.41 In 2014 the
Guyanese economy remains based on agricultural and extractive industries and is supported with
investments from the Inter-American Development Bank. Sixty-six percent of the colony’s
export trade is to the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. Though its imports are more
diversified, Guyana brings in more goods from the United States than from any other country.
Raw material extraction, liberalized finance, and trade with the United States have not addressed
the country’s needs and it remains among the poorest nations in the hemisphere.42 Guyana, as
Stephen Rabe notes, was in many ways a casualty of American aims, though as this dissertation
shows it was a victim of colonialism and a complex process of institutional decolonization most
of all.
It is possible absent American-funded subversion the PPP would have been forced to
moderate its policies to accommodate the political views of the substantial reformist presence in
British Guiana. It is also conceivable that the growing relationship between the PPP and Cuba
would have encouraged Cheddi Jagan to push more aggressively for a transition to socialism
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regardless of domestic sentiments. At the same time, it is likely that the PPP’s domestic
opponents would have had to accept considerable socialization and an Eastern-bloc oriented, if
neutral foreign policy. It is equally imaginable that ideological disagreements and racial tensions
would have exploded without external involvement; however, the possibility of cooperation
would have continued to exist in a way it did not once external actors made the determination to
subvert the PPP. Most importantly, the Guianese could have struggled together as citizens of an
independent nation to determine their own future absent the interference of Cold War actors.
The most recently available evidence suggests that the PPP’s Marxist-Leninist leaders
began working toward the establishment of a socialist-communist society connected to the
Eastern-bloc in 1946 through the institutional transformation of the colony while expecting to
retain cordial relations with the United States and Great Britain.43 The actions undertaken by the
left-wing of the PPP suggest that a Jagan-led government would have provided a strategic
challenge and perhaps a direct threat to American interests as the National Security Council
(NSC) and American labor leaders defined them. While it is unclear the extent to which the PPP
received support from the Eastern-bloc, it is possible that similar criticisms could be levied
toward communist involvement as well.44 Perhaps most importantly, the PPP’s removal paved
the way for the dictatorial Burnham government and oppression thereafter. In light of new
evidence, critics of American foreign policy toward British Guiana should emphasize the
destructive tendencies of intervention as a tool of foreign policy and urge the re-evaluation of its
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far too frequent use rather than suggest that American intelligence misread Cheddi Jagan’s
intentions. PPP policies were designed to pursue what party leaders thought was in the best
interest of the Guianese people and the party had popular support even though it also faced
considerable domestic opposition.
Thus, there are three key questions for scholars of American foreign policy that provide
the opportunity for future research. The first is whether United States labor leaders’ and officials’
pursued policies that were in the best interest of American citizens. A considerable amount of
information about Guiana came from AFL-CIO leaders who in turn gleaned information from a
select few colonial trade unionists. Much recent research considers American labor’s foreign
relations and there is room for much more research evaluating whether AFL-CIO activities
advanced or degraded Americans’ interests. There is also a need to evaluate whether the NSC
and State Department defined foreign policy objectives in a manner that benefited ordinary
Americans.
The second question is whether or not the costs of intervention were worth the price of
achieving American objectives. The Guyanese people, most importantly, paid a heavy price as a
consequence of United States intervention. More fundamentally, interventionist policies are
corrosive to international relations and seem to be self-perpetuating. External interference in
Guiana’s domestic disputes compromised principles of self-determination and negatively
impacted the domestic situation in the United States. In conceding that it is acceptable to outlaw
ideas, as Dulles argued that it was in defining his notion of the Monroe Doctrine, policymakers
reinforced a logic that justified restricting intellectual freedom within the United States as well.
Finally, scholars have the opportunity to evaluate whether institution-building efforts could have
succeeded if they were implemented more effectively. Some aspects of institution-building
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succeeded, and it would be useful to pursue further studies to examine those programs more
systematically. It is worth considering whether a collaborative international program could have
benefited the Guianese and simultaneously achieved Anglo-American interests.
Perhaps most importantly, this dissertation uses the prism of institutional decolonization
to argue that the British colonies’ transition to independence was a complex and
internationalized process involving a plethora of state and non-state actors debating the structure
of post-colonial Guyana. Labor leaders played a central role in the process of negotiating the
nature of post-colonial institutions and their ideologies and objectives influenced international
relationships. Transnational connections exacerbated ideological disagreements and resulted in a
web of symbiotic relationships that ensconced the progression toward self-government in the
Cold War. At the same time, the ideological debates unfolding in decolonizing areas created the
ground on which the Cold War conflict raged. Nonetheless, the Cold War and decolonization
were merely superficial manifestations of a phase of adjustment in international relations. The
underlying struggle between promoting self-determination and securing Anglo-American
interests preceded the period and continues to the preset day.
In the end, American labor leaders and the various agencies of the U.S. government
involved in British Guiana achieved their objectives more than any other actor in the struggle—
other than Forbes Burnham, who came to power as a result of the chaos. Regardless, American
labor’s support of neo-liberal foreign policy contributed to its demise in the United States.
Moreover, Guyana remains an impoverished country that is the source of a variety of
transnational criminal activities, including narcotics and sex trafficking, and forced labor of
children.45 Thus, failed institution-building, and outright political subversion, contributed to the
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devolution of the colony into a country that represents a destabilizing force in the region, despite
the preservation of American economic interests. British suppression of Guianese selfdetermination destabilized a fragile domestic situation in the colony. Rather than facing the
challenges of developing a nation through difficult discussions and compromise, Guianese
leaders used external support and anti-democratic practices to advance their objectives—
precluding domestic state-building. Most importantly, institutional decolonization in Guyana
culminated in the failed promise of a multi-racial coalition of Guyanese citizens cooperating to
develop the country based on the will of the people. Debates about how to structure post-colonial
Guyana devolved into a violent, internationalized conflict that created racial discord which
continues to permeate Guyanese politics. In this Cold War episode, there were no winners.
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